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How do states perceive threats? Why are material forces sometimes more 
prominent in shaping threat perception, whereas ideational ones are key in 
other instances? This study aims to move beyond the task of determining 
whether material or ideational factors offer a more plausible explanation by 
arguing that threat perception is a function of the interplay between material 
factors and state identity, the influence of which can run both ways. Based on 
‘analytical eclecticism’, I develop a two-layered conception of security as both 
physical and ontological, in which the interaction of ideational and material 
forces can be analysed. Ontological security is intimately connected with 
identity; its pursuit, therefore, requires distinctiveness and differentiation from 
the ‘Other’ as well as a coherent and consistent identity narrative at the 
domestic level. Physical security, on the other hand, involves the identification 
of threats that constitute a danger to the survival of the state. While ontological 
and physical security spheres have distinct dynamics and processes, they 
constitute two interrelated layers. Accordingly, I argue that states can suffer 
from ontological insecurity while their physical security remains intact, and vice 
versa. In some instances, physical security and its corresponding material forces 
condition identity narratives while in other instances the causal arrow points in 
the other direction. To illustrate these processes, I present a ‘structured, 
focused’ comparison of Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions during three major 
wars in the region: the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 2006 Lebanon War, and 
the 2009 Gaza War. While providing novel insights for explaining the dynamics 
of threat perception in the Middle East, this study contributes to the broader IR 
literature by proposing a conceptual framework that links the literature on 
Self/Other relations, ontological security, and realism in IR theory. This study 
thus demonstrates the potential utility of bringing IR theory and the Middle East 
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Note on Transliteration and Translation 
 
For Arab terminology, I have followed the system of translation adopted by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). The definite article al (the) 
that often precedes nouns and names is not capitalized, unless it is at the 
beginning of a sentence. Commonly used proper names and places have 
followed their standard English renderings, such as Al Saud, al-Assad, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, and Faisal. In addition, I have used accepted transliterations of 
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commonly Arabic words like shari’a, Jihad, Ba’ath, etc. In the bibliography, the 
titles of all Arabic primary and secondary sources have been transliterated and 















Chapter 1: Introduction 
Iran is backing Assad. Gulf states are against Assad! Assad 
is against Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood and 
Obama are against General Sissi. But Gulf states are pro-
Sissi! Which means they are against Muslim Brotherhood. 
Iran is pro-Hamas, but Hamas is backing Muslim 
Brotherhood! Obama is backing Muslim Brotherhood, yet 
Hamas is against the US! Gulf states are pro-US. But 
Turkey is with Gulf states against Assad; yet Turkey is 
pro-Muslim Brotherhood against General Sissi. And 
General Sissi is being backed by the Gulf states! Welcome 
to the Middle East and have a nice day. 
KN Al-Sabah, Financial Times, August 26, 2013 
 
1. Puzzles, Theoretical and Empirical 
Trying to explain the international relations of the Middle East with the 
intricacies of its alliance politics is a challenging task. Rivals share mutual 
enemies, and allies back opposite sides of the same conflict. The map of alliances 
in the region is in constant mutation and change. Alliances in the Middle East 
are usually born out of fear of ideational instability, military aggressions, and 
the overriding necessity of regime survival. Geographic proximity between 
states, the intensity of security interactions, states’ military weakness, existing 
overlapping and competing identities at both regional and domestic levels have 
made threat perception a key component of this regional system.  
In the discipline of IR, threat perception has conventionally been a 
constituent element in the study of alliances,1 which are considered to be 
central to the conduct of international politics. Glenn Snyder (1997, 2) attests 
that ‘any interaction between states, friendly or hostile, no matter how minor, 
may create expectations and feelings of alignment or opposition or both’. 
                                                             
1 Following Stephen Walt, I define an alliance—which I use interchangeably with ‘alignment’—
as ‘a formal or informal form of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states’ 
(Walt, 1987, 12). Although I might expand the cooperation to include non-state actors, an 




Alignment permeates all aspects of IR, in both its theoretical and empirical 
dimensions and its importance cannot therefore be dismissed. Traditional 
alignment theories based on balance-of-power theory suggest that states 
confronted by more powerful states are more likely to balance against those 
states than to bandwagon with them. Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory 
has refined the theoretical inquiry into alliance dynamics by arguing that states 
do not balance against superior power, but against perceived threats. Walt 
argues that power is one factor among others affecting threat perception. The 
international relations scholarship is nearly unanimous in the view that 
alliances are driven by security concerns, as states seek to enhance their 
capabilities in the face of some immediate or future threat.2 From the vantage 
point of systemic or domestic theorizing, alliances can be the product of either 
balancing or bandwagoning; either way, they are the product of a threat.3  
Scholars studying the dynamics of alliance formation focus on two main 
phases in states’ strategic calculus: (1) the perception or identification of a 
threat and (2) the decision about whether and with whom to ally in response to 
that threat. Although state behaviour driven by threat perception has been the 
subject of thorough scrutiny,4 the prior process of threat perception remains 
one of the most theoretically and empirically underdeveloped areas of inquiry. 
As there is widespread disagreement on the factors that contribute to one 
state’s fear of another, there are still gaps in the scholarly understanding of 
threat perception. This study, therefore, addresses the following questions: How 
                                                             
2 Scholars highlight that some alliances are driven by ambition rather than fear. In some cases, 
states may ally around international offensive goals, such as occupying another country 
(Schweller 1994). 
3 Although the literature is nearly unanimous in identifying threats as sources of alliances, 
scholars are divided on the origin of threat. Systemic scholars consider threats emanating from 
an imbalance in the structure of the international system (Schweller 2004; G. Snyder 1997; 
Keohane 1988; Walt 1987; Dingman 1979). Other scholars, especially those concerned with 
Third World countries, consider threats to be primarily internal (Miller and Toritsyn 2005; 
Gause 2003; Barnett and Levy 1991; VanDenBerg and Harknett 1997; Werner and Lemke 1997; 
Ryan 2009). 
4 Alliance formation literature focused on how states respond to security threats: balancing, 
bandwagoning, and underbalancing (Schweller 2004; Schweller 2006; Wivel 2008; Schweller 
1994; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). 
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do states perceive threats? Why, in some instances, do material forces seem 
more prominent in shaping threat perception, while, on the contrary, ideational 
ones are the apparent catalyst in other cases? How do ideational and material 
forces interplay in this process?  
For more than two decades, scholars have been divided between those 
favouring material explanations and others focusing on ideational factors. On 
the one hand, Walt’s (1987) neorealist-inspired balance of threat theory 
privileges material factors (aggregate power; geographic proximity; offensive 
capabilities). Although Walt adds ‘aggressive intentions’ as a source of threats, 
ideational factors are secondary in his theory. Focusing on one factor but not 
the other, neorealism offers viable explanations for some cases, but it cannot 
adequately account for others. On the other hand, Barnett (1996; 1998) offers 
an alternative constructivist explanation based on the politics of identity; this 
approach treats materialist considerations as secondary. As is true for 
neorealism, constructivism has invaluable insights for an elaborate 
understanding of the alliance behaviour in the Middle East, but alone is 
insufficient in explaining the varying outcomes. As Hinnebusch (2003b, 362) 
puts it, ‘the constructivist attempt to prioritize identity over interests is as 
misguided as the materialist attempt to reduce identity to an epiphenomenon’.  
Other scholars have sought a middle-ground position based on the 
regime security approach, combining systemic and domestic level variables, 
including external as well as internal threats (Gause 2003; Salloukh 2004; Ryan 
2009). Whereas Gause (2003) focuses on ideational political threats to regime 
security to explain foreign policy behaviour, Ryan (2009) emphasizes economic 
and normative factors in Jordan’s alliance decisions. Barnett (1996), from a 
constructivist perspective, also emphasizes the salience of regime security at 
the heart of the symbolic struggle among Arab regimes. These crucial insights 
on regime security in the Middle East suggest that the domestic public sphere is 
the battleground for acquiring regime legitimacy and, hence, the origins of the 
regime’s vulnerability to external threats. Although these insights have led to 
the conceptualization of the role that ideational and domestic factors play in 
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understanding threat perception and its link to foreign policy, this literature 
does not identify how ideational and material factor coexist and interact in the 
process of threat perception.  
The modern Middle East raises a number of intriguing questions and 
puzzles with direct relevance for explaining the interplay between ideational 
and material forces in the process of threat perception. One of the most 
intriguing puzzles in the region involves Saudi Arabia and Syria. Since 1979, the 
two countries—despite shared elements in their identities and similar regional 
interests— have diverged in almost every alliance choice, based on disparate 
threat perceptions. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), whereas 
the Syrian regime perceived a rising Iraq as a viable military threat; at the same 
time, Saudi Arabia considered the message emanating from the Islamic 
revolution to be the ultimate threat to the Kingdom’s survival. This case is not 
only a research puzzle in Middle East history, but it also yields theoretical 
questions for the study of threat perception in IR.  
Indeed, scholars researching identity politics have asserted that 
differences in identities were the source of conflict whereas similar identities 
lead to cooperation (Huntington 1993; Horowitz 1995; Wendt 1999; Hopf 2002; 
Haas 2012; 2003; Rousseau and Rocio 2007). This ideational explanation would 
point to the opposing identities of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic (Sunni 
and Shiite) as the source of Saudi threat perception. Following this logic, pan-
Arab identity would stimulate an alliance between Damascus and Baghdad. 
Nevertheless, scholars privileging constructivism to explain Middle East politics, 
have arrived at an important conclusion: shared identities can be tied to conflict 
or cooperation (Barnett 1998; Lynch 1999; Kaye 2013). The rivalry between 
the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athist regimes fits into this pattern (Kienle 1990). The 
puzzle of how shared identities lead to conflict is often reduced to ‘regime 
security’ as the main source of symbolic rivalry between Arab regimes. But the 
label of ‘regime security’ remains hardly problematized. ‘Regime security’ as an 
abstract concept, focuses on ideational transnational forms of threats, cannot 
adequately account for the Syrian case. Based on this approach, Syria, a secular 
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pan-Arab regime oppressing Islamist movements, should be equally threatened 
by the message of the Islamic Revolution. Similarly, if realist explanations can 
offer a viable explanation for the Syrian alliance based on the balance of power 
logic, they fall short in answering why Saudi Arabia supported a militarily 
ambitious Iraq against a militarily weakened Iran. In short, both neorealism and 
constructivism account for one case but not the other.  
This study claims that ideational or material explanations cannot account 
by themselves for the complexity of threat perception in the Middle East and 
opts, instead, for an eclectic approach pleading for a multitheoretical synthesis. 
There is evidence that identity shapes regimes’ threat perception in systematic 
ways, just as there are reasons to believe that material forces—such as the 
relative power distribution—are also fundamental. My aim, therefore, is not to 
show that ideational factors override other material factors or vice versa in 
explaining foreign policy choices. Rather, I argue that causal arrows run both 
ways. At the same time, I attempt to make sense of how ideational factors 
interact with material factors in the process of threat perception.  
This study presents a theoretical framework that combines a two-
layered framework of regime security that views it as both physical and 
ontological and allows for the interaction between ideational and material 
forces. Ontological security requires a distinct and stable identity narrative of 
the ‘Self’ as opposed to the ‘Other’. States therefore perceive ideational threats 
as those endangering the distinctiveness, consistence, and coherence of their 
identity narrative, in other words, their ontological security. Physical security, 
on the other hand, designates the identification of threats that constitute a 
danger to the survival of the state. While ontological and physical security 
spheres have different dynamics, they constitute two interrelated layers, which 
co-exist and interact. Based on this dual conception of security, I argue that, in 
some instance, states suffer from ontological insecurity while their physical 
security remains intact, and that the opposite can occur in other instances. 
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This study differs from the previous literature in its characterization of 
threat. Whereas previous work has dealt with threat perception as a discreet 
event that precedes alliance decisions, this study shows that it is a process of 
interaction among states, between states and societies, and between states’ 
material capabilities and identity narratives. The heavy focus of international 
relations scholars on alliance formation as the major defence mechanism 
following threat perception overlooks this process, especially if an alliance is 
already in place.5 It also obscures other types of foreign policy behaviour such 
as ideational balancing, counter-framing the ‘Other’, or reframing narratives of 
the Self.6 Therefore, this study looks at threat perception as a dependent 
variable and as a process that leads to various foreign policy behaviour, such as 
identity reframing, resource mobilization, and alliance formation or 
consolidation.  
This research presents a rigorous account of threat perception in the 
region based on theory building combined with a systematic comparative of 
Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during three major wars in the Middle East: 
the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 2006 Lebanon War, and the 2009 Gaza War. 
Although the framework was deductively developed through an examination of 
existing theorizing about threat perception, the empirical narrative of the cases 
contributed to the refinement of the theoretical framework—which can be 
tested and further developed in subsequent empirical research. In other words, 
the theoretical argument was the result of inductive and deductive reasoning. 
From this perspective, this study belongs to the recent trend seeking a bridge 
between IR theory and the Middle East as an area studies subfield.7 Bringing 
theoretical debates to an analysis of the region allows a fresh interpretation of 
the received historical consensus that exists around these cases. In addition, this 
                                                             
5 This is relevant to the cases of Syrian threat perception of Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War 
and the 2009 Gaza War. At the outbreak of the war, the Syrian regime already had an alliance 
with Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran. Also, Saudi perception of Hezbollah and Hamas did not result 
in a shift of alliances or coalition. Instead, the Kingdom used other foreign policy tools such as 
counter-framing the Other. 
6 Rubin (2014) shows this process clearly in his study of Saudi and Egyptian threat perceptions. 
7 Cf. Valbjørn (2003) and Teti (2007). 
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study’s comparative analysis of Syria and Saudi Arabia carries lessons for 
prominent debates in IR theory.   
 Beyond providing a valuable opportunity for theory development, the 
examination of Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions raises provocative puzzles 
with direct relevance to understanding current and future events in the Middle 
East. Why did Saudi Arabia—a pan-Islamist regime—fear the rise of other 
Islamic movements in the region, such as Hamas and Hezbollah? Can ideational 
powers threaten a state? Why and how? Why has Syria, a secular Ba’athist 
regime suppressing Islamists at the domestic level, supported similar 
movements at the regional level? Recent changes in the political landscape of 
the region as a result of the Arab uprisings make answers to these questions 
ever timelier and more relevant to the understanding of regional dynamics. The 
case of Saudi threat perception vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah can inform our 
understanding of its subsequent threat perception of the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to power in Egypt in 2012 or towards the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). Also, examining the dynamics of Syrian threat perception and 
foreign policy bears far-reaching implication for understanding the current 
regional alliances/coalitions as a result of the Syrian civil war. In addition, the 
cases of Syria and Saudi Arabia are of ‘intrinsic importance’.8 Both states have 
been incredibly important for regional stability and security in several spheres: 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf. Saudi and Syrian threat 
perceptions, and their consequent foreign policy behaviour, have had a 
tremendous impact on regional politics and will do so for years to come. 
 The study is organized around within-case and cross-case variations to 
explore interesting theoretical and empirical puzzles. The Saudi and Syrian 
cases were selected for an in-depth analysis9 based on variations in the 
dependent variable;10 both cases diverged in every threat perception and their 
consequent foreign policy choices. I examine both states through within-case 
                                                             
8 Cf. Van Evera (1997, 77). 
9 Cf. Seawright and Gerring (2008). 
10 Cf. Van Evera (1997, 77). 
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comparisons, which focus on the changes in threat perception and state policies 
through three different wars. The dynamics of threat perception are also subject 
to cross-case variations as Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions are compared 
during each war. Threat perception is assessed using a variety of methods. The 
empirical evidence at the heart of the study is drawn from primary sources—
such as speeches, elite statements, newspapers, and memoires—and extensive 
critical examination of secondary sources. 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. The first part aims to 
establish the theoretical case of the research question by presenting an 
overview of the existing scholarship on threat perception. This task is 
undertaken in two steps. I first present a critical cataloguing of contending 
explanations within IR theory. I then evaluate pertinent theoretical explanations 
deriving from these IR approaches with a particular focus on Middle Eastern 
international relations. After surveying the drawbacks and omissions in these 
theoretical explanations, the chapter turns to the central argument informing 
this study and the contributions it promises to make. The chapter then closes 
with an outline of the study. 
2. Contending Explanations of Threat Perception: The State of the Art 
IR approaches varying from realism to constructivism have attempted to 
untangle the driving sources of threat perception. By focusing on either material 
or ideational forces exclusively, the existing literature falls short in providing a 
satisfactory answer to the central question of this study. In the first section, I 
map how major IR theories answer two questions: What is threat? What are the 
sources of threat perception? In the second, I shed light on the heuristic value of 
these theoretical approaches when applied to the Middle East. This literature 
review focuses on how well each theoretical perspective fares when faced with 
the empirical puzzle of this research. 
2.1. Threat Perception in IR Theories 
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‘Threat’ is a relational concept linking two actors where the first represents a 
danger and might cause harm to the ‘Other’. Threat is defined as ‘a situation in 
which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a 
negative consequence to another agent or group’ (J. Davis 2000, 10). Although 
threat perception has been a cornerstone of IR theories, the question of how 
states identify threats and a fortiori what threat is has been scarce. Six scholarly 
trends can be discerned within the existing literature. The first focuses on 
balance of power theories, according to which threat is equated to power, which 
is defined in objective material terms. The second trend derives from Walt’s 
(1987) ‘balance-of-threat’ theory where perceptual variables are combined 
with objective material ones. The third represents the constructivist worldview, 
according to which threats are constructed in the light of ideational factors. The 
fourth trends belong to the Copenhagen school in IR, namely securitization 
theory, that focuses on the process of security and threat construction. The fifth, 
deriving from the neoclassical realist approach, explicates a cognitive 
materialist explanation that combines perceptual and material forces. The sixth, 
based on foreign policy approaches, examines psychologically oriented and 
agent-based explanations of threat perception. 
2.1.1. Balance of Power Theory: Materialist Explanations 
Classical realists and neorealists assume that threat is the function of power 
asymmetries. In a world of anarchy, where nothing prevents states from using 
force, the weaker side fears exploitation and the stronger fears a shift in the 
balance of power and the ascendance of a challenger. In the History of the 
Peloponnesian War, Thucydides contends that the real reason for war was the 
power asymmetry between Athens and Sparta. As he puts it, ‘What made war 
inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in 
Sparta’ (1972, 49). 
Morgenthau (1948) argues that, due to human nature, states are power 
maximizers. Accordingly, a state’s survival is threatened if another state’s power 
is ascending, thereby altering the balance of power. However, if all states are 
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entangled in a perennial power struggle, cumulating power should be the norm 
rather than an extraordinary condition for threat. Morgenthau categorizes 
states into ‘imperialist’ and ‘status quo’ states, a reasoning initially coined by 
Carr (1939) in terms of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ states. If anarchy and 
aggressive human nature are constants and all states are maximizing power, 
why will some states be perceived as ‘imperialist’ while others are considered 
‘status quo’ (Rynning and Ringsmose 2008; Donnelly 2000)? This question 
remains unanswered. Even if this revisionist/status quo dichotomy can be 
objectively defined, what drives one state to pursue ‘revisionist’ goals and 
another to remain ‘status quo’? Do these revisionist and status quo states have 
different identities or different domestic characteristics? These questions are 
unexplored, and the ideational dimension in this account remains insufficiently 
theorized. In short, classical realism has hardly theorized ideational dimensions 
in threat perception.  
A quite similar conception of threat is found in Waltz’s (1979) structural 
realism. According to Waltz, the primary threat endangering states emanates 
from power imbalances. In other words, threat perception is equated with 
states’ material capabilities and their position in the relative power distribution. 
For Waltz, as all states are seeking security and survival, they are all in fact 
defensive or status quo. This ‘status quo bias’ reveals a paradox in Waltz’s 
argument. If all states are security seekers and do not have any offensive 
motives, where do threats originate? As Schweller (1996, 91) comments on this 
predicament, ‘If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own 
survival, why would they feel threatened? Why should they engage in balancing 
behaviour? In a hypothetical world that has never experienced crime, the 
concept of security is meaningless’. Kydd (1997, 116) terms this inherent 
contradiction the ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing problem’. In other words, if all states 
were defensive, there would be no source of threat. In short, Waltz’s defensive 
neorealist account has not provided a clear answer to what is threat and its 
sources remained very narrowly limited to power distribution considerations. 
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Whereas Waltz categorizes all states as status quo, Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realist theory further develops the balance of power theory based on 
the assumption that all states are revisionist. Therefore, all states are potential 
enemies and probable threats. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer acknowledges that 
threat perception is primarily driven by military capabilities. As he firmly states, 
‘When a state surveys its environment in order to determine which state poses 
a threat to its survival, it focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities of potential 
rivals, not their intentions’ (Mearsheimer 2001, 45). 
In contrast, Organski’s (1958) ‘Power Transition Theory’ highlights the 
role of ideational factors in identifying status quo and revisionist states. 
Organski argues that war is more likely to occur when a challenger to the 
dominant power enters into approximate parity with the hegemon and is 
dissatisfied with the existing system. However, if the challenger is satisfied with 
the current system, it is not perceived as a threat by the dominant power. 
Organski claims that satisfaction is a function of shared values, similar beliefs, 
and shared history. From this perspective, Organski implicitly acknowledges 
that the threat posed by the challenger is perceived in terms of intentions and 
ideational factors, not just capabilities. However, these non-material variables 
lack operationalization, and the interaction between ideational and material 
forces was not addressed. 
All of these theories assume the prior existence of threats as a primary 
condition for a balancing behaviour in the international system. Nonetheless, 
they rarely examine threat as a concept and as a variable driving state 
behaviour.11 To summarize, balance of power theories argue that threats are the 
function of power asymmetries measured in objective material terms. Even if 
ideational and perceptual variables are implicitly present in classical realism, 
they remain marginal and unexplored. Realists dismiss historical anomalies in 
which ideas seem to exist alongside materialist factors. Limiting their 
explanations to a single understanding of threat, realists regard state behaviour 
                                                             
11 For earlier realist conceptions of threat, cf. Baldwin (1971), Cohen (1978), and Dorna, Hill, 
and Mladenka (1979). 
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driven by ideational factors as irrelevant and irrational (Feaver et al. 2000, 
165–169; Kitchen 2010, 121–123). 
2.1.2. Balance of Threat Theory: A Subtle Perceptual-Materialist 
Explanation 
While classical realists and structural realists’ approaches based on the ‘balance 
of power’ theory identify power as the primary source of fear, Walt, the 
progenitor of the ‘balance of threat’ theory, introduces a perceptual dimension 
to objective material variables to resolve the question of why states do not 
necessarily balance the most preponderant military power. 
Walt’s The Origins of Alliances presents the ‘balance-of-threat’ theory as 
a revision to Waltz’s balance of power. Walt introduces a cognitive dimension in 
his materialist explanation. Balance of threat theory advances ‘threat’ and its 
perception—not ‘power’—as the primary driver behind alliance formation. 
Threat is defined as the function of four determinants: aggregate power, 
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions (Walt 
1987, 21–26). Therefore, ‘threat’ is a broader concept where ‘power’ is one 
determinant among others. This conception could explain why states do not 
balance the predominant power as they might not conceive it as the most 
threatening to their security. Walt’s introduction of the ‘perception of intent’ is 
the primary development introduced in the neorealist balance of power theory.  
Nevertheless, Walt’s definition of threat raises more questions than it 
answers. His analysis remains only a partial explanation of threat perception; he 
does not provide any clear guidance on how to theorize or to ‘operationalize’ 
aggressive intentions (Gause 2003, 280; Barnett 1996, 403–404). Saying that 
‘perceptions of intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance 
choices’ is too broad (Walt 1987, 25). This extremely wide and subjective 
category raises another question: what factors contribute to the perception of 
aggressive intentions? Otherwise stated, Walt does not develop a priori any 
theory of threat perception.  
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2.1.3. Threat as a Function of Identity: Ideational Explanations 
Constructivism12 has attempted to fill the gap in Walt’s ‘aggressive intentions’ by 
adding an ideational dimension to the study of threat perception. As Hopf 
(1998, 187) states, ‘what is missing here is a theory of threat perception, and 
this is precisely what a constructivist account of identity offers’. This argument 
is prominent in Barnett’s constructivist account of threat perception and 
alliances in the Middle East. He claims to offer a superior alternative to Walt’s 
neorealist explanation. Barnett (1996, 401) summarizes his endeavour as 
follows: ‘It is the politics of identity rather than the logic of anarchy that often 
provides a better understanding of which states are viewed as potential or 
immediate threat to the state security’.  
 Constructivists have presented theoretical models based on the 
relationship between identity and state behaviour. In contrast to the prevailing 
realism, constructivism posits that structures are constituted not only by 
material factors but also by normative elements. In other words, agents and 
structures are involved in a process of mutual creation and reproduction, which 
shapes the interests of the agents and their capabilities. From this perspective, 
identity constitutes interests and therefore defines actors’ behaviour (Onuf 
1989; Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999; Adler 1997). 
While realists assume that interests derive objectively from the relative 
power distribution, constructivists claim that interests are not objectively 
derived but are socially constructed. Accordingly, constructivism challenges 
neorealist propositions about static interests deriving from the anarchic nature 
of the international system. Relevant to this study, constructivism challenges 
the deterministic relationship between power and threat advanced by the 
realist paradigm and argues that ideas are crucial to threat perception. In other 
                                                             
12 The constructivist literature mentioned in this study is consistent with ‘thin’ constructivism in 
IR as opposed to ‘thick’ constructivism (Wendt 1999). ‘Thin’ constructivism argues that social 
reality exists and can be accessed through empirical research. On the contrary, ‘thick’ 




words, constructivists argue that threat is socially constructed with a view to 
identity. Per Barnett (1996, 408), ‘Identity is a better predictor than anarchy to 
determine friends and foes’. According to this ‘thin’ constructivist approach, 
threat is inextricably related to a state’s identity and its perception of the 
‘Other’. This does not mean that constructivism has discarded the material 
factors in shaping actors’ behaviour. Rather, constructivists argue that the ideas 
states have about the material forces are more important than the material 
forces themselves. In Wendt’s (1992) terms, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it’. 
Accordingly, if two states share the same identity and the same conception of 
the balance of power, threat perception should diminish regardless of the 
material balance of power (Huntington 1993; Horowitz 1995; Wendt 1999; 
Hopf 2002; Haas 2003; Rousseau and Rocio 2007).  
Even though constructivism has addressed actively the role of ideational 
forces in international relations, it hardly accounts for the interplay between 
ideational and material forces (e.g. Risse et al. 1999; Meyer and Strickmann 
2011).13 Constructivism does not only highlight the centrality of identity issues 
and ideational structures in shaping state behaviour; but it emphasizes them to 
the exclusion of material factors. By looking at material structure as the result of 
an actor’s perception and understanding, constructivism conflates actors’ 
physical and ideational needs. Constructivism therefore leaves many questions 
unanswered. For example, why do states need to affirm their identity through 
foreign policy? Constructivist scholars have focused on how identities are 
constructed in relationship to Others and how material structures are 
                                                             
13 Several existing approaches have sought to combine ideational and material factors by 
adopting theoretical and methodological pluralism. Notable attempts include the International 
Society approach or the English School (Buzan 2004; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009), Cox's 
Neogramiscianism based on the notion of historical structures (Cox 1996; Sørensen 2008), the 
Historical Sociology approach (Hobden and Hobson 2002; Hinnebusch 2010b), and a few works 
in FPA (Risse et al. 1999; Nau 2002). Other scholars have borrowed realist insights about the 
relevance of capabilities, their distribution among state actors, and the role of threat perception, 
and have incorporated these within a constructivist framework (Rousseau 2006; Meyer and 
Strickmann 2011). Similarly, neoclassical realists have combined ideational domestic context—
such as elites’ perceptions—with material systemic factors (Glenn 2009; Wohlforth 1993; 
Kitchen 2010).  
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subjectively understood according to these identitty narratives. Nevertheless, 
they overlook how identities are formed and how they change. How does an 
actor’s perception of the ‘Other’ change from enemy to friend, or vice versa? In 
other words, what triggers this identity framing and reframing? The conflation 
of the identity and material interests in constructivism has generated an 
insufficient appreciation of the myriad mechanisms of identity change.  
Whereas constructivists examine threat perception as a function of 
identity, other scholars have looked at ideologies. Haas (2012, 3–4) defines 
ideologies as ‘leaders’ preferences for ordering the political world, both 
domestically and internationally. Ideologies, in other words, are the specific, 
often idiosyncratic, political principles and goals that leaders both value most 
highly and use to legitimate their claim to rule’. Hass (2012) attempts to explain 
how ideologies are likely to shape leaders’ perception of threats. He argues that 
threat perception is a function of what he calls ‘ideological polarity’ and 
‘ideological distance’. In his view, ideological similarity can be source of 
alignment whereas ideological difference can be source of conflict. Moreover, he 
argues that the more the system is ideologically multipolar, the less there are 
incentives for alliances. Although this argument complements the existing 
literature on threat perception in many ways, it is also subject to criticism. First, 
whereas Haas argues that ideological similarity is the source of cooperation, 
empirical evidence from the Middle East often suggests the opposite. As Walt 
(1987, 170) observes, ‘certain ideologies are more a source of division than of 
unity, even though the ideology explicitly prescribes close cooperation among 
the adherents’. Similarity, Barnett (1998) finds that pan-Arabism has had a 
divisive impact on its adherents. Moreover, materialist explanations constituted 
a significant challenge to Haas’ argument, as it does not account for situations 
where threat perception is the product of relative power distributions. 
The Syrian decision to ally with Iran is a good illustration of this puzzle. 
As Gause (2003:298) notes, ‘The [Ba’athist] regime in Damascus and the Islamic 
revolutionaries in Teheran had very little in common. [Ayatollah Khomeini] 
excoriated secular and nationalist regimes that suppressed local Islamic 
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movements; the [Assad] regime was a prototype of such a regime’. In an attempt 
to solve this anomaly, Haas (2012:xv) argues that threat perception is a function 
of what he calls ‘ideological distance’—that is ‘the degree of ideological 
differences dividing states’ leaders’. His hypothesis claims that the more 
ideologically different, the more states become threatening. In his analysis of 
the Syrian-Iranian alliance, he highlights the differences between their 
respective ideologies. Nevertheless, he argues that ideological multipolarity can 
temper the effect of ideological differences. Accordingly, a common ideological 
enemy—Zionism—created incentives for cooperation. However, Hass does not 
answer an important question: why the ideological similarity between the two 
Ba’athist regimes did not result into cooperation against both Zionism and the 
Islamic revolution? To answer this question, a consideration of material forces 
alongside ideology is indispensable, what Haas considers to be secondary. 
Therefore, my study provides an answer to the above questions, by considering 
ideational and material factors in the process of threat perception. 
2.1.4. The Copenhagen School in IR: Securitization Theory and the 
Construction of Threats 
Over the last three decades, insights of social theory have inspired several 
approaches in International Relations and led to alternative perspectives on the 
role of non-material factors in understanding actors’ behaviour. In the course of 
the 1990s, realist strategies dominant in security studies were challenged by 
theoretical innovations, which ‘sociologized’ the concept of security and took 
critical stances against the objective realities of world politics. Emerging from 
different methodological and ontological perspectives, these approaches offered 
reflective and dynamic debates on how to understand threats. 
One of the most important and controversial contributions to this debate 
has been the idea of ‘securitization’, a term advanced and developed by the 
Copenhagen School in IR. The concept of ‘securitization’ points to the process by 
which issues are transformed into security issues, i.e. securitized. Based on a 
broad constructivist approach, securitization theory claims that security is a 
discursive construction rather than an objective reality. Barry Buzan and Ole 
Wæver (2003, 491) define securitization as a successful ‘speech act’ ‘through 
31 
 
which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political 
community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent 
object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the 
threat’. In other words, for an issue to be securitized, an actor, or the securitizer, 
presents and frames it as an existential threat, which requires a suspension of 
normal politics. In other words, the securitizing act is ‘not simply a realm of 
instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation’ (Williams, 2003: 522), but 
obligates and enables a certain subsequent behaviour to handle the securitized 
threat. For securitization to be attained, this ‘securitizing move’ needs to be 
accepted by the ‘audience’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; Waever 1995). In 
other words, the securitization process is an intersubjective process that 
requires an interaction between the securitizer and the audience. In short, 
securitization is a mechanism or a process by which issues are transformed into 
the field of the existential.  
Accordingly, securitization starts as conscious, explicit political act or a 
‘speech act’ that leaders adopt to bring an issue into being a security situation 
by representing it as such. As Waever (1995, 55) states,  
What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard 
‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign 
that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By 
saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a 
ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to 
use whatever means are necessary to block it. 
Moreover, as Waever (1995, 54) adds, ‘something is a security problem 
when the elites declare it to be so’. In other words, securitization is a political 
choice, decision to conceptualize an issue in a particular way. There might be 
various reasons and motivations behind placing an issue in security terms, such 
as political survival or overcoming an identity crisis. The Copenhagen school 
also limits the use of securitization to a particular usage. Securitization is no 
applicable to any particular situation about security. It is limited to the use and 
constant repetition of a specific ‘rhetoric of existential threat’. As Buzan et al. 
(1998, 26) argue, 
The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical 
structure […] That quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to 
lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and 
presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as security 
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an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. 
For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective 
threats that ‘really’ endanger some object to be defended or secured; 
rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared 
understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to 
as a threat. 
By framing an issue as an existential threat, political actors give it a sense 
of urgency and importance to create a sustained political support and 
deployment of resources (Sjöstedt 2008, 10). These intended measures might 
not be possible if these issues were regarded as matters of ‘normal politics’. A 
securitizer not only urges ‘extraordinary measures’ to be taken, but more or less 
disregard all institutionalised rules of conduct. However, the speech act or the 
framing of an issue as an existential threat is not a sufficient condition for the 
success of securitization.  
Considering the above, one may come to the conclusion that 
securitization is an explicit speech act to bring an issue into security by framing 
it as an existential threat. Securitization theory as a framework of analysis has 
been widely developed and applied to many issues, such as analyses of state 
foreign policy behaviour (Kaliber 2005), the construction of transnational 
crimes, the framing of HIV/AIDS as security threats (Sjöstedt 2008; Elbe 2006), 
the US-led ‘war on terror’ (Abrahamsen 2005), and minority rights (Roe 2004). 
Nevertheless, the theory is widely known as a Western construct, and its 
application has been confined to Europe and US contexts. In the past decade, 
securitization has been vaguely adapted to non-Western contexts (Bilgin 2011; 
Kaliber 2005; Greenwood and Wæver 2013).  
Whereas securitization has highlighted the social and subjective aspects 
in the phenomenon of ‘threat construction’, it totally undermines objective 
factors contributing to threat perception. Although securitization can provide 
how Saudi Arabia framed Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas as a threat, it does not 
provide an answer to the ‘why’ question. Securitization provides only few 
insights as to why some issues are constructed as security threats (Sjöstedt 
2008). Moreover, securitization does not account for military and material 
threats, which can objectively exist beyond actor’s perceptions and framing. In 
short, securitization theory can explain how Syria and Saudi Arabia framed their 
respective enemies as threats through discourses and speech acts. Nevertheless, 
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securitization does not explain why Saudi Arabia and Syria made particular 
choices of friends and enemy. 
2.1.5. Neoclassical Realism: A Perceptual-Materialist Explanation 
While realism relies on materialist explanations, and constructivism favours 
ideational ones, foreign policy scholars have demonstrated the utility of another 
approach in explaining state behaviour. They argue that it is policymakers’ 
cognition of the balance of power that determines state behaviour (Christensen 
and Snyder 1990; Wohlforth 1993). The new wave of neoclassical realism has 
integrated this cognitive dimension into an overarching realist framework in 
order to explain threat assessment. Like balance of power and balance of threat 
theories, neoclassical realism places material power at the heart of the analysis. 
However, in contrast to conventional balance of power and balance of threat 
theories, neoclassical realism offers an alternative way of conceptualizing threat 
perception. Like structural realists, this approach posits that states identify 
threats based on shifts in material power. However, states do not balance 
against changes in the relative power distribution. Instead, leaders make foreign 
policy decisions and, therefore, a perceptual dimension that includes their 
personal traits, beliefs, and motivation is in play (Rose 1998; Schweller 2003; 
Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009). Nevertheless, this psychological 
cognitive dimension in neoclassical realism has been underdeveloped (Wivel 
2005; Goldgeir 1997).  
The distinctive contribution of the neoclassical realist approach is the 
integration of domestic factors alongside the structural level in explaining state 
behaviour. Based on these assumptions, Lobell (2009) presents a neoclassical 
model of threat identification titled the ‘Complex Threat Identification Model’. 
While classical and structural realism deal with the state as a coherent actor, 
neoclassical realists advance a different conception of the state as a complex 
relationship between state and society. If a state is faced with an external threat, 
societal leaders will identify it as such if it endangers their specific interest 
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(understood as socioeconomic interest, regime stability, and/or their position 
within the social structure) (Lobell 2009, 46–59). 
According to neoclassical realism, threat perception is an interactive 
process between objective material variables and leaders’ perception. Whereas 
neoclassical realism places perceptual variables alongside material power 
variables and rejects the mutual exclusion undertaken by neorealism and 
constructivism, it leaves many questions unanswered. The link between 
objective material power capabilities and subjective variables is still unclear 
and underdeveloped.14 Even though the neoclassical realist approach takes a 
step forward in combining ideational and material factors, it remains loyal to an 
overarching realist approach, wherein material factors are considered 
predominant. Furthermore, various attempts at integrating ideational factors in 
the neoclassical realist approach have limited the role of ideas to intervening 
domestic variables (Kitchen 2010; Rathbun 2008). In short, neoclassical realism 
has kept the materialist ontology of structural realism. Neoclassical realism has 
been dealing with threats as synonymous with material structural shifts, in 
which ideational factors are intervening variables at play at the domestic level. 
In other words, the possibility of an ideational threat endangering the state has 
not been explicitly considered by this approach.  
2.1.6. Threat Perception in Foreign Policy Approaches (FPA) 
Whereas the international relations theories reviewed above focus on structural 
factors as sources of threats, foreign policy approaches offer psychologically-
oriented and agent-based explanations of threat perception. They shed light on 
the role of individual leaders in affecting the path of international dynamics. 
‘Who Leads Matters’ as Hermann et al. (2001) acknowledges. Therefore, the 
decision-making process and the subjective understanding and perception of 
leaders are at the heart of threat assessment (J. G. Stein 2013; Kaarbo 2015; 
                                                             
14 Some scholars have borrowed from cognitive psychology to fill this gap in the balance of 




Levy 2013; Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001). The inclusion of political psychology 
into foreign policy has brought fundamentally new theoretical perspectives to 
the study of threat perception.  
Scholars have paid close attention to the variations between what 
leaders perceive as threatening and what the evidence of military capabilities 
suggests, i.e., perception and misperception (J. G. Stein 1988; Jervis 1976). 
Psychological approaches are built on the assumption that accurate perception 
and calculation of threats is impossible, and that this perception might be 
distorted due to lack of information, inaccuracy of data, and bad judgement 
(Voss 1998; Holsti 1967; Larson 1989; Khong 1992). Moreover, FPA scholars 
drawing on insights from psychology grapple with the impact of the beliefs, 
personalities, emotions, perceptions, and decision-making processes of 
individual leaders on their threat perception (Dyson 2006; M. Hermann 1988; 
M. G. Hermann 1980; Kaarbo 1997). The attention to emotions, anger, 
humiliation, reputation, and image constitutes an important innovation (J. G. 
Stein 2013, 384). This vein of thought within FPA has inspired the development 
of a few IR theories, such as models of strategic interaction and bargaining 
theories to explaining the outbreak of wars, for which rationalists failed to 
account (such as the 2003 Iraq War). Realist theories cannot explain why U.S. 
leaders perceived Saddam Hussein as more threatening in 2003 than in 1998. 
Iraq’s capabilities did not grow and its leader remained the same. The 
integration of psychological insights into the analysis has shown how the 
difference in beliefs between the senior leaders in the Clinton and the Bush 
administration mattered in the way threat was perceived (e.g. Lake, 2010). 
Despite the fruitful integration of psychology into the study of threat 
perception and foreign policy behaviour, it bears some limitations which make 
its integration in this study challenging. Political psychology has been used to 
explain particular foreign policy interactions such as strategic interaction, but 
its integration in broader IR theories is still ad hoc and limited (Kaarbo 2015, 
74). In addition, how important is the agency in explaining these 
regional/international outcomes? Psychologically-oriented explanations in FPA 
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focus on particular situations where threat perceptions led to wars or crisis—
but what if threat perception does not necessarily lead to an escalation of 
violence? Moreover, threat perception is hardly an individual process; leaders 
do not perceive threats in isolation. Their perceptions are usually shared and 
accepted by the surrounding elite. How threats are perceived in a collective 
group has been rarely developed in psychology (J. G. Stein 2013, 388–89). 
A critical evaluation of the above theoretical accounts in the context of 
the Middle Eastern international relations is essential to establishing the 
theoretical case for this study’s research question. The following section 
examines the existing literature on Middle East alliances deriving from the 
major trends in IR theory. I argue that threat perception is not only a matter of 
power or perception of power, but also of identity and ideational factors. 
Nevertheless, the existing literature lacks a theoretical position that combines 
both in a balanced inquiry. 
 
2.2. Threat Perception in Middle Eastern International Relations 
This section contends that ideational factors are present in realist accounts just 
as material factors are present in constructivist accounts. Nonetheless, the 
enigma of the interplay between both factors in shaping threat perception has 
never been satisfactorily resolved. In the first and second parts of this section, I 
evaluate materialist and ideational explanations when applied to the context 
Middle East. I then ask whether the introduction of domestic variables would 
solve the puzzle of how threat is perceived. 
2.2.1. Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory and Middle East Alliances 
With the prevalence of the realist paradigm in IR theory, generations of scholars 
have been content to view the Middle East through the lens of anarchy and 
power politics while considering identities to be mere instruments of policy 
legitimation. Walt’s The Origins of Alliances, the most comprehensive and 
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theoretically informed study on alliances in the Middle East, recognizes that 
anarchy and the distribution of power alone cannot predict which state will be 
identified as a threat. Threats are determined by aggregate power, offensive 
capabilities, geographic proximity and aggressive intentions. By considering 
aggregate power and perception of intent, Walt offers a compromise between 
ideational and material factors shaping threat identification and alliance 
formation. In other words, Walt’s ontology of the threat rests on objective 
materialist elements—as aggregate power— and on a subjective ideational 
element or the perception of intent. Nonetheless, the fundamental ontological 
assumption is unclear about whether subjective factors are more important 
than objective ones. Despite combining objective and subjective variables 
ontologically, Walt fails to make the same compromise on the theoretical level. 
As Goldgeier points out, Walt ‘argues for the importance of perceptions, beliefs, 
motivation, and bias while leaving the origins of these factors to case-by-case 
empirical study rather than systematic theoretical investigation’ (Goldgeier 
1997, 141). 
Walt’s analysis of alliances in the Middle East exposed the predicaments 
in his theory. While he was very reluctant to specify which factor would be more 
important, a better understanding of his argument can be obtained from his 
neorealist bias. As he presumed that ideological alliances would disappear 
whenever a military threat arises, he implicitly considered that states give the 
priority to military threats over ideological ones. Moreover, by arguing that 
‘ideology is less powerful than balancing as a motive for alignment’, he suggests 
that ideology can only explain the infrequent behaviour that is exceptional to 
the rule (Walt 1987, 5). In his desire to show that neorealism is proven to be 
correct even in the Middle East, Walt limits the impact of identity on alliance 
politics into his under-theorized potpourri category of ‘aggressive intentions’. 
Accordingly, he proposes that ‘intentions’ might be identified through domestic 
characteristics and ideology. ‘Ideology’ in Walt’s account is an instrument in the 
hands of Arab leaders to legitimize decisions already made on the basis of 
38 
 
material factors, or in other words, it is a discourse accompanied by propaganda 
and subversive efforts hiding behind strategic interests. 
Nevertheless, in the Middle East, where ideational factors—identities, 
ideologies and discourses—are most evident, Walt suggests that balancing acts 
in the Middle East are of two types: ‘balancing conducted by military means for 
particular military ends and balancing conducted by political means directed at 
an opponent’s image and legitimacy’ (Walt 1987, 149). In other words, Walt 
found cases where Arab states balanced threats based on ideational 
considerations. Yet, his adherence to the neorealist approach and systemic 
approaches led him to underplay the evidence brought by Middle East cases. He 
therefore cannot explain shifts in alliance patterns in the Middle East when 
power distribution remains the same. For instance, although Jordan allied with 
Israel in balancing against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and 
Syria in 1970, it complied with pan-Arab norms and joined the Arab alliance 
against Israel during the Kippur War (1973). By understating the role of 
ideational factors, Walt have not captured the normative aspect of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
Despite the evidence from the mentioned cases, Walt has not developed 
or revisited his theoretical framework, which makes his argument inconsistent 
when it came to the impact of ideational factors, namely of pan-Arabism. This 
inconsistency draws back to his ambiguous conception of threat. As Walt (1987, 
26) highlightes, ‘One cannot determine a priori, however, which source of threat 
will be most important in any given case, one can say only that all of them are 
likely to play a role’. As Wivel (2000, 9) underlines this predicament, ‘Walt 
presents us with a grab bag argument. If one element in his theory does not 
explain state action, another probably will, but the exact conditions under which 
they apply to as well as the relation between the variables remained 
underspecified’. 
Consequently, Walt’s balance of threat theory has the potential to explain 
some cases, but the exceptions are many. It is clear that his theory best explains 
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why, for example, Syria’s alliances reflected a high preoccupation with 
geopolitical considerations, even when these choices were unpopular, such the 
rapprochement with Iraq in late 1978 to counter the geopolitical imbalance 
created by the withdrawal of Egypt following the Camp David Accords in 1977, 
or as in the case of the alliance with Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq War that was 
formed with the view of weakening Syria’s aggressive neighbour, namely Iraq. 
However, Jordan’s alignment with Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War ran 
counter to the neorealist balance of threat, according to which Jordan should 
join the American-led coalition, but it did not. Similarly, Saudi, Egyptian, and 
Jordanian positions condemning Hezbollah and Hamas during the 2006 
Lebanon War and Gaza War in 2009 are baffling.  
One empirical analysis that reflects these problems in Walt’s theory is 
Priess’ (1996) attempt to study the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an 
interpretative case study of the balance of threat theory. Priess concludes that 
the overall result of his research is consistent with the theory’s principal 
argument that states balance the primary source of threat. However, he assesses 
that the four dimensions of threat are highly correlated, and that it is impossible 
to detect the effect of each of these variables. By pushing realism towards 
considering ideational and perceptual ontological assumptions, Walt underlines 
the potential of combining ideational and material factors. This potential 
constitutes the primary motivation behind my study.  
2.2.2. Does Identity Politics or Ideology Provide an Answer? 
By introducing intangible variables such as identities, values, ideas and beliefs 
in shaping state behaviour, constructivism converged with the need to fill a 
significant gap, namely the question of how identity politics systematically 
shapes regional interactions. Constructivism enabled Middle East scholars to 
challenge neorealist propositions about static interests deriving from the 
anarchic nature of the international system. For example, Barnett finds in Walt’s 
‘aggressive intentions’ category the starting point of his argument. As Walt fails 
to specify how intentions are determined, Barnett (1996, 401) offers an 
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alternative understanding: ‘the variable of identity also signals which states are 
considered more or less desirable partners’. Consequently, he contends that 
‘identity is linked to the construction of the threat and represents a potential 
source of alliance formation’ (1996, 409). 
 Barnett claims that the change in the content of identity has an enormous 
impact on strategic behaviour and alliance politics. During the Baghdad Pact, 15 
the debate within the Arab system was over the definition of a ‘collective 
identity’; hence, the rivalry was over the norms that should govern inter-Arab 
relations. As Barnett (1996, 409) summarizes, ‘threats, therefore, derive from a 
rival’s attempt to portray itself as acting in a manner that violates the group’s 
norms and to portray others as acting in a manner that is consistent with those 
norms and thus potentially threatening the group’. Barnett argues that the 
dominant norm in any given period determines state behaviour and its alliance 
choice. During the Baghdad Pact, pan-Arabism was the predominant norm in 
the region and, therefore, shaped states’ alliance behaviour. With the decline of 
pan-Arabism, threat construction in the Middle East underwent a detour. 
Barnett considers the Gulf War 1991 and alliances formation during this period 
to be a revelation of the decline of pan-Arabism and the emergence of state-
centric identities. As Arab states ceased to share the definition of threat, they 
diverged in their security policies (Barnett 1995).  
According to this constructivist view, symbolic, not strategic 
considerations, explain Arab alliance decisions. In other words, identities 
determine states’ threat perception. Just as Walt’s materialist inclination is the 
subject of considerable criticism, the empirical contradictions to Barnett’s 
argument are evident. Ideational and symbolic motivation for alliance formation 
explains several coalitions, such as Nasser’s participation in 1967 war, the 
formation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria in 1958, and the 
Arab coalition during the 1973 Kippur War between Israel and Arab states 
                                                             
15 Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan created the Baghdad Pact in 1955 to prevent the 
Soviet infiltration in the Middle East. British ambitions were faced with a strong opposition from 
Nasser in Egypt, who led a popular opposition across the Arab world. 
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(Egypt, Syria and Jordan). However, it is clear that nothing was symbolic or 
ideational in al-Assad’s rapprochement with Iraq in late 1978. This short-lived 
coalition was based on al-Assad’s attempt to counter the imbalance of power 
created by the Camp David Accords. Moreover, Syria deliberately withdrew 
from the Arab-United Republic when the norms of Arabism were at their peak 
(Salloukh 2000, 41). Similarly, some Arab regimes took foreign policy decisions 
that were based on material constraints and ran counter to the predominant 
normative order in the region. Examples include the Jordanian-Palestinian 
conflict in 1970, Syria’s intervention in Lebanon against the PLO in 1976, and its 
alliance with Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Similarly, when 
al-Sadat made the peace agreement with Israel in 1979, the norms of Arabism 
were still active (Owen 2004, 63–65).  
Barnett’s constructivist account failed to specify when strategic 
considerations will outweigh symbolic and normative ones, or when the 
opposite will hold. As Gause (1999, 21) notes, ‘it is not clear from Barnett’s 
account when states will be constrained by the norms of Arabism, and when 
they will ignore them’. Barnett himself underlines that systemic outcomes are 
the result of both material and ideational factors. As he states, ‘sometimes 
identity politics will figure centrally: at other times a strategic logic might 
provide an exhaustive explanation. There is no theoretical or empirical 
justification, however, for assuming the primacy of one over another’ (Barnett 
1996, 446). 
Although constructivist scholars have focused on identity, other scholars 
have focused on ideology. For instance, Nahas (1985) develops an argument 
about the challenge of revolutionary ideologies to state-system. Based on the 
concept of ‘ideological homogeneity’, he argues that ideological assimilation 
creates continuity and stability in the system, as states share the same 
foundational norms. When these interactions are disrupted by revolutions, 
instability and challenges evolve. He illustrates his argument through a 
comparative analysis of the Egyptian revolution (1952) and the Islamic 
revolution in Iran (1979) and their disrupting effects on the regional system in 
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the Middle East. Although this account presents a convincing argument, it 
remains structural as it examines the role of revolutions on the state-system. 
Nevertheless, it cannot account why some states were threatened by these 
disruption whereas others were not. 
Rubin’s (2014) Islam in the Balance is another attempt to analyse how 
ideas and political ideology can threaten regime survival. He examines the 
threat perceptions and policies of two Arab, Muslim majority states—Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia—in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) and the 
Islamic state in Sudan (1989). Using these comparative case studies, Rubin 
presents an analysis of how ideas, namely political ideology, can threaten states. 
He argues that transnational ideologies can present a greater and more 
immediate threats than shifts in the military balance of power. Ideas and 
transnational ideology pose a threat to domestic stability and legitimacy in 
another state. As these ideas can find resonance in other states. As a response to 
these threats, states engage in ‘ideational balancing’. Ideational balancing 
constitute a non-military response involving resource mobilization and 
counterframing (Rubin, 2014, 37-39). Accordingly, threatened regimes mitigate 
the symbolic power of the threatening ideology by mobilizing its ideational 
power, such as media technologies, transnational networks, and symbols to 
alter the commonly held beliefs about the threatening ideology. Moreover, the 
regime is counterframing the source of threat to undermine the credibility of its 
ideological power. Based on this argument, Rubin presented a comparative 
analysis of Saudi and Egyptian efforts at containing the ideological threats 
emerging from the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) and the establishment of 
the Islamic state in Sudan (1989).  
This book makes important contributions to the study of threat 
perception in Middle East international relations. More precisely, it captures 
how Islamic states—in broader terms ‘ideology’—can be more threatening than 
military capabilities. Although Rubin’s account contributes to the debate on how 
and why ideational factors can be threatening, material factors were almost 
absent. In other words, Rubin’s examination of threat perception lacks the 
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dimension of how ideational and material forces interplay in the phenomenon 
of threat perception. If Saudi Arabia and Egypt perceived the ideological appeal 
of the Islamic revolution in Iran as threatening, Rubin does not examine why 
this was not the case for Syria. Syria has been governed by the Ba’ath regime, 
upholding a secular ideology while oppressing Islamist groups, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, at the domestic level. In other words, the case of Syria 
poses a challenge to Rubin’s argument that ideological threats pose a greater 
threat than shifts in the military balance of power. In this regard, my study aims 
to contribute to this gap. This study presents a more comprehensive account of 
how both ideational and material threats shape threat perception. Moreover, it 
unpacks the interplay between both factors in the process of threat perception. 
In some instances, state can perceive ideational threats as more eminent, 
whereas material threats can be perceived as greater in other instances. 
In short, neorealists invoke ideational and normative factors whenever 
material considerations were unable to explain the totality of empirical cases. 
Walt calls upon ‘ideology’ and ‘image’ to explain alliances in the Middle East 
when neorealism seems to be otherwise inadequate. For their part, 
constructivists proclaim the superiority of normative and ideational factors 
over material considerations of power. They adopt material explanations when 
ideational factors do not provide a viable one. As Halliday (2005, 32–33) notes, 
‘if realism ignores values and ideas, constructivism and its outriders run the risk 
of ignoring interests and material factors, let alone old-fashion deception and 
self-delusion’. 
2.2.3. The Unit-level Analysis: A Middle Ground? 
Third World scholars, especially Middle East experts, consider the domestic 
level to be central when explaining threat perception. They claim that state-
society relations and regimes’ security are at the forefront of any foreign policy 
decision (Ayoob 1984; Ayoob 1995; David 1991b; David 1991a; Korany, Noble, 
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and Brynen 1993; Dawisha 1983).16 Classic works of Middle East international 
relations provide a reading of inter-Arab politics as driven by domestic 
considerations. In other words, foreign policy has been portrayed as a crucial 
tool in the hands of leaders seeking to preserve their hold on power 
domestically (Kerr 1971; Seale 1986; Mufti 1996; York 1988; Bar-Simon-Tov 
1983).  
Most relevant, however, for the purpose of this research is Gause’s 
(2003) ‘Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf’, a 
study inspired by the neoclassical realist approach. Gause presents a middle 
ground by combining the elements of threats underlined by Walt (1987), the 
regime security approach of David (1991a), and the importance of transnational 
identities highlighted by Barnett (1996) to explain alliance decisions in the Gulf. 
Gause develops hypotheses about how leaders prioritize among multiple 
threats. He also conducts a test on alliance choices made by Syria, Jordan, and 
Saudi Arabia regarding security arrangements in the Persian Gulf from 1971 to 
1991. 
In his attempt to find a compromise, Gause renders ideational factors 
more concrete through the logic of regime survival. He argues that Arab states 
overwhelmingly perceived ideational threats—which emanated from abroad 
and targeted the domestic stability of Arab ruling regimes—as more salient 
than material threats. Gause succeeds in presenting ideational factors in a 
tangible way while bridging systemic and domestic levels. However, this 
attempt is not free of criticism. First, Gause builds his framework on the 
assumption that leaders’ concerns about their hold on power domestically are 
the primary driver behind alliance choices. Hence, he limits the whole decision 
making to leaders’ perception of their own security and assumed that Arab 
regimes are independent from their institutional bases as well as from the 
organization of state-society relations.  
                                                             
16 These attempts at integrating the domestic level emerged as part of a larger trend within IR 
theory (Kapstein 1995; J. Snyder 1991; Mesquita 2002; Barnett 1990). 
45 
 
Second, Gause assumes that ideational factors pervasively override 
material factors in shaping leaders’ threat perception. Paradoxically, the cases 
reveal some instances where the same Arab leaders gave the priority to military 
threats over ideational ones. For instance, Gause points out that the Syrian-Iraqi 
rapprochement, beginning in late 1978 until mid-1979, was driven by the Arab-
Israeli balance of power where Syria gave the Israeli military threat the priority 
over the ideational threat emanating from Iraq, especially after the Egyptian 
withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Gause’s theoretical framework cannot 
not specify precise conditions under which ideational factors would precede 
material ones in the process of threat perception.  
Third, like Barnett, Gause underlines that alliance choices are bound by 
the exigencies of regime survival. This regime security logic is inextricably 
linked to regimes’ legitimacy, as transnational ideologies target the public 
opinion to stimulate domestic unrests. Leaders, constrained by calculations of 
legitimacy, perceive these transnational threats as more salient than others. If 
public opinion is the primary driver behind leaders privileging ideational 
threats, how then to explain the fact that Arab regimes have consistently taken 
unpopular foreign policy decisions based on materialist considerations? 
Examples include al-Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in 1977, al-Assad’s decision to 
align with Iran against Iraq, al-Assad’s intervention against the Palestinians in 
Lebanon in 1976, Syria’s alliance with the US-led coalition against Iraq in the 
Gulf War (1990-1991), and the Saudi-Egyptian-Jordanian stance on Hezbollah’s 
actions during the 2006 Lebanon War, etc. 
Similarly to Gause, Telhami (1999) combines realist theories of alliances 
with arguments related to the notion of legitimacy to account for Arab regimes’ 
threat perception. He claims that threats are constituted by the transnational 
symbols of legitimacy in the Arab world. In the absence of any electoral 
legitimacy, transnational identities become a part of a process of legitimization 
and coercion. Telhami argues that the force of transnational ideas still matters, 
because the emergence of the so-called ‘New Arabism’ as an independent 
transnational movement is still relevant to the regional coalitions and threat 
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perception. Accordingly, Arab regimes perceive threats when their domestic 
legitimacy is undermined. While this approach explains successfully some 
coalitions in the region—especially the Egyptian-Saudi-Jordanian coalition—, 
the Syrian-Iranian partnership is incongruent with Telhami’s argument.17 
Other scholars inspired by historical sociology emphasize those 
historical path dependencies that led to state behaviour in Middle East 
international relations. They aim to combine material and ideational structures 
at domestic and regional levels. To scholars inspired by historical sociology, an 
understanding of regimes’ threat perception and subsequent behaviour in the 
Middle East requires an analysis of how state formation, the development of 
state-society relations, and domestic structures affects foreign policy. Halliday 
(2005), for instance, adopts a historical-sociological framework to examine the 
regional and international dynamics in the Middle East. He recognizes that 
power politics, relative power distributions, and inter-state competition are 
important factors in explaining state foreign policy. Nevertheless, they present 
only one dimension. Instead, an examination of state’s foreign policy should 
include an explanation of state’s structure, including the power structure 
between different institutions, state-society relations, and the weigh of public 
opinion. These domestic structures affect foreign policy behaviour (Halliday, 
2005, chap 2). Based on this approach, historical sociology scholars examine the 
development of state institutions, which influence policy-making at the regional 
level. 
Hinnebusch (2003a) examines how the interrelation between a state’s 
specific position in the regional structure and the level of state formation and 
consolidation determines foreign policy behaviour. Systemic forces are the 
balance of power, economic dependency, trans-state ideological tides. However, 
it is level of state consolidation that determines how states react to their 
                                                             
17 Other studies have integrated domestic variables—such as political economic variables 
(Barnett and Levy 1991; Brand 1994a, 1994b, 1999), state-society relations (Gause 1990), and 
regime security and internal instability (Bar-Simon-Tov 1983; York 1988; Mufti 1996)—to state 




systemic environment. Accordingly, he presents a comparative analysis of 
Syrian and Saudi foreign policies. This comparison highlights that the 
interaction between paths of state formation and systemic factors led to 
convergence in some instances and divergence in other instances in Saudi and 
Syrian foreign behaviour. 
Moreover, historical sociologists criticize the constructivist approach for 
distorting the role of ideational factors in Middle East international relations. 
Stein (2011), for instance, pledges for an approach based on historical sociology 
and political economy to examine the role of ideas in regional politics. In 
particular, he focuses on the influence of ideas and their articulation within 
rising middle classes, which affected regional politics. 
 To scholars inspired by historical sociology, threat perception and 
subsequent foreign policy is thus primarily a question of sufficient strong state 
structure at the domestic level prompting elites in power from domestic and 
regional sources of threats. In contrast to constructivists, historical sociologists 
analyze identities at domestic levels while recognizing the role of material 
structures at the regional level. Ideas are, therefore, seen as entrenched in 
domestic institutions difficult to change or reverse, as they become established 
in popular discourse and practices. Although historical sociology has provided 
one way of combining ideational and material forces in the study of Middle East 
international relations, it remains focused on structure with little attention to 
agency. From this perspective, threat perceptions and state vulnerability 
appears to be dependent on particular historical paths where ruling elites have 
a marginal role. Moreover, as in case of regime security approaches, identity is 
presumed to be a tool for self-preservation and a form of undercurrent available 
to ruling elites when states are under threats. 
In short, neorealism, constructivism, regime security approach, and 
Historical Sociology each allow us to tell a different story about threat 
perception in the region. These theoretical approaches can be employed as:  
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[…] different coloured lenses: if you put one of them in front of your eyes, 
you see things differently. Some aspects of the world will look the same 
in some lenses, for example shapes, but many other features, such as 
light and shade of colour, will look different, so different in fact that they 
seem to show alternative worlds (Smith 2007, 11).  
Each of the theoretical approaches discussed here leads us to ask a 
different set of questions and to privilege some logics over others, as each 
approach ‘uncovers’ a different aspect of the same reality. The existing 
literature suffers from a widespread limitation in theorizing the 
ideational/material nexus, as it treats either identity or material power as prior 
to or dependent on the other. Whereas neorealism considers identities as 
instruments of policy justification, constructivists find material factors to be 
constituted by identities. Sørensen (2008, 6) identifies this gap: ‘[A]t a time 
when we have two major theoretical traditions in IR that emphasize material 
and social forces respectively, we have very little attempt to examine the 
relationship between those forces as they play out in the real world of 
international relations’. In this study, I do not suggest that both should be 
synthesized into one perspective or that the significant differences between 
both ought to be downplayed. Incorporating insights from both approaches 
allows for the exploitation of their strengths and creates new avenues for 
investigating how material and ideational factors interact.  
This study supports Fearon and Wendt’s (2002, 52) claim that 
‘rationalism and constructivism are most fruitfully viewed pragmatically as 
analytical tools, rather than metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions of 
the world’. Instead of using these theories as lenses tested against reality to 
reveal which one is more accurate or presents the correct explanation,18 one can 
imagine what Jepperson et al.  (1996, 70) calls ‘stage-complementarity’, 
whereby one argument covers one phase of the process, while another 
argument explains another stage. The theoretical framework presented in the 
following chapter attempts to reveal how these stages hang together to shape 
                                                             
18 For example, Moravcsik (1998) presented paradigms as competing alternatives in explaining 
European integration. Also, Wivel (2008) used theories as lenses to explain the bandwagoning 
of European states with the United States after World War II.  
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the process of threat perception. The proposed framework therefore fits into 
what Moravcsik (2003) calls ‘midrange theories of concrete phenomenon’19 that 
are empirically grounded and are not constrained by prior assumptions about 
the meta-theoretical ontological or philosophical status of science. 
3. Overview of the Argument and its Contribution 
Neorealists and constructivists fundamentally agree that ideational and 
material forces matter in IR, but they remain biased towards one or the other. 
This study aims to address this gap through a theory-building endeavour 
combined with empirical analysis from Middle Eastern international relations. 
Rather than supplanting these narratives, I supplement them by drawing 
attention to the interaction between ideational and material factors in the 
process of threat perception. Building on earlier studies that have 
acknowledged the ontological and epistemological possibility of combining 
ideational and material forces in IR (Risse et al. 1999; Nau 2002; Sørensen 
2008; Barkin 2010), this study develops a theoretical framework based on 
‘analytical eclecticism’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2012; P. Katzenstein and Sil 2010; 
Sil 2000). This framework underlines how identity and material power 
interplay in the process of threat perception; I use the cases of Syria and Saudi 
Arabia during three major wars in the region as illustrations of its utility. I 
provide a full explication of the theoretical framework in the next chapter, as 
well as of methods and case selection. However, it is necessary at this point to 
underline the main argument of this study and the contributions it promises to 
make.  
This study develops a two-layered framework of security as both 
physical and ontological, where the interaction of ideational and material forces 
can be analysed together. Ontological security is intimately connected with 
identity; its pursuits, therefore, requires the state’s distinctiveness and 
differentiation from the Other as well as a coherent and consistent identity 
                                                             
19 ‘Midrange theories’ are developed to explain specific sets of empirical phenomena. In this 
sense, they do not aspire to develop grand theories or universal theories that can be adopted to 
investigate other phenomena (Merton 1968). 
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narrative at the domestic level. Physical security, on the other hand, designates 
the identification of threats that constitute a danger to the survival of the state. 
In other words, I distinguish between the ontological security necessary for the 
constitution a distinct Self (security-as-being) and physical security defined as 
actors’ freedom from harm or danger (security-as-survival). While the 
ontological and physical security spheres have distinct dynamics and processes, 
they constitute two interrelated layers. In other words, this dual conception of 
security shows how the dynamics of security-as-survival influence identity 
framing and how security-as-being affects the dynamics of physical security. 
Based on this dual conception of security, I argue that states can suffer 
from ontological insecurity while their physical security remains intact, and vice 
versa. When states are in a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security, 
they attempt to restore their distinctiveness and identity stability. The process 
of restoring their ontological security influences the practices of physical 
security. I argue that this was the case of Saudi Arabia during the three wars 
considered here. However, when states are in a situation of ontological 
security/physical insecurity, they attempt to fend off danger and harm. This 
dynamic of security-as-survival constrains and conditions processes of identity 
formation and framing. This was the case of Syria during the same regional 
contexts. This line of argument shows that the direction of causality is not fixed 
or predetermined as states can switch paths. In some instances, physical 
security and its corresponding material forces condition identity narratives 
while in other instances the causal points in the opposite direction. To illustrate 
these processes, I present a systematic comparison between Syrian and Saudi 
threat perceptions during three major wars in the region: the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988), the 2006 Lebanon War, and the 2009 Gaza War.  
By locating the process of threat perception within the two-layers 
conception of physical and ontological security, this study accounts for 
ideational and material forces while examining their interaction. This argument 
contributes to the broader IR literature by providing a conceptual framework 
that links the literature on Self/Other relations, ontological security, and 
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realism. The two-layered conception of security paves the way for interaction 
and engagement between these literatures. First, the theoretical framework 
provides a base to examine how ontological and physical security dynamics 
relate to one another in the process of threat perception. Second, having 
established ontological security as a distinct and separate motivation for state 
behaviour, the literature on ontological security may be further developed by 
investigating the ways in which its dynamics are influenced by physical security 
considerations. Third, further engagement between the ontological security and 
Self/Other relations’ literatures should shed light on the process of state 
identity framing and reframing. 
Beyond these theoretical insights, this study contributes to the long 
tradition of studying Arab states’ foreign policies. By far, single-country foreign 
policy analysis predominates in the tradition of studying Arab regimes’ 
behaviour while comparisons remain overlooked and underdeveloped in the 
field. Whereas the existing literature presents insightful analyses into the 
foreign policies of Syria and Saudi Arabia, they are presented as part of a single-
country analyses or in the framework of regional analysis (Hinnebusch and 
Ehteshami 2002; Telhami and Barnett 2002; Korany and Dessouki 2008). 
Moreover, these studies remain generic and do not aim to study particular 
periods or important events, such as wars. For example, the Syrian-Iranian 
alliance is often examined as an ‘odd’ case not comparable to any other alliance 
in the region (Goodarzi 2006; Agha and Khalidi 1995; Hirschfeld 1986). 
Likewise, Saudi foreign policy analysis is rarely compared to other foreign 
policies. In a book chapter examining the broad variations in Syrian and Saudi 
foreign policies, Hinnebusch (2003a, chap. 6) points to the insights that a direct 
comparison might bring to theory development. This unique attempt suggests 
that there is unexplored room for comparative work to be done. Through a 
‘structured, focused’ comparison of Saudi and Syrian alliance choices that 
uncovers the similarities and spotlights differences, this study provides novel 
insights for explaining the dynamics of threat perception in the Middle East.  
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In addition, these cases contribute to the development of the theoretical 
framework. Examining Syrian and Saudi alliance choices through a comparative 
perspective should lead to an in-depth understanding of regional political 
dynamics in the Middle East. The Syrian-Iranian axis, often labelled a ‘marriage 
of convenience’, has been studied as an exceptional case (Hirschfeld 1986; Agha 
and Khalidi 1995; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997; Byman 2006; Goodarzi 
2006). By studying this alliance as part of a pattern, and from a comparative 
perspective, I show that the received historical consensus, which exists around 
these cases, can be understood differently. Ultimately, an understanding of 
Syrian and Saudi cases is imperative to any student of Middle Eastern 
international relations. Because much of the literature on these subjects focuses 
on these two cases, demonstrating the failure of existing theories to account 
adequately for their outcomes provides a solid rationale for a thoroughgoing re-
examination. Finally, this study demonstrates the potential utility of bringing IR 
theory and the Middle East as an area study into closer dialogue. 
4. Thesis Outline 
In chapter two, I present the core theoretical argument deployed in this study. I 
develop a theoretical and conceptual framework based on analytical eclecticism 
to account for the interplay between ideational and material forces in the 
process of threat perception. I then present the research design and case studies 
selection. The plausibility of the theoretical framework is probed through a 
comparative case study of Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during three 
regional wars, in which I present a theoretically-informed narrative of how 
identity and power interplayed differently in each case. In chapter three, I 
examine Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988). In chapter four, I present the 2006 Lebanese War. In chapter five, I 
discuss the case of the 2009 Gaza War. In chapter six, I recapitulate the central 
themes examined in this study and their implications. I also identify some 






Chapter 2: Rethinking Ideational and Material Forces in Threat 
Perception: A Theoretical Framework 
 
Of course, we can always construct a theory or a 
generalization if we wish as long as we remember that it 
serves the limited and heuristic purpose of throwing light 
on a small number of features of the phenomenon at the 
expense of obscuring all others. 
James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy (1993, 
276). 
 
This chapter develops a causal logic that shows how ideational and material 
forces systematically shape regimes’ threat perception and their subsequent 
foreign policies. I also seek to propose a novel theoretical framework for 
examining the interplay between ideational and material forces in this process. 
The central claim is that ideational and material forces correspond to a dual 
conception of security: ontological and physical, which are in constant 
interaction. Responding to fundamental existential questions of being, 
ontological security is intimately connected with identity; its pursuit, therefore, 
requires a state to reinforce its distinctiveness and differentiation from the 
Other while pursuing a coherent and consistent identity narrative at the 
domestic level. Physical security denotes the identification of threats 
endangering the survival of the state. While the two security spheres have 
distinct dynamics and processes, they constitute two interrelated layers, the 
influence of which runs both ways. This theoretical framework serves a 
heuristic purpose for examining divergent Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions. 
Simultaneously, it establishes a means by which to add empirical substance to 
the theoretical debate on threat perception and alliances in IR. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explore the overarching eclectic 
approach of the proposed theoretical framework. My aim is not to put forward a 
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grand theoretical model for the study of threat perception. Instead, I present a 
framework that theorizes the ideational/material nexus in the process of threat 
perception. After presenting the main tenets of this approach, I define the major 
concepts of the study. I then turn to the definitions ideational and material 
forces, their influence on threat perception, and their corresponding layers of 
security: ontological and physical. Subsequently, I explore the interplay 
between these two spheres of security. The chapter also includes a methodology 
section that discusses research methods, data, and case selection criteria.  
1. Combining Ideational and Material Forces: Elements of Analytical 
Eclecticism 
The puzzle of threat perception cannot be solved with either material or 
ideational explanations nor can it be addressed from within either uniquely 
domestic or regional contexts. In order to advance to a position that gives 
weight to both normative and material structures, and also to systemic and 
domestic levels of analysis, the present theoretical framework advocates 
‘analytical eclecticism’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2012; Sil 2000). It also moves 
beyond a simple combination of conceptual elements to present a theoretical 
framework based on a multitheoretical synthesis.  
‘Analytic eclecticism’ is defined as ‘any approach that seeks to extricate, 
translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements—concepts, logics, 
mechanisms, and interpretations—of theories or narratives that have been 
developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of 
substantive problems that have both scholarly and practical significance’ (Sil 
and Katzenstein 2012, 10). Another definition would be ‘a process according to 
which theorists construct coherent analytical frameworks by evaluating, 
synthesizing, and reflecting on insights from disparate paradigms’ (Makinda 
2000, 206). That is possibly what Walt (1998, 30) envisioned when he wrote 
that ‘no single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world 
politics’. From this perspective, I argue that developing an eclectic framework 
allows the analysis to deal with complex empirical puzzles without imposing 
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any a priori theoretical contour. Jervis depicts this approach as ‘engaging with 
the “isms” without being confined by them’ (quoted in Katzenstein and Sil 2010, 
67). 
Combining ideational and material forces in this study belongs to what 
Jepperson et al. (1996, 70) calls ‘stage-complementarity’, whereby one 
explanatory factor covers one phase of the process, while another factor 
explains another stage. The framework developed below attempts to reveal how 
different factors hang together in the process of threat perception. 
Incorporating insights from both approaches allows for the exploitation of their 
respective strengths and creates new avenues for investigating how material 
and ideational factors interact. Accordingly, this study goes beyond flexible 
eclectic approach that only combines causal insights from separate paradigms; 
it presents a synthesis based on a multi-theoretical framework. Some scholars 
outline. Hellman (2003, 149) speaks of a ‘pragmatic fusion and synthesis’ in 
solving complex empirical puzzles. Similarly,  Moravcsik (2003) offers an 
exceptional view of ‘synthesis’ in IR theory. He presents a dissenting view of 
theories as instruments subjected to testing and synthesis. He argues that 
elements from different theoretical paradigms do not need to share the whole 
set of ontological assumptions; only some fundamental coherence while 
downplaying epistemic principles can lead to fruitful synthesis. For Moravcsik, 
‘theoretical synthesis’ is an additive process, with each element constituting an 
independent proposition that is subjected to a specific type of test. Following 
Moravcsik’s understanding, this study presents a multitheoretical framework 
combining ideational and material elements from ‘ontological security’ and 
‘realism’, sharing some ontological foundational assumptions. Both approaches 
recognize the presence of ideational and material elements in IR phenomenon. 
Although each approach is biased toward one element or the other, both 
fundamentally agree on the presence of both elements. 
This theoretical approach is not without pitfalls. Some scholars argue 
that developing a balanced inquiry combining ideational and material 
components is fundamentally prevented by theoretical obstacles, based on 
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Kuhn’s (1970, 148) thesis about the ‘incommensurability of paradigms’.20 I 
argue that existing theoretical debates in IR do not represent a compelling 
barrier to a balanced inquiry (cf. Barkin 2010). The ontological debate is about 
the nature of the social world; is there an objective reality in the world or is it a 
subjective creation? In IR theory, the objective position is frequently connected 
to neorealism and the ‘subjective’ view is connected to constructivism. These 
extreme positions or one-sidedness are not, however, reflected in neorealism or 
constructivism. Although realists and constructivists conduct their analysis 
based on privileging one side or the other, they fundamentally agree on the 
presence of both elements in IR.  
Another caveat to this eclectic approach can be found in Hollis and 
Smith’s (1990) claim that a synthesis between material and ideational forces is 
impossible, as there will always be ‘two stories to tell’. One story is based on the 
objective material dimension of the social phenomenon, and the other 
underpins a normative subjective dimension.21 One way to overcome this 
epistemological caveat is to adopt a positivist approach to ideational factors, 
according to which identity is treated as a causal factor that is analytically 
independent of material factors. Although state identity sometimes shapes 
material interests, it may be the case that states uphold particular identity 
narratives because it is in their interest to do so. In addition, states can maintain 
identities that contradict their interests, and it is for this reason that identities 
and interests should remain conceptually and analytically distinct. As 
Hinnebusch (2003b, 362) has expressed it,  
State interests and identity, are autonomous of each other, but stability 
depends on a correspondence between them […] They can be in conflict, 
but where this is so, in time either norms and identity will likely stimulate 
revolts against material power structures perceived to be illegitimate or 
they will be altered to conform to material interests and constraints. 
                                                             
20 The ‘incommensurability of paradigms’ implies that arguments from different paradigms 
cannot be combined or matched with one another. This is because they deploy different 
concepts and conceptual systems, ask different questions, and select different facts. 
21 Kratochwill and Ruggie (1986) share similar scepticism. 
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These eclectic and synthetic approaches have been evident in the study of 
Middle East international relations, especially in Hinnebusch’s (2003a; 2004; 
2005b) work, even though he does not explicitly refer to it as ‘analytical 
eclecticism’ or ‘theoretical synthesis’. The impact of this earlier work should not 
be dismissed, as it represents the first step in encouraging others to pursue 
eclectic explanations. Nevertheless, Hinnebusch (2003a) presents a malleable 
framework that lacked specific causal mechanisms. If one element in his 
argument does not explain state behaviour, another probably will. In other 
words, the exact conditions under which variables play as well as the relations 
between them remain underspecified. This study builds upon these previous 
efforts to deal with ideational and material forces as analytically and 
conceptually distinct while examining their various interactions. 
2. Conceptual Definitions 
Before proceeding to the main argument, I define three key terms: 
‘threat’, ‘perception’, and regime-state nexus. Threats can be defined as ‘in the 
passive sense an anticipation of impending danger rather than in its active 
sense of an undertaking by one actor to impose a sanction on another’ (Cohen 
1978, 95). If ‘A threatens B’, we focus on B’s conditions. Similarly, social 
psychologists have defined threat as ‘the outcome of A’s (intended future) 
activities as perceived (imagined) by B’ (Baldwin 1971, 72 emphasis in 
original). Perception is defined as ‘the process of apprehending by means of the 
sense and recognizing and interpreting what is processed’ (J. G. Stein 2013, 
366). Even in the case of concrete objective evidence of danger, if a threat is not 
perceived, there will be no defensive reaction or alliance. Similarly, a threat 
might be perceived even if the intention of causing harm is absent or if there is 
no objective evidence of its presence (Cohen 1978, 93).  
This study focuses on threats perceived by regimes in the Middle East. 
But what is a ‘regime’? Is it distinct from the state? Making an analytical 
distinction between states and regimes has important implications for the 
question of threat perception, i.e., whose threat perception am I studying? The 
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literature on democratic transition has made the distinction between state, 
regime, and government. A regime can be defined as ‘the formal and informal 
organization of the centre of political power, and its relations with the broader 
society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those 
who in power deal with who are not’ (Fishman 1990, 428). Another definition 
would be ‘that nexus of alliances within and without the formal bureaucratic 
and public sectors that the leaders form in order to gain power and keep it’ 
(Waterbury 1983, xiii). Accordingly, regimes present a form of political 
organization that is more stable than a government but less permanent that the 
state. The state, however, is the most permanent structure of political 
domination, including coercive capacities and abilities to control society.22 
Although the distinction has been useful in examining cases in southern Europe 
and Latin American, the cases of the Middle East present a challenge to this 
distinction.23 The history of state formation in the Middle East is inextricably 
intertwined with regime power and dominance (Anderson 1987; 1986; Ayubi 
1996; Owen 2004). As Longva puts it, a Saudi notion of belonging ‘to a land or 
an ‘imagined community’ is unthinkable because the country itself is 
appropriated to the ruling family whose name it bears (Longva 2000, 193). The 
same observation applies to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In other words, 
state apparatuses in the Middle East have been co-opted, penetrated, and 
captured by authoritarian regimes. As Anderson (1987, 7) describes states in 
the Middle East, ‘a stable government administration and a military which 
controls the use of force are the sine qua non of statehood’. Therefore, I 
provisionally use ‘state’ and ‘regime’ in the Middle East interchangeably to 
signify the threat perception of the elite in power, which becomes diffused and 
transmitted to state apparatuses. Also, writing about ‘regime identity’ or ‘state 
identity’, I signify these narratives promoted by the elite in power and 
transmitted to the bureaucratic body in the state. 
                                                             
22 My understanding of the state follows Theda Skocpol’s thesis (1979). 




3. What are Ideational and Material Forces, and How Do they Shape 
Threat Perception? 
A good starting point is to define ‘ideational’ and ‘material’ factors and their 
corresponding layers of security. Despite its prominence in mainstream IR 
literature, material forces as a source of threat remains imprecisely defined. 
Material forces are intimately related to physical security or security-as-
survival, which suggests concerns about the physical survival of the state. In 
other words, some threats are purely physical and put the survival of the state 
at stake. In this context, I understand ‘materialist’ factors as those related to ‘the 
capabilities or resources mainly military, with which states influence one 
another’ (Wivel 2005, 368). This definition of materialist factors might be 
extended to include economic power, which is inextricably related to military 
capabilities. In this study, I focus on ‘relative power distribution’ as the primary 
material factor influencing threat perception. This term refers to the real 
distribution of capabilities, to which states adjust or fail to adapt. Despite its 
significance in generating ‘fear’, relative power distribution is alone insufficient 
to measure material power. For this reason, I draw a connection between a 
state’s military power and its ability to use it based on the logic of the offence–
defence balance, which is defined as ‘a state’s ability to perform the military 
missions that are required to successfully attack, deter, or defend’ (Glaser and 
Kaufmann 1998, 48).24 According to this conception of security, changes in the 
relative power distribution trigger ‘fear’. Based on objectified sources of 
physical harm, states identify their friends and enemies. 
Ideational factors are, however, more problematic in their definition. 
They include diverse elements such as culture, norms, values, beliefs, identity, 
and ideology. As scholars deal with these elements in different ways, definitions 
can be overlapping or even contradictory. That is what Abdelal et al. (2006, 
                                                             
24 In some cases, states have considerable military power that cannot be used efficiently. For 
example, the Saudi Kingdom has grown as the most important importer of military hardware in 
the region. Nevertheless, the lack of manpower makes the relative power distribution an 
insufficient lens for assessing the Kingdom’s capabilities (Cronin 2014, 236–239). 
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695) identifies as a ‘definitional anarchy’. As Finnemore (1996, 16) highlights, 
‘one analyst’s norm might be another’s institution and a third scholar’s identity’. 
Among many ideational forces, my focus here is on ‘identity’, which deserves a 
thorough discussion. Although identity is central to social sciences and is at the 
heart of constructivism within IR, it is a difficult concept to define.  
In this framework, I focus on ‘identity’ as part of the realm of security-as-
being (Rumelili 2015, 56). This layer of security signifies another motivation for 
state behaviour, which is the pursuit of a stable definition of the Self that is 
distinct and different from the Other. Does the content of identity shape state 
interests and preferences and, hence, define the sources of threats? 
Alternatively, is it just a mere reflection of material factors? According to 
Jepperson et al. (1996, 59), identity refers to ‘the image of individuality and 
distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an actor’. However, why do 
states need to assert a distinctive self-identity? The answer, I argue, lies in the 
intricate ontological security need of states to have a distinctive and consistent 
sense of self and to have that sense affirmed by others. Some IR scholars have 
aimed to transfer the concept of ‘ontological security’—which was coined by the 
psychiatrist R.D. Laing and only recently introduced to IR theory—from the 
individual to the state level.25 For Laing, an ontologically secure individual is one 
with a firm ‘sense of integral selfhood and personal identity’. The concept was 
further developed in Giddens’ structuration theory (1984; 1991). He defines 
ontological security as ‘the confidence that most human beings have in the 
continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social 
and material environments of action’ (1991, 92). This sense of self is reflected in 
agents’ behaviour. As Mitzen argues, ‘ontological security is security not of the 
body but the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and 
motivates action and choice’ (2006, 344). Accordingly, agents choose a course of 
action that conforms to their self-identity.  
                                                             




This ontological security lens offers explanations for foreign policy 
behaviour driven by identity threats. For example, Steele (2005) provides an 
ontological security interpretation for British neutrality during the American 
Civil War. Supporting ‘slavery’ was inconsistent with British self-identity, and, 
therefore, a decision to intervene would have led to shame. In this situation, 
where British physical security was intact, identity security was the primary 
driver behind British foreign policy. Zarakol (2010) provides another 
illustration to this concept outside the West by examining states’ inability to 
apologize for past crimes: Turkish reluctance to apologize for the Armenian 
genocide and Japanese discomfort over WWII atrocities. Both states have 
significant incentives to apologize and endure high costs for not apologizing. In 
both cases, apologizing threatens the states’ identity continuity and consistency, 
or in other words, their ontological security. Turkey and Japan both suffer 
insecurities vis-à-vis the West and, hence, have historically shaped their identity 
around a quest to prove ‘modernity’ and ‘civilization’. As Turkey aimed to 
differentiate itself from the Ottoman Empire, Japan tried to distinguish itself 
from the period called the Meiji Restoration. In both cases, apologizing for past 
crimes challenges Turkey and Japan’s present image as part of the ‘civilized’ 
world. In ontological security terms, apologizing for past crimes poses a threat 
to the stability and continuity of their conception of the self. 
From this perspective, alongside realist accounts—according to which 
security and survival are achieved through the accumulation of military 
capabilities—actors also engage in ontological security–seeking behaviour that 
affirms their self-identity, which provides them with ‘a sense of continuity and 
order in events’ (Giddens 1991, 243). Hence, ontological security involves the 
ability to ‘experience oneself as a whole […] in order to realize a sense of agency’ 
(Mitzen 2006, 342). In other words, actors need to feel secure in who they are, 
as they see themselves and as they want to be seen by others. As Giddens 
claims, ‘to be ontologically secure is to possess [...] answers to fundamental 
existential questions which all human life in some way addresses’ (Giddens 
1991, 47). This claim suggests that ‘insecurity’ means that individuals are 
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confused about who they are and uncomfortable with their identity in social 
interactions with others (Steele 2005, 525).  
How do states acquire this sense of self? The sources of ontological 
security are the subject of contention among scholars. On the one hand, some 
scholars have looked at the sources of ontological security as endogenous. 
Steele (2008) argues that ontological security is couched in a state’s intrinsic 
narrative about the self. From this perspective, the sense of self enables the 
state to process its environment and build sustainable relationships with others. 
However, other scholars argue that a state’s sense of self is based on social 
interaction with others. As Mitzen (2006, 354) argues, state identity is 
‘constituted and sustained by social relationships rather than being intrinsic’. In 
this interpretation, the sense of self is only reinforced and distinguished 
through sustainable interactions with others.  
Drawing on this debate, Zarakol (2010, 19) has sought a middle ground 
by arguing that both are ‘partly right’. According to Kinvall (2004, 749), 
‘internalized self-notions can never be separated from self/other 
representations and are always responsive to new inter-personal relationships’. 
Building on this compromise, I argue that the exogenous and endogenous 
sources of ontological security are inextricably related. As identity refers to ‘the 
image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an 
actor’ (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 95), the sense of self acquires 
meaning not only through the actor’s distinctive personal characters embedded 
in actor’s reflexive understanding of the self but also through the uniqueness of 
this narrative from that of the Other. Here, self-identity is affirmed at the self-
versus-other nexus, according to which distinctiveness ‘can only be established 
by difference, by drawing a line between something and something else’ 
(Nabers 2009, 195). This constant effort to forge self-distinctiveness can be 
seen as part of a larger process, which is an actor’s ‘struggle for recognition’.26 
States not only frame their self-other distinction but also desire to have their 
                                                             
26 For more details on the role of recognition in IR, cf. Wendt (1999, 193–245), Ringmar (2002), 
Haacke (2005), Greenhill (2008), and Lindemann (2010). 
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particular narrative recognized by their interlocutors in the international 
system. As Wendt (2003, 559) argues, ‘it is through recognition by the Other 
that one is constituted as a Self in the first place’. Therefore, acquiring 
ontological security entails reproducing a particular self-versus-other 
distinctiveness and having this narrative recognized by others. 
According to this relational perspective, state identity acquires a 
meaning only in a relationship with others. This understanding presupposes 
that identity is conceived only at the systemic level while domestic and national 
factors are aggregated into a structure of social relationships. Nau (2002, 19) 
describes this predicament: ‘if a state’s foreign policy acquires a meaning only in 
the context of an external social relationship, is a state’s individual foreign 
policy relevant any longer? It is not unless the state possesses an autonomous 
domestic capacity to criticize and potentially alter the prevailing international 
social structure’. In other words, states’ identity has an internal dimension that 
evolves from the interaction among domestic groups and is influenced by 
historical, cultural, and societal factors. Therefore, and alongside this relational 
dimension, state identity is also the function of individual characteristics, which 
are not necessarily dependent on the state’s role at the international level. For 
example, the Islamic element in Saudi state identity evolved from domestic 
historical and sociological origins. Although this element has been framed and 
reframed through interaction with others, it initially evolved as an individual 
characteristic. 
It appears therefore that identity is also about how a state perceives 
itself, which represents the second dimension. According to Wendt (1999, 224), 
state identity is ‘rooted in the actor’s self-understanding’. Self-identity does not 
originate in interaction with others. Instead, actors extract their self-identity 
from their own characters. For example, states might base their actions on 
religion, as in Saudi Arabia or Iran, or on a secular ideology, as in the pan-Arab 
regimes in Syria or Egypt under Nasser. This self-perception mostly relies on 
domestic sources, and is corroborated by the common belief shared by domestic 
groups aggregating their views around a particular institution. Is identity 
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another name for domestic politics? I argue that it is not. The domestic sphere is 
a pool that provides policy-makers with a ‘menu of identities’. Accordingly, the 
relational and domestic dimensions of state identity and its ensuing ontological 
security are not separable; rather, they interact with and shape each other. In a 
word, ontological security emerges from the nexus of an actor’s reflexive 
understanding of the self and the interaction with others. With these two 
dimensions, the concept of ‘identity’ and its corresponding realm of ontological 
security function as a crucial link between external and domestic structures. For 
example, the emergence of Arab nationalism was a response to both domestic 
(aimed at uniting and mobilizing societies) and external factors (against 
colonialism) (Mufti 1996). 
Is this Self/Other distinction any different from the friend/enemy 
dichotomy of the physical security sphere? Are they two sides of the same coin? 
Ontological security distinguishes between positive and negative security. 
Accordingly, what makes the Self secure in the Other could be an either negative 
relationship of enmity or a positive relationship of friendship (Roe 2008, 779). 
In other words, the Other is not necessarily a threat or an enemy (Rumelili 
2015, 56–57). The example of the European Union is indicative. Whereas 
European member states maintain the us/them distinction vis-à-vis each other, 
they identify each other as friends (Waever 1998). 
When do states feel ontologically insecure? Because the sources of 
ontological security are both endogenous and exogenous, insecurity can emerge 
from the Self. In the first case, actors can become ontologically insecure if 
contradictions emerge within their identity narrative, or if they choose a course 
of action that is incongruent with their sense of integrity. This insecurity leads 
to instability and disruptions, as the actor’s self-definition comes under 
question. At the same time, the sources of insecurity can be exogenous. As the 
very basis of identity construction is differentiation and uniqueness from 
others, any disturbance in the self-versus-other distinction leads to agents’ 
uncertainty about their own identity. Therefore, if the discursive constructions 
of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ become increasingly similar, agents become 
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ontologically insecure; they perceive the very basis of their self-identity to be 
eliminated. From this perspective, and in contrast to the conventional wisdom 
that similar identities lead to convergence and cooperation, cultural and 
identity similarities can lead to divergence and conflict. Based on social identity 
theory, Brewer (1991) postulates that the need for distinctiveness is met 
through comparisons. Consequently, similarity constitutes a threat to one’s 
need for differentiation or distinctiveness. As Currie notes, ‘one’s individuality is 
more threatened by similarity rather than difference’ (2004, 86). Thus, 
similarity is a source of disturbance because the old and secure meaning of self 
and the associated sense of agency lose saliency.  
Social psychology literature has pinpointed the process of developing 
larger collective identities between groups as an effective technique of reducing 
conflicts. The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) advocates the elimination 
of group boundaries by facilitating the inclusion of different groups into a 
‘superordinate identity’ (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner et al. 2000). Scholars 
applying this model conclude that sharing a common identity can reduce the 
perception of the Other as a threat (Prentice and Miller 1999; Rousseau and 
Rocio 2007). Despite supportive literature for the idea that superordinate 
identities can reduce conflict between groups, some work within social identity 
theory postulates that low levels of similarity can foster cooperation whereas 
high levels of similarity can lead to the opposite (C. R. Snyder and Fromkin 
1980). Freud (1917, 197) argues that individuals feel aggression, hatred, and 
envy toward those who resemble them the most. Individuals feel threatened not 
by the ‘Other’ with whom they have little in common—the ‘nearly-we’, who 
mirror and reflect them. Brewer’s (1991) theory of ‘Optimal Distinctiveness’ 
posits that actors simultaneously express a need for both assimilation and 
differentiation. Actors become satisfied and secure when they adopt a level of 
social identity that lies somewhere between the uniqueness of their own self-
identity and larger collective identities. At the extremes, the actor’s identity is 
threatened. Being highly individualized leads to his isolation and stigmatization. 
At the other extreme, being entirely included in a larger collective identity 
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eliminates the actor’s self-identity, which is based on comparison with others 
(Brewer 1991, 477–478). Consequently, actors are motivated to find an optimal 
balance between assimilation with and differentiation from others. From this 
perspective, similarity may be threatening if a state’s assimilation becomes 
much higher than its differentiation from others. In other words, the sources of 
distinctiveness from others become minimal in its identity narrative. Similarity, 
I argue here, becomes threatening if it extends to that particular line of 
distinctiveness without which the actor’s raison d’être is meaningless. 
Conversely, similarity may lead to cooperation if the sources of distinctiveness 
are so significant that actors are motivated to seek inclusion in a larger 
collective identity. 
Ontological insecurity will trigger anxiety, which Giddens distinguishes 
from fear. Whereas fear is ‘a response to a specific threat and, therefore, has a 
definite objective’, anxiety is ‘a generalized state of emotions’ (Giddens 1991, 
43). In other words, fear is the reaction to an objective material threat to the 
agent’s survival. Anxiety, however, is the sense of insecurity that emerges when 
the agent’s self-identity is challenged. From this perspective, anxiety causes a 
state of ontological insecurity that is not based on a specific objectified threat, 
because it attacks the ‘core of the self once a basic security system is set up’ 
(Giddens 1991, 44). 
If changes in the relative power distribution trigger physical insecurity 
and fear, what triggers an actor’s ontological insecurity? If continuity and order 
in the self-versus-other relationships are the primary source of ontological 
security, ‘critical situations’ that disrupt actors’ distinctiveness can pose risks to 
their sense of self. Giddens defines ‘critical situations’ as ‘circumstances of a 
radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of 
individuals’ (1984, 61). These unpredictable situations constitute an identity 
threat, as ‘agents perceive that something can be done to eliminate them’ 
(Steele 2008, 12). Giddens’ structuration theory presents these critical 
situations as endogenous to self-identity. In other words, they are situations 
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constituted by the fragilities of entities; only actors who care about ontological 
security will perceive these situations to be critical.  
Still, this agent-focused conception disregarded the role of external 
others in the constitution of the Self. Acknowledging that self-identity is the 
product of interaction with others alongside the reflexive understanding of the 
Self, my conception of ‘critical situations’ goes beyond the endogenous sources 
of ontological security. If the constitution of the Self is related to the other, 
‘critical situations’ can also be external events that alter the representation of 
the Other, ultimately constituting a source of instability and insecurity for the 
self. Relevant events can include revolutions, wars, and regime changes that 
disrupt the relationship between the Self and the Other. When critical situations 
alter the established Self-Other distinction, agents become uncomfortable in 
who they are.  
However, what is the worst scenario in a case of ontological insecurity? 
Can it ultimately lead to the elimination of actors just as physical insecurity 
does? According to Rumelili (2015, 60), ‘concerns about instability and 
uncertainty of being can easily be politically mobilized and manipulated into 
concerns about survival’. In an extreme case, ontological insecurity can 
ultimately lead to physical insecurity. If statesmen fail to maintain a consistent 
narrative about the state’s self-identity and its raison d’être, domestic rifts can 
ensue. Because the endogenous and exogenous sources of identity become 
inextricably related in the state’s narrative, such challenges can pose an 
existential threat to the state, jeopardizing its survival as a collective community 
of several societal groups. Thus, challenges to states’ distinctiveness and 
uniqueness vis-à-vis the other can lead to physical threats. The resulting sense 
of insecurity usually leads to policies that affirm and reinforce the state’s self-





Figure (1): Two conceptions of security 
 Physical security Ontological security 
Security as Survival Being 
Insecurity manifests 
into 
Fear in the face of a 
threat 
Anxiety (uncomfortable 
disconnect with the self) 
Dichotomy Friend/Enemy Self/Other — Us/Them 
Structural changes 
leading to insecurity 
Changes in the relative 
power distribution 
Critical situations — 
change in the identity of 
the Self or the identity of 
the Other 
Worse case scenario Physical harm and 
regime elimination 
Disaggregation of 
political communities – 
Regime collapse 
 
The ontological security literature stresses that ontological and physical 
security are distinct, because they are characterized by different dynamics and 
process. Although the two types of insecurities are inherently separate, I argue 
that they are interrelated and affect one another. The next section explores this 
linkage between the two in the process of threat perception. 
4. The Interaction of Physical and Ontological Security  
This framework is built on the assumption that ontological and physical security 
are distinct types. Whereas physical security, understood as security-as-
survival, is associated with military threats to the state, ontological security, or 
security-as-being, is associated with those dynamics and processes that center 
around the reproduction of identity narratives and the maintenance of a system 
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of certitude. I do not subscribe to the argument positing that identity politics 
and material interests—and their corresponding layers of security—are 
opposed or mutually exclusive. As Keohane (2000, 127) puts it, ‘creating this 
dichotomy is a bit like arguing whether the heart or the brain is most 
fundamental to life’. Instead, this section examines how these two layers of 
security are interlinked and interact in the process of threat perception. In 
exploring this interaction, I assume that all states seek ontological and physical 
security. Accordingly, in every situation, states will experience two dimensions 
of security. States, however, do not vary uniformly in the attainment of 
ontological and physical security. In other words, states can attain ontological 
security in the absence of physical security and vice versa. Based on this 
conception of dual spheres of security, table (2) charts the four possible 
situations. 
 The first is a situation of ontological security/physical security, an optimal 
situation in which states maintain a stable and certain self-identity while 
remaining physically secure. Nordic states provide the best example. States in 
this security community maintain a collective identity that maintains the 
us/them distinction, which is necessary to sustain a stable identity. In the 
meantime, these states remain in an environment of physical security vis-à-vis 
each other (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). In this situation, a collective 
identity evolves and enables actors to see each other as different but not 
necessarily threatening. The second is a situation of ontological 
insecurity/physical insecurity, where actors experience the fear of harm while 
also experiencing an uncertainty and instability about their being. That is an 
ambiguous situation in which one cannot know how states will attempt to 
restore their security and how they will prioritize between the two security 
spheres. Either way, in these situations, physical insecurity and ontological 
insecurity reproduce one another. 
 The third is a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security, where 
actors do not perceive the other as source of harm or danger. Nevertheless, 
their identity suffers from instability and insecurity as their distinctiveness 
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from others is challenged or the consistency of their identity narrtive is 
disrupted. In other words, the Other is not a threat to security-as-survival, but 
instead destabilizes and challenges the Self’s identity and sense of being. This 
situation may arise following revolutions where the Other is not physically 
threatening but its new identity may threaten the stability of the Self. Also, the 
resolution of protracted conflicts can challenge the previously shaped 
conflictual identities. The cases of Turkey and Japan apologizing for past crimes 
is another example. In the Middle East, one can think of the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to power in Egypt as source of instability to the Saudi identity 
narrative based on its image as the leader of the Sunni world. 
The fourth is a situation of ontological security/physical insecurity, 
where actors maintain a stable identity and a distinction vis-à-vis the Other. 
However, they suffer from danger or harm to their physical survival. Actors 
experience existential stability and certainty of being in a relationship where 
the Other is identified as a threat to security-as-survival. In other words, they 
remain in the conflict as it provides their identity with certainty and continuity 
(Mitzen 2006). In protacted conflicts where actors portray each other as 
existential threats, such as in Cyprus or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the 
Self/Other relationship is stablized through identifying the Other as an enemy. 
 
Figure (2): Situations of ontological and physical security 
 Physical security Physical insecurity 
Ontological security The Self experiences 
stability and continuity 
of being/does not 
experience concerns 
about physical danger. 
The Self experiences 
stability and certainty of 
being/experiences 
concerns about physical 
danger. 
 
Ontological insecurity The Self experiences 
instability and 
uncertainty/ does not 






about physical danger. 
concerns about physical 
danger. 
 
 For the purpose of this study, I focus on two main possibilities. The first is 
the situation where states have fears about their ontological security and the 
stability of their identity while remaining physically secure. The second it is 
when states maintain stable identities while their physical security is 
threatened. In what follows, I will situate the identity-material power 
interaction within these dual layers of security. I intend to show that these two 
spheres are not only distinct but also interlinked. 
 When states are in a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security, 
they will attempt to restore identity distinctiveness and stability. Two primary 
adaptive mechanisms can be discerned. First, states seek to demonize the Other. 
Ontological insecurity leads actors to engage in practices that mark the Other as 
being not only different but also inferior and threatening (David Campbell 1992, 
135–136). Second, states attempt to force a new, stable self-other distinction. 
The new Self/Other distinction has a negative dimension, as the actor aims to 
discredit the Other. This ontological insecurity dimension affects the physical 
security dimension. The framing of the Other as an existential threat affects the 
actor’s perception of the balance of power/relative power distribution and of 
the friend/enemy identification. In other words, this perception of the relative 
power distribution and states’ behaviour become subjugated to this self-other 
distinction, which originally arise to restore the actor’s ontological security. 
 When states are in a situation of ontological security/physical insecurity, 
they will direct their identity narratives towards the primary source of threats 
identified as danger to survival. This second case highlights a different dynamic 
according to which the Other is identified as a threat to the state survival. The 
friend/enemy identification needs to be congruent with the Self/Other 
distinction. In other words, the friend needs to be included in the ‘us’ category, 
and the enemy should be placed in the ‘them’ category. If the friend/enemy 
dichotomy that emerges from the new relative power distribution is 
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incongruent with the Self/Other, then identity is reframed to accommodate this 
change to avoid any inherent contradiction, potentially triggering an 
endogenous case of ontological insecurity. Accordingly, a new Self/Other 
emerges whereby the enemy is placed in the ‘Other’ category. In other words, 
the Other is identified as an enemy based on its capabilities and intentions to 
cause harm. In short, actors move to reframe this self-other distinction based on 
a friend/enemy dichotomy identified in the realm of physical security.  
5. Methodology 
The above conceptual framework is deployed in this study to examine the 
persistently divergent Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during three major 
wars in the Middle East: the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 2006 Lebanon 
War, and the 2009 Gaza War. As Bennett and Elman (2007, 180) highlightes, 
‘theory development would not have been possible without the authors’ close, 
creative engagement with the cases’. The theoretical framework presents a 
conceptual tool to enhance our understanding of these empirical cases, which 
are of intrinsic importance to any student of the Middle East. In other words, the 
purpose is to present a theoretically informed narrative of intra-regional 
alliances in the Middle East. In addition, these cases serve a heuristic purpose 
crucial to the theory-building endeavour in this study. In this section, I present 
the study’s research design, which includes: explaining the methods of analysis, 
introducing the cases and their selection criteria, and the data. 
5.1. Research Methods and Data 
Given that the aim of this study is theory building through exploring the validity 
of the above theoretical framework, I deploy a small n case study combined with 
the ‘structured, focused comparison’ method of analysis. The case studies serve 
a dual purpose: they offer empirical evidence to substantiate the overall 
argument and further develop the theoretical framework. Accordingly, the cases 
examined here belong to the category of ‘heuristic case studies’ that ‘inductively 
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identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths’ 
(George and Bennett 2005, 75). In order to generate considerable inferential 
leverage from the study of a limited number of cases, the study employs cross-
cases as well as within-cases comparisons. Figure (1) shows that cross-cases 
comparison will focus on comparing Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions in each 
war. Within-cases comparisons will focus on looking at each Syrian and Saudi 
threat perception over time in order to discern a pattern. 
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Figure (3): Sources of threat perceived by Syria and Saudi Arabia 
 
 The comparison of these cases aims to establish the validity of the 
argument by comparing how it performs in different cases (Collier 1993, 108). 
Moreover, these comparisons serve as a building-block technique within the 
theory-building process. Eckstein (1991, 144) describes  this method as follows:  
One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct. 
That construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a 
slim clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another 
case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to 
achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the 
construct seems sufficiently refined to require no further major 
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amendment or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative 
study.  
In this study, within and cross-cases comparisons follow the method of 
‘structured, focused comparison’ (George 1979). This method employs 
theoretically relevant variables for the purposes of explanation to permit 
comparison and cumulative findings. Accordingly, I examine the dynamics of 
ideational and material forces affecting the process of threat perception in each 
case. The comparison is ‘structured’ because it examines each case by ‘asking a 
set of standardized, general questions […] these questions [are] carefully 
developed to reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of inquiry’. It is 
‘focused’ because it ‘deals only with specific aspects of the historical cases 
examined’ (George and Bennett 2005, 67 & 69). Namely, I look at how, and 
under which conditions, ideational and material forces interplay in the process 
of threat perception. 
 In ascertaining the process of threat perception across the case studies, I 
utilize three research methods: congruence procedure, longitudinal analysis, 
and process-tracing. As the study is theory-driven, the empirical cases are used 
to illustrate and to develop the theoretical framework. Congruence procedure is 
used to test whether there is a strong correlation between the argument’s 
predictions and leaders’ perceptions of threat. Van Evera (1997, 61–63) also 
argues that congruence procedure enables to observe variables in within-cases 
comparisons and then determine whether these variables co-vary as predicted 
by the theoretical argument (George and Bennett 2005, chap. 9). For example, if 
threat perception is driven by identity threats, there should be no evidence of 
objective military threat. Similarly, in the case of a military threat, there should 
be relative military imbalance. This does not mean that there is causation. But 
building correlation is one step towards proving causality. 
 Longitudinal analysis and process-tracing move us from simple 
correlation towards establishing a causal logical reasoning. Longitudinal 
analysis allows a close examination of the timing of changes in both the 
independent variables (state identity and military capabilities) and dependent 
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variables (threat perception and subsequent behaviour). Does the change in the 
dependent variables follow a change in the independent variable? For example, 
did the Syrian decision to ally with Iran in 1979 followed a change in the 
relative power distribution? Does the dependent variable (threat perception) 
occur before the independent variable? If so, then there is no causal relationship 
to examine. Also, events that lead to the disruption of Self-identity should be 
followed by important changes in identity narratives. Here a longitudinal 
analysis shows how identity narratives have changed over time, either as a 
response to ontological insecurity or physical insecurity. Moreover, it shows the 
timeline of threat perception. 
 Process-tracing is one of the best methods in social sciences for building 
and testing theoretical arguments. George and Bennett (2005, 224) consider it 
to be ‘an invaluable method that should be included in every researcher’s 
repertoire’. Van Evera (1997, 64) describes it as ‘[exploring] the chain of events 
or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated 
into case outcomes’. This method tries to get inside actors’ heads by examining 
speeches, pronouncements, and statements that explain why leaders make the 
choices they do. Bennett (2010, 208) defines process-tracing as a method that 
involves ‘the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case that 
contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. A 
central concern is with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of 
hypothesized causal processes’. 
 Beach and Pedersen (2013, chap. 2) identify three uses of process-tracing: 
theory-testing, theory-building, and case-centric. Theory-testing process-tracing 
is a two-stage deductive research process where the analyst first clarifies the 
theoretical argument and then empirically verifies each of its parts and stages. 
Theory-building process-tracing follows an inductive logic, where process-
tracing uncovers new causal relationships between variables, after which the 
discovered logic becomes generalized to wider population of phenomena. Case-
centric process-tracing is the most common, where the aim is to craft an 
explanation for particularly puzzling outcomes, such as a particular war or 
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event. This study uses process-tracing in the theory testing stage. After 
presenting the theoretical argument, process-tracing is used to ‘get inside’ the 
cases to evaluate what drives threat perception as well as the ideational-
material interaction. Moreover, process-tracing performs a heuristic function by 
unravelling relationships and empirical evidence that enables a refinement of 
the theoretical argument (Bennett and Elman 2007, 183; Van Evera 1997, 67–
70; George and Bennett 2005, 7). In this study, process-tracing follows the 
comparative logic of the research. If within-cases findings are repeatedly 
consistent with cross-cases comparisons, the argument is valid (Mahoney 2003, 
361–363). This procedure is called ‘pattern matching’ (Donald Campbell 1975) . 
It is combined with a causal narrative based on historical analysis. Causal 
narrative seeks to compare the sequence of events across cases to determine if 
both cases are following the same causal patterns. The variables are 
contextualized in the cases and disaggregated into sequences across the cases 
(Mahoney 2003, 365–367).  
 A ‘focused, structured’ comparison is combined with the above three 
research methods. If these methods—congruence methods, longitudinal 
analysis, and process-tracing—all point to a causal relationship between 
ideational or material factors (or both) on the one hand and perceptions of 
threat and subsequent policies on the other, I can be confident about the 
accuracy of the findings. 
 It is true that, given the closed and secretive nature of the decision-making 
processes of both the Syrian Ba’athist regime and the Saudi Kingdom, 
inaccessibility to primary sources and interviews with current government 
officials in Damascus and Riyadh remains the chief obstacle to a complete and 
accurate picture of the inner workings of these authoritarian governments. At 
the same time, this thesis is not a work in the discipline of International History. 
It does not seek to reconstruct events but rather to evaluate particular 
theoretical explanations of events and thereby to judge the validity of the 
theoretical argument. To recall, the study introduces a theoretical framework 
based on a combination of ontological and physical security. The successive 
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chapters offer empirical evidence to substantiate and develop this framework. 
Therefore, I have undertaken an exhaustive survey and analysis of the available 
secondary sources in Arabic, English, and French, most notably Middle Eastern 
and Western newspapers and, more importantly, numerous books and articles 
published by historians (both from the region and Western countries). I have 
supplemented these with primary sources, such as speeches, official 
government statements, and memoires. The reason for this choice is that this 
study does not aim to establish what happened, but to address a gap in the 
literature on threat perception within International Relations theory of which 
the cases of Saudi Arabia and Syria provide examples.  
The choice of secondary sources poses some challenges, however. As 
Lustick (1996) notes, the reliance on secondary work might result in an 
arbitrary selection of secondary data. Historians and scholars build particular 
narratives of events. The problem is how to take the claims made about the past 
as evidence to confirm a particular theoretical argument. Moreover, how to 
distinguish accurate from inaccurate stories? Lustick (1996, 605) suggests that 
this problem maybe addressed if  
We take seriously the fact that our loadings of variables do not spring 
from a transparent historical record but from a collection of accounts of 
sets of events constructedly narrated as episodes. In other words, if we 
treat our database as ‘historiography’ or ‘histories’ and not ‘History’, then 
the actual number of ‘cases’ expands from the number of episodes to the 
number of accounts of those episodes. 
Accordingly, to prevent evidentiary errors, I tried to collect various 
narratives of each event and to compare them. I also relied on sources from the 
two sides of a conflict to be able to extract the most accurate picture of events 
beyond politicized stories. For example, regarding the Iran-Iraq War, I collected 
narratives from Arab and Iranian historians. For the latter, I mainly relied on 
English materials written by Iranian historians. Similarly, for the 2006 Lebanon 
War and the 2009 Gaza War, I examined Saudi and Syrian narratives, but I also 
compared narratives from Israeli, Arab, and European analysts. 
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Another challenge is to know how the sources can support the 
theoretical argument. To answer this question, I ‘triangulate’ amongst diverse 
primary and secondary sources, which may increase the confidence in claims I 
make about the past. Lustick (1996, 616) defines ‘triangulation’ as 
‘[constructing] a background narrative from the identity of the claims made by 
different historians despite their approach from different archival sources 
and/or implicitly theoretic or political angles’. The advantage of looking at 
particular historical events is that is possible to exhaustively examine the 
majority of monographs devoted to them. However, there are still problems 
related to the distinction between objective and subjective information. As 
Mouzelis (1994, 35) notes, primary and secondary sources are ‘second-order 
interpretations referring to the first order ones that individuals generate when 
they act and interact’. 
Finally, how to distinguish between what is objective and what is 
subjective? The objective refers to evidence, which has its own reality external 
to human experiences and thoughts. The subjective refers to that which is 
created by the actor’s thoughts, perceptions, and experiences. As this research 
deals with ‘material’ and ‘ideational’, historical narratives were also examined 
to extract both the hard evidence and the subjective stories, or the perceptions 
held by actors while they were acting or taking a political decision. 
Consequently, there is the material evidence, but there is also actors’ perception 
of it. 
5.2. Case Selection: Why Compare Syria and Saudi Arabia 
The choice of Syria and Saudi Arabia as case studies followed three criteria: (1) 
the intrinsic importance of the cases, (2) the fact that both cases present two 
extremes cases on the independent variable, 27 (3) and the divergence of 
outcomes from predictions made by various theoretical explanations. 
                                                             
27 These case-selection criteria were in the list identified by Van Evera (1997, 77–78). 
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 Despite the fact that both capitals, Damascus and Riyadh, have generally 
conveyed the impression of coordination and a kind of alliance—or at least an 
entente—in various spheres, they have differed on almost every alliance choice 
during major wars in the region, especially since the Iranian revolution 
(1979).28 These diametrically opposite decisions are one of the most intriguing 
puzzles in modern Middle East politics. The intrinsic importance of Saudi and 
Syrian threat perceptions, as well as the ensuing alliance decisions, stems from 
their far-reaching implications for regional dynamics. 
 In 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iraqi invasion of Iran were 
the subject of disagreement between Damascus and Riyadh. Whereas the Syrian 
regime perceived rising Iraq as a viable military threat and the Islamic Republic 
as a potential ally necessary to balance Saddam Hussein and Israel, the Saudi 
regime’s perception of the situation was drastically different. For the Kingdom, 
the message emanating from the Islamic revolution constituted the ultimate 
threat. Accordingly, the royal family ignored Saddam Hussein’s regional 
ambitions. This divergence is even more paradoxical when seen against the 
background of the two states’ identities. A secular Ba’athist regime in Syria, 
claiming to be an ardent supporter of the Arab cause, allied with a non-Arab 
Islamic theocracy that rejects the concept of the nation-state and promotes the 
overthrow of secular regimes. On the other hand, despite its claim of Islamic 
universalism and the rejection of pan-Arabism defended by the socialist 
republics in the region, Saudi Arabia allied with a secular socialist Ba’athist 
regime in Iraq. Henceforth, Syria and Saudi Arabia joined opposing camps in 
major wars in the region. The 2006 Lebanon War as well as the 2009 Gaza War 
constituted a division between the so-called ‘moderate camp’ (Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Egypt) and the ‘resistance camp’ (Syria, Iran, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah).  
Substantive importance and fascination, however, cannot be the only 
criteria for selecting a case study. As the primary goal of this research is to infer 
                                                             




an explanation of the interplay between ideational and material factors shaping 
threat perception, Syria and Saudi Arabia constitute extreme cases. 29  I 
hypothesize that Saudi Arabia and Syria portray extreme cases manifesting the 
interplay between ideational and material forces. The Syrian case demonstrates 
a situation of ontological security/physical insecurity, where physical insecurity 
has shaped the regime’s identity and the ensuing self-other dichotomy. The 
Saudi case, however, represents a case of ontological insecurity/physical 
security, as the self-other distinction framed to restore ontological insecurity 
has shaped the friend/enemy dichotomy.  
These puzzles are further intriguing, because both cases diverge from the 
predictions made on the bases of various theoretical lenses. Beyond the generic 
foreign policy accounts of Syria and Saudi Arabia, their alliance choices have 
been examined through various theoretical lenses. 30  Realist explanations 
underscore the geopolitically-shaped balance of power as the origin of the 
Syrian regime’s alliances. These accounts argue that the strategic balance in the 
Middle East throughout the second half of the 1970s provides an illuminating 
explanation for the Syrian decisions. Due to the failure of the Syrian-Iraqi 
rapprochement in 1978-79, especially after the Camp David Accords, Syria 
became marginalized in the regional dynamics (Kienle 1990). In this context, 
the Iranian revolution was a ‘gift’ for Syria to create a new geopolitical situation 
in which it would play a dominant role in the Middle East (Hirschfeld 1986). 
However, realist explanations fall short of explaining why Saudi Arabia 
supported a military ambitious Iraq against a military weakened Iran. 
As the Saudi case diverged from realist predictions, Syria constitutes a 
deviation from regime security approaches. Regime security explanations are 
based on a critique of realism’s preoccupation with external threats to state 
security (Buzan 1991; Ayoob 1995; Job 1992; David 1991a). They explain 
                                                             
29 Extreme cases are usually selected because the study variable is very high, making the causes 
behind it much easier to identify (Van Evera 1997, 79–81). 
30 For generic foreign policy accounts, cf. For generic foreign policy accounts, cf. Korany (1991), 
Hinnebusch (2002), Nonneman (2005), Kandil (2008), and Korany and Fatah (2008). 
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foreign policy choices in terms of the regime’s evaluation of the overlapping 
domestic and regional threats affecting its stability and survival (Gause 2002; 
Dawisha 1990). Foreign policy is, therefore, considered a tool for offsetting the 
domestic legitimacy crisis. Scholars of Saudi foreign policy argue that the 
ultimate goal of such policy is ‘to preserve the Saudi regime and Saudi 
independence’ (Piscatori 1983, 51). From this perspective, the Kingdom is 
repeatedly caught by the dilemma of balancing external and internal threats 
(Nonneman 2005; Dawisha 1979). According to this approach, external threats 
are often related to domestic ones, as foreign opponents instrumentalize 
transnational identities to destabilize the Kingdom through subversion.31 From 
this perspective, the threat of an Islamic spill-over in the Arab regimes was 
explained in terms of fear of the Shi’a minorities subversion (Kostiner 1987; 
Long 1990), which manifested in November 1979, February 1980, and 
November 1980. According to this explanation, Syria, a secular pan-Arab 
authoritarian regime suppressing Islamist movements at home, should have 
been equally threatened by the message of the Islamic Revolution. Moreover, 
how did Hafiz al-Assad, presiding over a divided society, take a geopolitical 
decision that so was risky and costly for the survival of the regime? From this 
perspective, the Syrian choice to ally with Iran was considered as an ‘odd’ case 
(Lawson 2007; Byman 2006; Goodarzi 2006). In short, both realism and regime 
security approach account only for one case but not the other, as Saudi Arabia 
and Syria constitute extreme cases deviating from the predicted patterns. 
Alongside these two theoretical accounts, sectarian explanations deserve 
a brief discussion. Sectarian explanations present a primordial approach 
towards understanding Saudi and Syrian foreign policy. Relying on divisions 
within Islam, some scholars have portrayed Syrian foreign policy as driven by 
Shiite politik based on the ‘Alawite identity of the ruling elite (Bronson 2000; 
Susser 2007; Hussein 2012; Agha and Khalidi 1995). This narrow approach 
                                                             
 
31 This was the major dilemma facing the Kingdom during the rise of Pan-Arabism of Nasser in 
the 1950s and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). For an excellent comparison between both 
threats, see cf. Nahas (1985). 
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does not unpack Syria’s alignment with the Sunni Palestinian movement Hamas; 
nor does it account for the incompatible interests and policies implemented by 
Syria and Iran regarding many issues, such as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003 (Ma’oz 2007b; Lawson 2007; Saad-Gorayeb 2007). Similarly, Saudi foreign 
policy during the Iran-Iraq War was portrayed as a Sunni state facing a Shiite 
revolution in Iran (Yamani 2008; Ulrichsen 2013a; Goldberg 1990; Fürtig 
2002). However, this does not explain the rapprochement in the Saudi-Iranian 
relations throughout the 1990s (Wehrey et al. 2009; Okruhlik 2003). In short, 
this primordial approach to identities cannot stand alone as an explanatory 
model for Saudi or Syrian foreign policies. 
 I now turn to my case studies. I begin with an analysis of Saudi and Syrian 









Chapter 3: Explaining Syrian and Saudi Threat Perceptions 
during the Iran-Iraq War 
 
Saudi Arabia wants to balance us out with Iran, and 
balance us with Syria, and balance us with Jordan. And 
Jordan wants to balance us with Syria, and wants to 
balance us with Saudi Arabia, and wants to balance us — 
we are a priority weight balance over all […] All of this is a 
soap opera. We know all of this and we are disturbed. 
Saddam Hussein, 1979 (quoted in Woods, Palkki, and 
Stout. 2011, 131–132). 
 
As rivals often share mutual enemies and allies have been known to back 
opposite sides in the same conflict, Saddam Hussein’s quote underlines an 
evident fact: Iraq was a source of fear to its Arab neighbours. Nevertheless, a 
collective regional balancing never materialized; instead, Arab polarization and 
divergence prevailed. The alliances formed in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-88) proved enduring in moulding events and reshaping the political 
landscape of the Middle East for decades. Whereas Saudi Arabia identified Iraq 
as a friend and Iran as an enemy, Syria considered Iraq as a source of danger 
and Iran a reliable ally. 
This chapter argues that we can make sense of this outcome by paying 
attention to the interaction between identity and material power, as well as the 
interaction between their corresponding spheres of ontological and physical 
security. In 1979 the Islamic revolution altered Iran’s regime identity and 
emerged as a source of ontological insecurity for some actors in the region. 
Moreover, the revolution altered the regional power distribution, creating 
physical insecurity for others in the region. In the Saudi case, the emergence of 
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an Islamic government in Iran claiming to play a pan-Islamic role constituted a 
source of ontological insecurity for the Kingdom’s identity. At the same time, 
while the change in the relative power distribution left the Saudi elite in a state 
of confusion and uncertainty, the physical security of the Kingdom remained 
intact. To restore its ontological security, the Saudi Kingdom discredited the 
Islamic Republic and invented a new Self-Other distinction based on a Sunni-
Shiite discourse. This new Self-Other distinction affected the Saudi elite’s 
perception of their physical security and, therefore, defined the enemy/friend 
dichotomy.  
In contrast, the change in the material configuration led to the isolation 
of the Syrian regime, which feared its Iraqi neighbour. Unlike the Saudi case, 
Iran’s altered regime identity did not disturb Syrian ontological security as the 
Ba’ath regime maintained a distinct identity based on pan-Arabism, according to 
which the Self was defined based on an ‘Israeli other’. In this state of ontological 
security/physical insecurity, the Syrian identification of material dangers 
defined its friend/enemy dichotomy. This particular configuration shaped the 
us/them distinction, as the regime’s identity was changed and reinterpreted to 
accommodate the material constraints. In short, the Syrian regime adopted a 
broader pan-Arab narrative based not on the Arab dimension but on animosity 
toward Israel. This is the context in which Syria widened its definition of ‘us’ to 
include the Islamic Republic. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I contextualize Saudi 
and Syrian alliance choices in the regional developments of 1979-1980. Second, 
I examine the Saudi threat perception and explore the strategic position of the 
Kingdom in the relative power distribution. I then present how the Iranian 
revolution disrupted the stability of the Saudi regime identity and led to a case 
of ontological insecurity. Third, I explore the Syrian threat perception. Here, I 
discuss the Syrian strategic position in the relative distribution, which led to the 
regime’s physical insecurity. I then demonstrate how identity and the Self-Other 
distinction followed the physical needs of the Syrian regime.  
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1. The Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and Regional Reactions 
Political shocks — such as wars, revolutions, or economic crises — are often a 
catalyst for ideational and material discontinuities.32 The Islamic revolution in 
Iran (1979) was one such exogenous shock, which significantly moulded 
regional events for decades, as it brought about substantial changes to the 
normative and geopolitical order in the Middle East. 
 From an ontological security perspective, this external shock may be 
considered a ‘critical situation’. The revolution altered Iran’s identity and, 
hence, its relations with others. As an actor’s identity has a strong relational 
dimension; based on the Self-Other distinction, changes in any Others’ identity 
may lead to changes in the identity of the Self. The revolution altered the state 
identity of Iran from a monarchy ruled by the Shah to a populist Islamic republic 
governed by Khomeini’s Islamic worldview. The key to understanding 
Khomeini’s world order is the idea of vilayat-e faqīh33 (the rule of the leading 
jurisprudent), according to which the government or the rulership (vilayat) 
belongs to God, to the Prophet, to the infallible imams, and, by extension, to the 
pious faqīh. The rule of the faqīh is temporal until the Twelfth Imam (al-Mahdi) 
appears. Khomeini called on all rulers in Muslim countries to return to ‘true and 
unique Islam’. The new ideology posited that, being the only ‘Government of 
God’, Iran had a role in spreading justice around the Islamic world. This drastic 
change in Iran’s identity could not be contained within its borders since it 
affected others’ ontological security as the latter remained inextricably tied to 
the consistent distinction of the Self vis-à-vis the Other (Iran in this case). 
The Islamic revolution emerged around the idea of building an ‘Islamic 
community’ that would transcend sectarian and national boundaries. Khomeini 
believed that Muslim countries should unite (tawḥīd) in order successfully 
counter Western influence. He saw nationalism as a source of disunity and 
                                                             
32 Political shocks are considered to be ‘rare moments’ in history leading to dramatic changes in 
states’ policies. For examples on ‘shocks’, cf. Legro (2005), Goldstone (1993), Ikenberry (2000), 
and Walt (1996). 
33 For more details on the religious foundations of this system, cf. al-Labbad (2005). 
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disintegration between Muslim countries. Therefore, Khomeini’s ideology may 
be regarded as ‘pan-Islamic’ (Menshari 1990). In September 1980, he declared: 
Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and 
splits the ranks of the believers, is against Islam and the interests of the 
Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed 
by the spread of Islam […] More saddening and dangerous than 
nationalism is the creation of dissension between Sunnis and Shi’is and 
diffusion of mischievous propaganda amongst brother Muslims’ 
(Khomeini 1981, 304). 
Accordingly, the Islamic Republic pursued a foreign policy strategy that 
appealed to Arabs and Muslims. Palestine constituted a central theme in 
Khomeini’s ideology from the earliest days of the Islamic Revolution (Ramazani 
1986, 151–154). Iran consistently emphasized its commitment to the 
Palestinian cause. At the height of the Second Intifada (2000), Supreme Leader 
Khamenei termed Palestine ‘a limb of our body’ (Wehrey et al. 2009, 23). This 
pan-Islamist narrative was accompanied by increasing financial support to 
Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Iranians 
thus presented themselves as the leader of Islam in the region and as the 
epitome of virtue in the Arab–Israeli conflict. As pan-Islamism constituted the 
basic tenet of Khomeini’s theory of an Islamic state, some regional actors found 
the stability of their identity disrupted, negatively affecting their ontological 
security. Some Arab actors discovered that it was difficult to establish clear and 
distinctive boundaries between themselves and the ‘Persian’ Other. 
Beyond this ideational perspective, the Iranian revolution was pivotal in 
altering the material power configuration in the Middle East. Indeed, it 
destroyed the American-Iranian partnership and distorted the alliance pattern 
in the region. The relative power distribution was transformed from a situation 
of Iranian regional hegemony to one of power parity between Iran and Iraq. 
Throughout the 1970s, Iran enjoyed a considerable supremacy in the region. 
This hegemony was observable in the size of its armed forces, which was nearly 
double that of Iraq, and through its yearly military spending, which ranked the 
highest in the region (Gause 2003, 285). The Shah exerted hegemony over the 
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Gulf and played a dominant role in the Middle East. The military balance 
between Iran and Iraq was estimated roughly two-to-one in Iran’s favour due to 
its three-to-one manpower advantage and its predominant American arsenal 
(Cashman and Robinson 2007, 279).  
The Iranian revolution altered this equilibrium. Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
first act after seizing power on 11 February 1979 was to deliberately destroy 
the Shah’s well-trained professional military, which was regarded as disloyal to 
the Islamic regime.  Approximately 5000 of the most experienced officers, 
mostly trained in the United States or Israel, were executed; thousands more 
were imprisoned or exiled (Segal 1988, 952–953). By some estimates, 30 to 59 
per cent of the highest-ranking officers, mainly majors and colonels, were killed. 
The size of Iran’s army in 1980 was about half of what it has been in 1979 
(down from approximately 415,000 men to 240,000 men). Military spending 
fell from 15 per cent of GNP to 7.3 per cent (Cashman and Robinson 2007, 279). 
In short, Iran set about destroying its military capacity to threaten its 
neighbours or to even defend itself. In the meantime, Iraq, which was supported 
by the Soviet Union and profiting from the oil windfall of 1973/74, increased its 
own military capabilities throughout the 1970s. By 1980, its military had 
doubled in size (to 242,000 men). Its military spending jumped from 14 per 
cent of GNP in 1972 to 21 per cent in 1980. As a result, the military balance 
tilted toward parity between Iran and Iraq (Gause 2009, 51–54).34 
These material and normative changes caused by the Iranian revolution 
ultimately led to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. The change in the material 
balance of power provided Saddam Hussein with the opportunity to launch 
what he thought would be a short victory against his weakened rival. It soon 
became apparent that Hussein’s misperception of the situation led both 
countries into a costly eight-year war, during which Saudi Arabia and Syria 
joined opposing camps. The former supported Iraq while the latter allied with 
Iran. Despite their professed neutrality, the southern Gulf States (Kuwait, Saudi 
                                                             




Arabia, and, to a lesser degree, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) openly 
provided financial and military support to Iraq. The financial assistance, 
including oil and non-oil support, amounted to approximately US$ 25 billion 
from Saudi Arabia alone (Ulrichsen 2013b, 115).35 In addition, Jordan also 
openly supported Saddam Hussein. King Hussein provided Iraq with military 
hardware and economic aid. He also negotiated credit and loans from Western 
countries to purchase weapons on behalf of Iraq. Despite Egypt’s ousting from 
the Arab League in March 1979, it sold advanced weapons to the Iraqi army in 
1981. 
Syria, and to a lesser extent Libya, opposed this main trend in the Arab 
world and thereby prevented Iraq from claiming an ‘Arab’ war against the 
Persian neighbour. On 7 October 1980, Syria became the first Arab state to side 
officially with Iran. Syria criticized Iraq for attacking a potential ally of the 
Arabs, especially in their struggle with Israel. Alongside this verbal support, 
Damascus provided the Iranian armed forces with war materiel and made its 
airfield available for Iranian strikes in the west of Iraq (Kienle 1990; Marschall 
1992; Stanely 1990; Goodarzi 2006).36 This Arab polarization over the Islamic 
revolution and the Iran-Iraq War led to an unprecedented deterioration in 
inter-Arab relations, as it exacerbated older conflicts between Arab regimes. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore Saudi and Syria threat 
perceptions by examining the interaction at the nexus of physical and 
ontological security layers. To recall, whereas Saudi Arabia presented a case of 
ontological insecurity/physical security, Syria was a case of ontological 
security/physical insecurity. 
2. Saudi Arabia and the Quest for Distinctiveness 
                                                             
35 For more details on the financial and military assistance provided by the Gulf States in 
support of Iraq, cf. Quandt (1981a), Lotfian (1997), Nonneman (2004; 1986), Adib-Moghaddam 
(2006), and Ulrichsen (2013a). 
36 This fact was denied by Syrian leaders (Baraka 2011). 
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On the eve of the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia supported an aspiring Iraq against 
a militarily weakened Iran. The external shock of the Islamic revolution and the 
resulting change in the regional power distribution created a state of 
uncertainty that made the Saudis unable to identify any eminent source of 
danger. Amid this confusion and disarray, the ideational message of the Iranian 
revolution challenged the stability of the Saudi regime identity. Seeking to 
distinguish their state identity from Iran’s pan-Islamic appeal, the Saudi elite 
framed the Iranian Other in a demonizing manner. Moreover, the Saudis 
narrowed down their regime identity from pan-Islamism to Sunni Islam and, 
thereby, established a new us/them distinction. The new Self/Other distinction 
provided a channel through which the elite identified the friend/enemy 
dichotomy in the sphere of physical security. This section is divided into two 
parts. First, I present the Kingdom’s position in the new relative power 
distribution, which demonstrates a case of physical security. I then explore the 
case of Saudi ontological insecurity, which influenced the elite’s perception of 
the Kingdom’s physical security. 
2.1. The Relative Power Distribution: ‘A Structure without an Instruction Sheet’37 
Although the Saudi support of Iraq seemed assertive at the outbreak of the war, 
the decision to follow this policy was preceded by a long period of confusion 
and disarray approximately from January 1979 to September 1980 (Altoraifi 
2012, 128–131; Safran 1988, chap. 12,14). Before 1979, Saudi Arabia was 
successful in pursuing separate and incompatible strategies in different areas—
namely, the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the partnership with the US. The 
Islamic revolution in Iran coincided with other crises: the signing of the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and strains in 
the Saudi-US partnership. Embroiled in disarray and uncertainty, the royal elite 
was compelled to make strategic choices in order to adapt to these critical 
changes. Nevertheless, the new relative power distribution did not come with 
evident sources of danger to the Kingdom’s physical security. Accordingly, this 
ambiguity made a coherent friend/enemy identification difficult to sustain. This 
                                                             
37This title is based on Blyth (2003). 
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section examines three areas relevant to the Saudi physical security: the Gulf, 
the Arab-Israel sphere, and the Saudi-US partnership. 
Physical security in the Gulf is of primary concern in Saudi foreign policy. 
Before 1979, the major sources of instability in the Gulf were communist 
infiltration and the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, whose pan-Arab identity 
constituted a source of threat to the Kingdom.  Based on these concerns, Saudi 
Arabia relied on the United States to ensure the Kingdom’s physical security. 
This security arrangement was part of the so-called ‘twin pillar’ strategy, 
according to which the United States ensured the stability of the Gulf through 
the build-up of two regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It was in this 
framework that the Shah’s regime emerged as a military hegemon in the Middle 
East (Ramazani 1979, 822). 
In 1975 the Algiers Agreement was signed to settle the long-standing 
dispute between Iran and Iraq.38 The settlement marked an Iraqi turn towards 
moderation in its relations with its Arab neighbours (Niblock 2006, 50). This 
change transformed the strategic configuration in the Gulf as it led to the 
emergence of the Riyadh-Teheran-Baghdad triangle, which allowed Saudi 
Arabia more room for manoeuver. The agreement enabled the Kingdom to play 
Iraq off against Iran while consolidating its own influence among the smaller 
Gulf countries (Safran 1988, chap. 10). From this perspective, the Saudis 
managed to use Iraq’s opposition to impede the Shah from consolidating the 
Iranian hegemony in the Gulf. At the same time, Iran’s opposition to Iraqi 
aspirations of domination constituted substantial gains for the Saudis. 39 
Although this triangle had brought many gains to the Kingdom, the 
Islamic revolution turned the post-1975 strategic configuration upside down. 
With the fall of the Shah, Saudi Arabia lost a friendly regime with which it 
shared many norms, such as preserving the status quo in the region and a 
                                                             
38 For more details on this agreement, cf. Sirriyeh (1985). 




dominant US role in safeguarding stability in the Gulf. Moreover, Saddam 
Hussein took advantage of the sudden absence of an Iran at the regional level to 
assert Iraq’s own role in the Gulf. After the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Hussein positioned Iraq as the champion of the Arab cause and 
the only regional power capable of saving Arab states from any regional threat, 
including the spread of the Islamic revolution.  
While Iraq asserted itself as an ambitious power aspiring to a leading 
role in the region, the new regime in Iran was caught up in revolutionary chaos. 
Iran was weakened and had neither the time nor the capability to contain 
Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions. Moreover, Iran was unable to launch a 
war or even defend itself, a situation of which Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States 
were very much aware. Ahmad Abdulaziz al-Jassim, from the Kuwait Foreign 
Ministry, described the situation as follows:  
In April 1980, an attempt was made on Tariq ‘Aziz [Iraqi foreign 
minister] life and there were some clashes along the Iran-Iraq border. At 
that time, Iran offered us to sell their Phantom airplanes to Kuwait. 
When we told them we were not interested, they asked us to relay the 
offer to the Saudis. They were not interested either. This showed us that 
Iran was not thinking of entering a war (quoted in Marschall 2003, 67). 
In short, the strategic balance of power portrayed the weakness of Iran’s 
capability in standing as a threat to the Kingdom’s physical security. The 
question that arises is why a country ready to sell its air force was consistently 
identified as a major source of danger to its neighbours?  
It is worth noting that the decline in Iranian military capabilities did not 
usher in an Iraqi hegemony in the region. Instead, the change in the relative 
power distribution revealed an emerging parity between Iran and Iraq. The 
Iranian revolution and the subsequent change in the regional configuration did 
not directly affect the physical security of the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia initially 
sought to keep the balance between Iraq and Iran by appeasing Iran without 
provoking Iraq. In case one became too dangerous, the Saudi elite hoped to play 
one against the other (Ehteshami 2002). The emerging power parity in the Gulf 
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was too ambiguous for the Saudis to clearly identify their enemies and friends. 
For example, and despite the Shi’a demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf countries, King Khalid sent a letter of congratulations to Khomeini when 
the Islamic Republic was founded by a referendum on 30 March 30 1979:  
We always welcome the establishment of an Islamic government in any 
country, and we believe that the establishment of such a government in 
Iran will lead to a greater measure of understanding and to closer ties. 
After all, this is consistent with our constant call for adopting the Islamic 
Sharia as the basis of government (quoted in Samore 1983, 423–424). 
The fall of the Shah and the changes in the Persian Gulf coincided with 
other developments in the Arab-Israeli area, where the Kingdom faced 
additional uncertainty. Before 1967, the Saudi involvement in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was limited to the Palestinian question (Piscatori 1983, 37–38). Like the 
majority of the Arabs, the Saudis resented the Jewish state. Zionism was 
considered a primary concern for the security and stability of the Saudi regime. 
In addition, the repeated Arab defeats and the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem 
made the Arab-Israeli conflict a foreign policy concern for the Kingdom. The 
Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus trilateral axis thus emerged, with the purpose of 
maintaining a military balance against Israel. King Faisal developed a 
partnership with Egypt and mediated the tensions with Syria (Sunayama 2007, 
37). Beyond this diplomatic role, the Kingdom’s involvement was mainly 
financial (Safran 1988, 261–264; Taylor 1982, 49). 
The short-lived Arab reconciliation over the issue of balancing Israel in 
1973 was quickly replaced by inter-Arab polarization, which began to surface 
following King Faisal’s death. The Camp David Accords (1977) and the 
subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (1979) constituted a real challenge to 
the Kingdom since the Saudis were forced to take sides. Despite Saudi efforts to 
maintain Arab cohesion, especially through the triangular axis, the alliance 
finally collapsed. Consequently, Egypt’s withdrawal from the conflict created a 
military imbalance in favour of Israel. While sympathizing with the Egyptian 
initiative, Saudi Arabia could not afford the costs of taking such a position 
publicly. As an alternative, Saudi Arabia mediated between Damascus and 
94 
 
another powerful Arab state, namely Iraq (Kienle 1990, 100). A strong Arab 
opposition front was formed and threatened any party that would not actively 
penalize Egypt. The Saudis were torn between two options: (1) to espouse the 
US oriented strategy of endorsing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty while 
confronting the Damascus-Baghdad axis, as well as the Islamic Republic, or (2) 
to join the Damascus-Baghdad axis in confronting Egypt while risking the US 
connection. Serious strains emerged in the Saudi-US partnership when 
Washington proposed to link the protection of the Kingdom to Saudi support for 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Safran 1988, 231). In short, the events in the 
Arab-Israeli sphere created a confusing situation for the royal elite. 
Nevertheless, the Arab-Israeli imbalance created by the withdrawal of Egypt did 
not endanger the physical security of the Kingdom. The conservative, oil-rich 
Kingdom is not a frontline state in the conflict with Israel and has no territorial 
quarrel with it. Unlike other Arab states—such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and 
Iraq—Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the conflict was limited to financial and 
diplomatic means rather than military ones (Bahgat 2009b).  
Alongside the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the partnership with the 
United States constituted the third pillar in Saudi foreign policy. In 1979, this 
partnership seemed to undergo some changes, which contributed to the Saudi 
confusion and uncertainty about the relative power distribution. Since the 
Kingdom’s creation in 1932, Saudi Arabia relied on its partnership with the 
Great Britain then with the United States as a safeguard to its physical security. 
This partnership was always a source of tension and embarrassment to the 
Saudi royal family in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The Saudi elite was, however, 
successful in maintaining a balance between preserving the US connection and 
preserving its status in the Arab world. Nevertheless, the Iranian revolution and 
the signing of the US-sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty created acute 
tensions in this partnership. 
In the Gulf, losing the Shah undermined the US reliability as a security 
asset (Safran 1988, 275; Lippman 2004, 209). As Safran (1988, 354) explained,  
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It provided clear confirmation of a point the Saudis already suspected: 
that in its dealing with the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia included, the 
United States was prompted only by its interest in oil and would work 
with any regime that would serve that interest. American’s refusal in 
September 1979 to provide asylum to the shah only underscored that 
point.  
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia attempted to rely on regional cooperation to 
address regional security concerns. Since the November 1978 Baghdad Arab 
summit, reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iraq seemed to be possible 
(Goodarzi 2006, 27–28). Following the failure of the Baghdad-Damascus axis, 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed a mutual security pact in February 1979 
(Nonneman 1986, 14; Nonneman 2004, 173). Nevertheless, this pact did not 
indicate a firm tilt toward Iraq. Instead, it reflected Saudi Arabia’s ambiguous 
stance on the issue. At the same time, the Saudi minister of the interior declared 
that this cooperation concerned only civil defence, police, and extradition 
(Ramazani 1986, 73). However, relying on a wider Arab consensus either in the 
Arab-Israeli sphere or the Gulf seemed futile as the Syrian-Iraqi axis quickly 
dissolved leaving the Saudi leadership in an even more puzzling situation.40  
At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia had to take a firm 
position, especially after the split in the Syrian-Iraqi axis. While the new 
regional configuration did not generate evident physical security threats to the 
Kingdom, the position to be taken still had far-reaching implications. In light of 
this ambiguous regional configuration, the Saudi elite struggled to make a 
precise identification of enemies and friends and wavered between two options. 
The first was balancing Iraq’s military ascent by supporting a weakened Iran 
while befriending the nationalist Arab camp—namely Syria and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO)—in the Arab-Israeli sphere. This choice would 
mean scuppering the long-term strategic relationship with the United States 
and incurring the hostility of Iraq. It would also involve improving Saudi 
relationship with Moscow at the expense of the Kingdom’s relationship with 
Washington. The second option was supporting Iraq and sacrificing Saudi 
                                                             




Arabia’s traditional strategy of maintaining a balance of power between Iran 
and Iraq in the Gulf. This option would mean accepting Iraq’s regional 
hegemony and depending more on the United States for security. The choice 
would imply Saudi support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and would 
engender the hostility of Syria and Iran.  
The absence of a precise source of danger triggered acute tensions 
within the royal elite, which was divided between those for supporting Iraq and 
those for befriending Iran. A conservative faction, led by King Khalid and Prince 
Abdullah, favoured befriending Syria and welcoming the Islamic fervour of the 
new Iranian regime. This faction was supported by a younger generation in the 
family led by Saud Al-Faisal that advocated for the strengthening of Saudi ties 
with the nationalist Arab Camp and for the improvement of relations with 
Moscow at the expense of the reliance on the United States (Samore 1983, 416–
422; Abir 1993, 127–128). In fact, Sa‘ud al-Faisal explicitly referred to the Soviet 
role in the Middle East as ‘positive’ (Quandt 1981b, 69; Sunayama 2007, 57). 
The opposing faction—led by Crown Prince Fahd and Sultan, who relied on the 
influential power of the Sudairi branch in the family41—advocated a pro-US 
stance stemming from a deep hostility to the Soviets. Fahd’s pro-US moderate 
foreign policy and modernist project were partly discredited and blamed for the 
Mecca incidents42 as well as the Shiite uprisings in the Eastern province (Abir 
1988, 145–147). This divergence between the Saudi elite resulted in the defeat 
                                                             
41 This is most powerful clans of the Al Saud family, derived from the patronymic of Fahd’s 
mother—Hussa bint Ahmad Al Sudairi—who was married to King Abdel-‘Aziz. This marriage 
resulted in seven sons: Fahd, Sultan, Abdel-Rahman, Nayef, Turki, Salman and Ahmed. The seven 
sons of Hussa al-Sudairi constituted the largest bloc of full brothers forming a strong alliance 
within the House of Al Saud. 
42 In 1979, a group of Sunni dissidents seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca for three weeks 
condemning the rule of Al Saud. In fact, these events had no direct connection to the Iranian 
revolution. It was only the timing that made these actions even more challenging to the regime’s 
stability (Gause 1991; 2009, 48). For more details on this incident, see Trofimov (2008) and 
Hegghammer and Lacroix (2007a). 
97 
 
of Crown Prince Fahd and his self-exile in Spain43 when his brothers took over 
his responsibilities. 
Fahd’s temporary withdrawal left room for the Khalid-Abdullah faction 
to impose its own vision. This conservative and nationalist coalition within the 
royal family temporarily reoriented many of the Kingdom’s policies away from 
those pursued by Fahd and the Sudairis. In the Arab-Israeli sphere, Saudi Arabia 
now supported the radical Arab countries, in clear contradiction with the Saudi 
traditional policy. At the Baghdad Arab summit in 1979, Saudi Arabia agreed to 
the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab League and the imposition of a boycott, 
based on a total rejection of the Camp David accords and of the US policy in the 
Middle East. As part of the new regional emphasis of this coalition, Khalid and 
Abdullah led the first Saudi efforts to accommodate Khomeini. As Abdullah 
explicitly declared, 
 The new regime in Iran has removed all obstacles and 
reservation in the way of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Islam is the organizer of our 
relations. Muslim interests are the goal of our activities and the 
holy Koran is the constitution of both countries […] For this 
reason I am very optimistic about the future of relations between 
us and the Islamic republic of Iran. Our cooperation will have an 
Islamic dynamism against which no obstacles facing the Muslims 
can stand … the material potentials—money and oil—possessed 
by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and by the 
Islamic and Arab worlds will be utilized and directed by an 
Islamic spirit—a spirit which is superior to all hollow secular 
pomp such as authority, dominance, or self-interests. The fact is 
that we are very relieved by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy 
for making Islam and not heavy armaments, the organizer of 
cooperation, a base for dialogue and the introduction to a 
prosperous and dignified future (Samore 1983, 423M CSL.  
Amid this acute disagreement, Saudi royal family members exercised a high 
degree of self-restraint in dealing with their differences. In the face of rumours 
swirling around the Kingdom and in the media, King Khalid and Abdullah 
denied any weakening in the unity of the royal family. In an interview with the 
                                                             




Gulf New Agency on April 21, Abdullah stated the following: ‘We have lived with 
one another for a long time. We have inherited concepts and a way of life and 
family ties which we have all established on profound religious and solid ethical 
bases. We have been brought up in this country on these bases for successive 
generations. In our firm Islamic beliefs, estrangement among blood relatives is 
considered an unforgivable sin’. Like Khalid and Abdullah, Fahd denied all 
allegations of divisions within the royal family, especially between himself and 
Abdullah (Samore 1983, 425–427). Safran (1988, 238) notes: ‘Although the 
leadership did not visibly split again, the policies pursued showed all the marks 
of an intermittent tug of war, punctuated by improvisations, compromises, and 
zigzags’.  
These internal tensions demonstrated that the Al Saud were confused 
about the relative power distribution, and, hence, that an Iranian military threat 
to the Kingdom was not imminent, as it took almost one year to decide between 
the two available options. Instead, these tensions underlined an intrinsic 
contradiction in the Saudi regime’s identity. The ontological security of the 
Kingdom was endangered by the new identity of the Islamic Republic. To 
restore its identity security, the Kingdom reframed its identity, which eventually 
influenced its friend/enemy dichotomy pertaining to the physical security 
sphere. 
2.2. The Regime Identity: From Pan-Islamism to Sunni Islam 
Whereas the Islamic revolution in Iran and the subsequent regional material 
configuration did not endanger the Kingdom’s physical security, the new 
identity of the Islamic Republic caused Saudi ontological insecurity. The Saudi 
regime identity was based on pan-Islamism, which provided the Kingdom with 
the source of distinctiveness in the region. Ironically, its claim to be the 
protagonist of ‘true’ Islam in the world sowed the seeds of its vulnerability to 
other emerging Islamic models in the region. In 1979, the Islamic revolution in 
Iran constituted a ‘critical situation’ that endangered the stability of the Saudi 
regime identity. The Kingdom feared that it would lose its unique Islamic 
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credentials once the revolution adopted a similar pan-Islamic identity. In other 
words, the distinction according to which the Kingdom had consolidated its own 
identity vis-à-vis the other states in the region became irrelevant. Seeking to re-
establish its ontological security, the Saudi state narrowed its regime identity 
from pan-Islamism to Sunni Islam. Based on the prominence accorded to the 
Sunni version of Islam, Iran was identified as a Shiite ‘other’, which was framed 
in demonizing terms. This new emerging Self/Other distinction defined not only 
the Saudi identity but also determined its identification of enemies and friends. 
Before examining the Saudi Kingdom’s ontological insecurity, I will 
briefly explore what ‘Saudi state identity’ means. As opposed to Arab states, 
where nationalism was based on ethnic elements—such as Arabism—combined 
with territorial affinities related to the struggle against colonialism, the Saudi 
Kingdom was not formed on the basis of a ‘national’ identity.44 Modern Saudi 
Arabia came into existence as a result of the Al Saud’s attempt to establish an 
Islamic monarchy on the Arabian Peninsula. The unification of the Arabian 
Peninsula was the outcome of a long-standing alliance between Muhammed Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhab (the eponym of Wahhabism) and the Al Saud.45  
Two elements constituted the identity of the newly established regime: 
religion and the loyalty to the royal family. These two basic tenets were 
identified by King ‘Abdul Aziz (known as Ibn Saud): ‘Two things are essential to 
our State and our people […] religion and the rights inherited from our fathers’ 
                                                             
44 The nature of the Saudi society—composed of diverse clans, tribes, and Bedouins—did not 
allow the emergence of a state around a collective national identity. The Arabian Peninsula was 
rarely unified until the forces of Al Saud succeeded in unifying the country in the early twentieth 
century (Kostiner 1990).  
45 Wahhabism refers to the Saudi variant of the Sunni tradition. The word ‘Wahhabism’ is 
derived from the teachings of the Muslim scholar, Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who lived on 
the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century (1703–1792). Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab founded a 
religious movement that aimed to reverse what he perceived as the moral decline of the Islamic 
society on the Arabian Peninsula. Based on an alliance between Muhammed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
and Muhammed Ibn Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state, Wahhabism provided the ruling 
family with legitimacy and a powerful tool with which to unite various tribes and regions. It is 
worth nothing that the term Wahhabism is a pejorative term. The Wahhabis call themselves 




(quoted in Nevo 1998, 35). The role played by the Al Saud in unifying the 
country provided a source of loyalty to the ruling family. Gulf States, including 
Saudi Arabia, used oil wealth to consolidate their legitimacy among various 
societal groups (E. Davis 1991, 24). Nevertheless, these new states, the Saudi 
Kingdom including, lacked a distinct identity that could stand in contrast to the 
patriotism developing in the neighbouring Arab states.46 Since the Kingdom 
contains within its borders two of the three holy cities in Islam—Mecca and 
Medina—its identity came to be based on an appropriation of Islamic symbols; 
‘our constitution is the Quran and the application of shari’a’. As Nevo (1998, 35) 
states, ‘religion has played a prominent role not only in moulding the 
individual’s private and collective identities but also in consolidating [the] 
national values’.47 According to a survey conducted in 2003, Saudis consider 
religion the most important element of their identity; territorial nationalism 
comes second (Thompson 2014, 233).  
Islam, and its Wahhabi interpretation in particular, enabled the regime to 
distinguish itself from other regional actors.48 For decades, the Kingdom relied 
on Islam to provide it with a unique identity in the region, separate from the 
secular pan-Arab ideology that swept the region during the 1950s and 1960s 
under the charismatic leadership of Egyptian President Nasser (Piscatori 
1983).49  In an attempt to discredit pan-Arabism, the Kingdom emphasized the 
imagery of the pan-Islamic umma50 and crowned itself the defender of the faith 
in the region. This pan-Islamic narrative, which prescribed solidarity among 
Muslims, was often identified by King Faisal (1964–1975) as the inherent raison 
d’être of the Saudi state (Sindi 1986). With the demise of the pan-Arab project, 
the pan-Islamic discourse gained leverage among the Arab masses. Saudi Arabia 
                                                             
46 On the lack of a national Saudi identity, see the article of the leading Saudi columnist Hamid 
Al-Din (2014). 
47 For further details on the role of Wahhabism in the formation of the Saudi state, cf. Ayoob and 
Kosebalaban (2008). 
48 This does not mean that the state identity was an amalgamation of diverse groups in the 
society. Instead, the Al Saud monopolized the state’s identity narrative. 
49 Pan-Arabism refers to the political project of unifying all Arabs under a single state. 
50 Umma is used to refer to all Muslims as one community bound by religion. 
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portrayed itself as the representative of the Muslim world and prided itself on 
being the only Islamic state to rule according to shari’a.  
While the ideal of Islamic unity and solidarity is encapsulated in the 
Quranic notion of umma, pan-Islamism became an integral component of Saudi 
regime identity and foreign policy only in the 1960s and 1970s under King 
Faisal. To promote this identity narrative, King Faisal established a number of 
national and supranational institutions that worked to promote cooperation 
and solidarity in the Muslim world (Hegghammer 2010, 17–18).51 The support 
of the Palestinian cause came as the most significant manifestation of pan-
Islamism in Saudi regime identity. The Kingdom funded the Palestinian struggle 
against Israel and directed most of its foreign aid budgets to the conflict, which 
became consistently framed in pan-Islamic terms (Ochsenwald 1981, 276). This 
pan-Islamic narrative was strongly supported by the Saudi ulama. The Grand 
Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz,52 in a mid-1960s publication, 53 proclaimed: ‘It 
is known in Islam that the call to Arab nationalism, or any other form of 
nationalism, is false and a grave mistake. It is an assault on Islam and its 
followers’ (quoted Al-Yassini 1983, 13). The pan-Islamic appeal enabled the 
Saudis to re-establish a distinguishable state identity in a region dominated by 
pan-Arabism. After the 1967 Arab defeat and the demise of pan-Arabism, Saudi 
Arabia was able to crown itself the defender of the faith in the region. 
Whereas the Saudis embraced a pan-Islamic identity, the Shah opted to 
construct an identity for the Iranian state that appealed to an Iranian 
nationalism permeated with liberal Western values. These two very distinct 
identity narratives did not deter Saudi Arabia and Iran from developing an 
entente over issues of shared interests, such as the security of the Gulf, the 
                                                             
51 The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was established between 1969 and 1972 as an 
intergovernmental organization with influence in the diplomatic sphere. In 1962, the Kingdom 
funded the foundation of the Muslim World League (MLW), which is a non-governmental 
institution involved in cultural, educational, and charitable activities. 
52 Ibn Baz, one of the most prestigious Islamic scholars, was the grand mufti for the Kingdom 
from 1993 until his death in 1999. 
53 From Abdul Aziz bin Baz’s indicative title Naqd al-Qawmiyya al-‘Arabiyya ‘alā Daw’ al-’Islām 
wa al-Wāqi‘ [A Critique of Arab Nationalism Based on Islam and Reality]. 
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alliance with the United States, and containing communism and pan-Arabism in 
the region. 
Just when Saudi Arabia had consolidated its distinct identity as the sole 
Islamic model in the region, the Islamic revolution broke out in Iran in 1979 and 
undermined the Saudi’s self-identity by altering the representation of the Other. 
The Islamic revolution downplayed Persian nationalism and promoted Islamic 
universalism. The revolution aimed to transcend its national context and called 
for Muslim unity and solidarity (Buchta 2002). The new identity of the Islamic 
Republic portrayed Iran as the vanguard of revolutionary and anti-imperialist 
Islam and the legitimate leader of the Muslim umma. It thus explicitly converged 
with the Saudi worldview, which was also based on solidarity among Muslims, 
and, hence, competed with the Saudi claim to distinctive leadership.  
Iranian foreign policy became subordinated to the new norms of the 
Islamic state encapsulated in the slogan na sharghi na gharbi, jomhuri-ye eslami 
(neither Eastern nor Western; only the Islamic republic). With this detachment 
from the Cold War rationale, the Islamic republic radically moved from 
preserving the status quo under the patronage of the United States to a 
revisionist role in the region. According to Khomeini, Muslims formed a single 
community (umma), and the existing borders were the result of imperialism 
and domination. He argued that Islam was one and that Muslims should 
henceforth unite: ‘Muslims must become a single hand. They must become a 
united hand, remain united, become one; they must not think themselves 
separate from us’ (quoted in Halliday 2002, 31). This claim remained a core 
concern for Iran and was reflected in the country’s new constitution, which 
proclaimed solidarity among Muslims transcending all sectarian divisions. 
Accordingly, the Islamic Republic pursued a foreign policy strategy that 
appealed to Arabs specifically and all Muslims generally. Iran consistently 
emphasized its commitment to the Palestinian cause. This pan-Islamist 
narrative was accompanied by increasing financial support to Hamas, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Iranians thus 
presented themselves as the leader of Islam in the region and the epitome of 
103 
 
virtue in the Arab–Israeli conflict, a narrative similar to the one embedded in 
Saudi regime identity. In other words, Iran presented an alternative to Saudi 
regime’s monopoly over the Palestinian cause. 
Pan-Islamism should serve as a common denominator between the 
Iranian Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ironically, its implications 
were divisive. The Kingdom saw the foundations of its state identity eroded. As 
a Saudi official explained this tension, 
Iran’s biggest struggle is with Saudi Arabia, not with the United States. 
Iran wants to challenge the Saudi version of Islam, that is the division of 
politics and religion. Saudi Arabia wants to help Muslims by sending 
scholars, for instance to China, and by inviting students. We educate them 
about religion without political propaganda. In Senegal, for example, Saudi 
Arabia invests money in order to improve the living conditions of the 
people without influencing them politically. Iran, on the other hand, pays 
imams to reach the masses. They want to turn the people into fanatics and 
preach how evil Saudi Arabia and the United States are (quoted in 
Marschall 2003, 48). 
The Saudi regional position as the leader of pan-Islamism was now 
challenged by another pan-Islamic movement driven by revolutionary, 
idealistic, anti-imperialist and anti-monarchic values (Adib-Moghaddam 2006, 
28–30). The distinctiveness the Saudi state claimed to have in relation to other 
actors was endangered by the rise of a pan-Islamist ideology in Iran. Saudi 
anxiety was magnified by the Iranian revolution’s efforts to discredit the 
Kingdom’s version of Islam. Turki al-Faisal Al Saud54 has offered an interesting 
perspective on the anxiety the Saudis experienced:  
Saudi Arabia is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,55 and the 
Birthplace of Islam, and as such it is the eminent leader of the wider 
Muslim world. Iran portrays itself as the leader not just of the minority 
Shiite world, but of all Muslim revolutionaries interested in standing up to 
the West (Al Saud 2013, 38). 
                                                             
54 Turki al-Faisal is a member of the Saudi royal family. From 1977 to 2001, Prince Turki was 
the director of al-mukhābarāt al ‘aāma (the Saudi general intelligence service). 
55 This title was introduced in 1986 in reaction to Iranian demands to place Mecca and Medina 
under international rule. 
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This challenge to the distinctiveness of Saudi identity was also related to 
the domestic dimension of its identity narrative. The first event in this respect 
was Juhaymān al-‘Utaybī’s seizure of the Mecca Mosque on 20 November 1979. 
Employing a discourse grounded in the Wahhabi tradition, Juhaymān accused 
the regime of deviating from Islamic values (Al-Rasheed 2006, 105). 56 
Moreover, he accused the ulama of interpreting the Quran in ways that served 
the non-Islamic policies of the ruling family (Nevo 1998, 42). Almost 
simultaneously, the Shiites in the Eastern province of the Saudi Kingdom staged 
protests on 28 November 1979. The regime claimed that its small Shiite 
community—estimated at approximately 350,000 in 1986—was subject to 
Iranian influence (Goldberg 1986, 230). Scholars of regime security approach 
argue that these domestic problems might have posed a threat to the Saudi 
regime and led the elite to reframe their identity. I however argue that the 
domestic dimension on its own could not have posed an identity risk to the 
regime. There is no compelling evidence that Iran was involved in Saudi internal 
affairs. Khomeini's speeches inspired a small number of Shiite clerics in Saudi 
Arabia (Ibrahim 2006, 117). Nevertheless, this community was small, and its 
influence on the stability of the Saudi regime was far from significant. From an 
ontological security perspective, I argue that the domestic dimension became 
only relevant because the narrative of self-identity is inextricably related to the 
interaction with the Other, which was disrupted following the critical situation 
created by the Islamic revolution. The domestic dissent only magnified the 
shakiness of the regime’s identity narrative and its ontological insecurity.  
These circumstances drove the Saudi rulers to reinvent their state’s 
identity. To re-establish a sense of self vis-à-vis the changing representation of 
the Iranian ‘Other’, they needed to separate their narrative from generic pan-
Islamic rhetoric. The Saudis thus narrowed their identity to privilege the Sunni 
tradition, known for its rejection of the Shiites as a legitimate Islamic 
community. Seeking to distinguish the Saudi version of Islam from the Iranian 
                                                             




one, the Kingdom reinvigorated a sectarian discourse. Sunni Islam was broadly 
introduced into Saudi foreign policy not as a source of legitimacy but as a 
component of Saudi regime identity distinguishing the Kingdom from the 
Islamic Republic.  
The reduction of the Saudi pan-Islamic identity to a Sunni Islamic one 
created a new Self-versus-Other distinctiveness couched in sectarian terms 
(Sunni versus Shiite). Henceforth, the Kingdom adopted an anti-Shiite discourse 
designed to discredit the pan-Islamic narrative of the Iranian revolution. In 
pursuing this endeavour, the regime strengthened the power of the ‘ulama (as 
representatives of the state religion) and promoted the Kingdom’s conservative 
Sunni image. It also reinforced a stricter Wahhabi code of conduct, granting the 
‘ulama, such as Ibn Baz, more control over social and religious life (Steinberg 
2005, 28–29). This was manifested in the strengthening of the religious strands 
in the educational system. All of this resulted in the state becoming more closely 
associated not only with Islamic symbols but also with a Sunni approach that 
rejected Shiite symbols (Niblock 2006, 55). Moreover, the Kingdom’s rulers 
aimed to consolidate the Kingdom’s image as the eminent leader of the Muslim 
world by using the title of ‘the custodian of the two holy sites’ — Mecca and 
Medina. 
In addition to creating this new distinction, the Kingdom counter-framed 
the Islamic Republic to demonize the latter’s claims. The Saudi clerical 
establishment produced an abundant flow of anti-Shiite publications to blunt 
the pan-Islamic appeal of the Islamic revolution.57 Sectarian language became 
explicit. From the perspective of the Sunni ulama, the Shiite propensity for saint 
worship, shrine and grave cults, and veneration of imams were abhorrent acts 
of polytheism (shirk). Indeed, Sunni-Wahhabi scholars pronounced Shiites to be 
‘the incarnation of infidelity, and [...] polytheists’, making it the duty of believers 
‘to manifest enmity to the polytheists [who] were perceived as unbelievers 
(kufar), and were therefore liable to the severest sanctions, including that of 
holy war (Jihad)’ (Goldberg 1986, 232). In short, this Saudi counter-framing of 
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Shi’ism placed the Iranian regime outside of the Muslim community, describing 
them as defectors (rafidda). It is important to note here that the Saudi anti-
Shiite discourse is not entirely novel (Jones 2007). Since its foundation, the 
Kingdom has announced its rejection of Shiism based on fatwas issued by 
Sheikh Taqiyy al-Dīn bin Taymiyyah, who considered Shiites to be heretics. He 
also accused Shiites of blasphemy. Accordingly, Muhammed Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, denounced all Shiites as unbelievers 
(Mouzahem 2013). Nevertheless, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Saudi 
need for identity distinctiveness led to an intensified anti-Shiite narrative. 
In short, based on the Saudi quest for distinctiveness, and ontological 
security, the representation of the ‘Saudi-Sunni Self’ was contrasted with the 
‘Iranian-Shiite Other’ in Saudi foreign policy. The discourse of exclusion—based 
on religious otherness and framed by a religious narrative—highlighted Saudi 
Arabia’s religious uniqueness, which was necessary to forge a distinct regime-
identity narrative. In other words, sectarianism was simply a strategy for re-
establishing the Kingdom’s distinctiveness and, thus, its ontological security. 
The previous interpretation of the Saudi regime identity highlighted how the 
establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran with a revolutionary pan-Islamic 
discourse undermined the very distinct identity of the Saudi Kingdom. In its 
ceaseless quest for distinctiveness, the Saudis narrowed their identity and 
reinvented a new Self/Other narrative based on sectarianism. The new 
Self/Other provided the elite with guidance in navigating a confusing and 
ambiguous relative power distribution. Henceforth, the enemy/friend 
identification emerged from this Self/Other distinction. This situation of 
ontological insecurity/physical security explains the Saudi decision to support 
Saddam Hussein against the Islamic Republic over the eight years of the Iran-
Iraq War.  
3. Syria: Demystifying Rationalism 
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If Saudi Arabia faced a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security, the 
Syrian regime was an illustration of a critical physical insecurity. This insecurity 
defined not only Syria’s friends and enemies but also its identity narrative. 
Whereas the Islamic revolution endangered the distinctiveness of the Saudi 
identity, the Syrian identity adjusted and adapted to the dictates of the regime’s 
physical security needs. This section examines why and how an Arab nationalist 
Syrian regime that claims a secular Ba’athist ideology supported non-Arab 
Iran—an Islamic regime bent on exporting its revolutionary theological 
doctrine—against a fellow Arab and Ba’athist regime, Iraq. 
‘We did not want Iran to be defeated as we were aware of Saddam 
Hussein’s plans’ (Baraka 2011). With these words, former Syrian Vice President 
Abd al-Halim Khaddam58 explicated the Syrian position in 1979. Exposed to an 
Israeli military supremacy on its western borders, Syria could not endure an 
Iraqi military victory on its east. Just at the moment when Syria was in need of a 
regional ally, a regime change in Iran provided an opportunity to balance Iraq 
and Israel. In these circumstances, the Syrian regime reframed its identity to 
embrace an alliance with a non-Arab state. The Syrian regime’s Self/Other 
distinction was based on pan-Arabism, which distinguishes between Arabs and 
non-Arabs. This identity underwent a change wherein the Self/Other distinction 
became based on the animosity toward Israel and the championing of the 
Palestinian cause. This Self/Other distinction became not necessarily tied to an 
Arab dimension. In other words, the friend/enemy dichotomy that emerged 
from Syria’s physical insecurity, guided the regime’s Self/Other distinction. This 
process has often been described in the literature as the redefinition of Arab 
nationalism in Syrian terms (Sadowski 2002; Chalala 1988; Maltzahn 2013). 
This section first unpacks Syria’s physical insecurity, which was caused by Iraq 
and Israel’s military supremacies. I then lay out the regime identity change from 
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 Abd al-Halim Khaddam was Syria’s foreign minister from 1970 until 1984 and then vice-
president of foreign affairs until 2005. In December 2005, he went to exile in France. Since then, 
he has conducted several interviews with Arab newspapers and satellite channels about his 
relationship to Hafiz al-Assad and Syria’s relationship with Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. 
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pan-Arabism to a more state-centric conception accommodating the new 
friend/enemy dichotomy. 
3.1. The Strategic Balance of Power: Limited Options 
Syria has conventionally faced unfavourable geostrategic conditions. It is 
unprotected by natural boundaries and, hence, remains vulnerable to its Arab 
(especially Iraq either under both the monarchy and the Ba’ath party) and non-
Arab neighbours (Israel and Turkey). Syria’s relatively small size and its limited 
manpower made the quest for alliances the predominant preoccupation of al-
Assad’s regime. For instance, in order to keep the balance against Israel, Syria 
sought alliances with Arab regimes: Egypt from 1966 to 1975,59 Iraq from 1965 
to 1971, and Saudi Arabia from 1971 through 1975.60 
Throughout the 1970s, al-Assad was successful in balancing Israel’s 
military capabilities. Following the 1967 defeat, al-Assad improved Syria’s 
relationship with its Arab neighbours. He sought a military alliance with Egypt, 
which he considered to be an indispensable actor in the case of war. In addition, 
he terminated Syria’s isolation from the oil- rich Gulf monarchies and concluded 
a détente with Iraq (Salloukh 2000, 400–401). During the Yom Kippur War 
(1973), the emergence of the Damascus-Riyadh-Cairo axis exemplified al-
Assad’s new pragmatic approach. While al-Assad allied with al-Sadat to combine 
Egypt and Syria’s capabilities in a coordinated attack on Israel, the Saudi 
Kingdom used the oil weapon to pressure Western powers (Sunayama 2007, 
37–39). In 1979, al-Assad’s strategy to maintain Syria’s regional role collapsed. 
Two regional developments endangered Syria’s physical security and led to its 
isolation: the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty and Iraq’s military ascent following 
the Islamic revolution in Iran. 
The withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict constituted the 
most acute challenge to the Syrian regime, as it became exposed to Israel’s 
                                                             
59 A defence agreement between Egypt and Syria was signed in 1966 ((IISS) 1979). 
60 For a summary of inter-Arab alliances, cf. Taylor (1982, 123–124).  
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military supremacy. Although the Egyptian-Syrian alliance was fruitful in 1973, 
it was severely tested by post-war diplomacy. Despite the constraints of pan-
Arabism, al-Sadat showed a willingness to enter bilateral negotiations with 
Israel under US auspices. Syria’s fears of isolation were aroused when Egypt and 
Israel signed the first American-mediated disengagement agreement in January 
1974. In September 1975, al-Sadat signed the second disengagement 
agreement, known as the Sinai II Agreement. The subsequent direct talks 
between Egypt and Israel led to the signing of the Camp David Accords in 
September 1978 and to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1979. In one 
move, this treaty removed the Arab world’s strongest actor from the Arab-
Israeli theatre and left the Syrian regime severely exposed (Drysdale and 
Hinnebusch 1991, 63–64; Ehteshami 1996, 50). In March 1978, Syria’s fears of 
Israeli military supremacy materialized when Israel invaded Lebanon and 
occupied a stretch of South Lebanon all the way to the Litany River. Lacking a 
strategic depth, Damascus was close to the dreaded scenario: an Israeli attack 
against Syria through al-Beqaa Valley and on the Golan Heights (Seale 1989, 
310–312). 
From 1977 to 1979, al-Assad attempted to restore the balance against 
Israel through three strategies: (1) increasing its military build-up with more 
reliance on the Soviet Union, (2) mobilizing an Arab opposition front to isolate 
Egypt, and (3) finding other Arab partners to counterbalance Israel’s military 
capabilities. However, these efforts were unsuccessful.  
The breakdown of the Egyptian-Syrian alliance convinced the Syrian elite 
that self-reliance in defence was a fundamental requirement of the new balance-
of-power equation. Therefore, the Syrian regime triggered a huge military build-
up, known as the ‘strategic parity’ policy (A. Khalidi and Agha 1991; Eisenstadt 
1992). Syria’s conscripted forces grew from 50,000 in 1967 to 227,500 in 1979 
((IISS) 1979, 42). More than 20 per cent of GDP was devoted to this military 
build-up. Defence expenditure increased from US$1.12 billion in 1978 to US$ 
2.04 billion ((IISS) 1979, 39, 42, 45). However, the Syrian regime was unable to 
achieve parity with Israel. In 1978, Israel had a total armed force of 164,000 
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soldiers with a potential of mobilizing up to 400,000 in 24 hours (Kandil 2008, 
428–429). The expansion of the military forces under al-Assad and the supply of 
a modern arsenal weapons placed a heavy burden on the Syrian economy and 
transformed Syria into a major recipient of Arab and Soviet military aid. By the 
late 1980s, Syria’s debt to the Soviet Union amounted to US$ 10 billion 
(Ehteshami 1996, 55). 
 Alongside this internal balancing strategy, Syria attempted to mobilize 
an Arab front to counterbalance Israel’s military preponderance. After al-Sadat’s 
visit to Jerusalem, Syria, South Yemen, Algeria, Libya and, the PLO formed the 
Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (Jabhat al-Ṣumūd wa al-Taṣadī). They 
were later joined by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Initially, the front attempted to 
convince Egypt to give up its negotiations with Israel. Following the Baghdad 
summit of November 1978, a delegation was dispatched to Cairo headed by 
Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Huss. The delegation offered al-Sadat US$ 5 
billion annually for ten years in return for not signing the peace treaty with 
Israel. However, al-Sadat refused to meet the delegation (Salloukh 2000, 433). 
Accordingly, the front moved to isolate Egypt and apply sanctions. The coalition 
had the potential to act as the most important inter-Arab force in the Arab-
Israeli sphere. Nevertheless, this Arab quasi-consensus was short-lived as Arab 
polarization emerged. In short, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front 
turned out to be ineffective in realizing Damascus’ intentions in building a front 
to counterbalance Israel. 
When Damascus observed this ineffectiveness in building an Arab 
consensus against Israel, it set its sight on Baghdad as the primary regional 
partner that could fill the vacuum caused by Egypt’s exit from the Arab camp. 
Given its military capabilities and geographic location, Iraq was the only Arab 
state capable of counterbalancing Israel. In the first half of 1979, Syria’s critical 
vulnerability and Iraq’s regional ambitions brought about what Kienle (1990, 
135) termed the ‘marriage contre nature’ between the two states. Nevertheless, 
the rapprochement was short-lived. On 28 July, Baghdad announced that a 
conspiracy against the regime has been discovered and accused Syria of 
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domestic interferece. Damascus swiftly denied any involvement in Iraqi internal 
affairs and dispatched Khaddam and al-Shihabi61 to resolve the issue. Khaddam 
later claimed that the Iraqi regime was unable to provide any concrete evidence 
of Syrian involvement (Baraka 2011). The Syrians became convinced that 
Saddam Hussein intentionally destroyed the partnership. The latter would have 
moved Iraq to the frontline confrontation with Israel; however Saddam Hussein 
was unwilling to get involved in this conflict (Khadduri 1988, 74–78). 
Obviously, the two countries pursued two different aims. While Iraq pushed for 
the unification of the Ba’ath party and states’ apparatuses under its own pre-
eminence, Syrian leaders were looking for the regional benefits of unity with 
Iraq without losing their independence. Henceforth, relations between 
Damascus and Baghdad degenerated into a cycle of mutual recrimination. By 
September 1979, Syria accused Saddam Hussein of arming and financing the 
Muslim Brotherhood to destabilize al-Assad’s regime. In less than a year, Syria’s 
strategy of relying on Iraq to balance Israel proved failure, and Baghdad turned 
from an asset into Syria’s most dangerous neighbour.  
Worse was yet to come. After the partnership between Iraq and Syria 
formally failed, Saudi Arabia consolidated a new partnership with Iraq and 
isolated Syria even further. On 17 September 1979, Saudi Minister of the 
Interior Prince Nayif concluded an agreement with Iraq on security cooperation. 
Damascus’ fears increased when a parallel Jordanian-Iraqi rapprochement 
emerged. Throughout 1979, these bilateral arrangements developed into a tacit 
alliance between Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. This rearrangement of 
allegiances in the region increased Syria’s insecurity, as the Arab focus on 
regional politics shifted from the Arab-Israeli sphere to the Gulf (Sunayama 
2007, 59–60). 
This isolation did not only affect the position of Syria on the Arab-Israeli 
front. The change in the balance of power in Iraq’s favour following the Iranian 
revolution in itself constituted another source of fear to al-Assad’s regime. Iraq’s 
                                                             
61 Hikmat al-Shihabi (1931-2013) served as the Syrian Army chief of staff from 1974 until1998. 
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aspiration for regional hegemony was manifested in its military build-up. 
Following the increase in the oil prices during the 1970s, Iraq’s military forces 
doubled in size, reaching 242,000 men by 1979. Its defence expenditures 
increased to US$ 2.67 billion (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
1980, 42). In short, Syria had to deal both with Israel’s military supremacy and 
with Iraq’s ascent, which was not only destabilizing on the ideological level but 
was also, mosre importantly, a military threat (Marschall 1992, 433–35). Both 
hostile states shared long borders with Syria, and both had considerable 
projection capabilities. Syrian leaders were aware that any confrontation with 
its Arab neighbour would mean compromising Syria’s military capabilities on 
the Golan Heights. Khaddam expressed Syria’s physical insecurity as follows: 
‘[Syria] cannot fight a hundred wars at the same time’ (Salloukh 2000, 405). 
The overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the advent of a regime that 
was not aligned with Israel provided Syria with an opportunity to balance Israel 
and limit Iraq’s regional ambitions. As Hafiz al-Assad stated, ‘This revolution 
introduced important changes in the strategic balance […] [Iran] supports the 
Arabs, without hesitation, […] for the sake of liberating our lands […] How can 
we […] lose a country like Iran of the Islamic revolution…with all its human, 
military, and economic potential’ (quoted in Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997, 
93). Al-Assad condemned Saddam for ‘launching the wrong war against the 
wrong enemy at the wrong time’. He also argued that ‘to fight Iran was folly: it 
would exhaust the Arabs, fragment their ranks and divert them from ‘the holy 
battle in Palestine’ (Seale 1989, 357). 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 presented the 
Syrian regime with an acute challenge. Syria had now to deal with the regional 
consequences of a potential Iraqi victory in the east, all while continuing to face 
a militarily superior Israel in the south. For a regime that assumed ‘any 
imbalance [khalal] in any part of the region affects all the region’, a rapid Iraqi 
victory would mean the cementing of Syria’s regional isolation. In other words, 
Syria would find itself encircled between Israel’s military supremacy and Iraq’s 
hegemonic aspirations. Khaddam portrayed Syria’s fear in this context as 
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follows: ‘the Iran-Iraq War was two wars: one against Iran and the second 
against Syria’ (Baraka 2011). In short, Syria sided with Iran to protect its 
regional position from the unbearable consequences of an Iraqi victory (Seale 
1989, 353–358; Hunter 1993, 198–210; Chalala 1988, 112–113). The alliance 
with Iran was popular neither within Syrian public opinion nor among the 
cadres of the Ba’ath party, but Syria’s physical security dictated the choice of its 
enemies and friends regardless of any domestic opposition.  (Ehteshami and 
Hinnebusch 1997, 64; Batatu 1999, 284–285). 
Thus, al-Assad’s decision to join Iran to counterbalance Iraq and Israel 
may be said to have been dictated by raison d’état (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 
1997, 102). As the sources of danger and harm were clear, Syria’s identification 
of enemies and friends came as a response to the regime’s physical insecurity. 
The observed dangers led the regime to re-interpret its identity and its related 
Self/Other identification to accommodate physical security needs. 
3.2. The Syrian Regime Identity: A Strategic Adaptation 
After accusing Egypt of challenging the very core of Arabism, al-Assad found 
himself in a similar position a year later. By allying with Iran against Iraq, Syria 
violated the most conventional pan-Arab norm.  Against the fundamental 
principle of Arabism, according to which Arabs should only unite with Arabs, al-
Assad aligned with a major non-Arab state threatening Arab states across the 
Gulf. In a futile attempt to save Syria’s Arab façade, Khaddam stated: ‘We told 
Iran that in the case of any aggression on any Arab state, Syria will follow the 
Pan-Arab dictates and support the Arab state’ (Baraka 2011). However, the 
statement completely ignored the inconvenient fact that Iraq is an Arab state. 
 The Islamic revolution in Iran did not affect the ontological security of 
the Syrian regime, which prior to 1979 had maintained a stable, distinct identity 
based on Syrianism and Arabism. Syria’s strategic isolation imposed high 
constraints on the regime’s identifications of enemies and friends, which led to 
the redefinition of Self/Other distinction. The following discussion highlights 
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the changes in Syria’s identity as a result of its alliance with Iran and of its 
animosity with Iraq and Israel. First, I present the two principles in the regime 
identity: pan-Arabism and pan-Syrian nationalism. Second, I present the 
changes in the content of the regime identity and its move toward a more 
defined ‘Syrian’ nationalism under a pan-Arab label in the context of the Iran-
Iraq War. I argue here that the us/them distinction in the regime identity 
underwent two developments. First, the definition of the Self became distinct 
from the Arab nation. More precisely, Syrian nationalism supplanted Arab 
nationalism. Second, the pan-Arab component in Syrian identity changed from 
emphasizing the unity between different Arab states to focusing on the struggle 
against Israel. As Hinnebusch (2001, 140) summarized this change, ‘the 
meaning of Arabism [altered] from a cause for which Syria would sacrifice to a 
means to reach Syrian ends’. In short, the source of distinctiveness became 
based not on Arabness but on animosity toward Israel. Accordingly, Iran 
became explicitly integrated within the ‘us’ category. This section explores the 
basic tenets of Syria’s identity and, then, traces the changes imposed by the 
physical security needs of the regime. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Syrian regime identity wavered 
between two poles: pan-Arabism and Syrianism. Pan-Arabism represents a total 
commitment to the idea of Arab unity to the extent of denying any separate 
identity to territorial states. The ideology portrays the Arab world as one Arab 
nation divided between artificially established Arab states. The ultimate goal of 
pan-Arabists was (and to a smaller degree remains today) to merge these 
territorial states into a ‘true’ Arab nation-state. Until then, the raison de la 
nation Arab should take precedence over the narrow raison d’état (W. Khalidi 
1978, 696). From this perspective, the ‘Arab Homeland’ (al-waṭan al-‘arabī) is 
the primary source of Self/Other distinction. On the other hand, pan-Syrianism 
presupposes the existence of a distinct Syrian identity, which corresponds to a 
greater Syrian state to be established within the natural geographic borders of 
bilād al-shām (Zisser 2006). Greater Syria comprises four states in terms of 
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today’s political units—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel/Palestine including 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Pipes 1990, 13–14).  
Since the early days of state formation, Syrian leaders sought a middle 
ground that would combine these two poles. They adopted an ‘Arab Syrianist’ 
identity. Syria became portrayed in the official discourse as the ‘beating heart of 
Arabism’ or ‘the cradle of Arabism’. On its independence day, President Shukri 
al-Quwatli, outlined the state identity that guided Syrian foreign policy for 
decades:  
Bilad al-Sham [which] was the cradle of the concept of ‘uruba and the 
home of its first champions and martyrs [...] has been the first Arab 
country to carry its civilizational mission to parts of the world as far away 
as [...] the hills of al-Andalus and the wall of China, declares today that it 
believes in ‘uruba […] we shall not accept that any flag other than that of 
Arab unity (wahda) will fly over this country (quoted in Kienle 1995, 58). 
The official name of the Republic—‘The Arab Syrian Republic’—
expressed the declared priorities of the state identity.62 Pan-Arab nationalist 
considerations took precedence over the particular interests of the Syrian state. 
The Ba’ath party that has dominated Syrian politics from 1963 to the present 
was established under the same ideology. ‘The unity of the Arab nation and its 
freedom’ [waḥdat al-’umma al-‘arabiya wa ḥuriyatahā] was the first principle 
enshrined in the 1947 party constitution (Kedar 2006, 2006:35). 
From the independence through the late 1970s, pan-Arabism remained 
predominant in Syria’s identity. Consequently, Arab solidarity and unity 
occupied a privileged place in the regime’s foreign policy discourse. Before 
1979, Syria initiated nine attempts for Arab unity (Khūrī 1988). Syrian foreign 
policy was often explained in Arab nationalist terms. Although it was initially 
imposed by the elites, this meaning of Arabism eventually reached the people 
who developed a real sense of integration into a larger community and a strong 
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belief in its realization. Syrian foreign policy always privileged Arabs over non-
Arabs. In countless public speeches and interviews, al-Assad highlighted that 
the cure for all Arab problems lies in the unity of all Arab states. In 1975, al-
Assad emphasized: ‘the division we are living leads to a growing regional spirit 
threatening the fate and the future of the Arab nation […] We should resist this 
division […] it is the greatest threat […] and if we beat this threat then we would 
beat any other threat all over the Arab world’  (Al-Assad 1975). 
This pan-Arab dimension manifested itself in Syrian foreign policy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question in particular. 
Syrian leaders assumed Syria to be the motherland of the other countries in the 
Levant—Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon—and considered the struggle with 
Israel to be a conflict for ‘Greater Syria’. Aware of inter-Arab rivalries, the Syrian 
regime distinguished between long-term Arab nationalist objectives and short-
term pragmatic ones. The most important long-term nationalist goal remains 
the unity of all Arabs under a federative state that would respect the historic 
idiosyncracies of each country [quṭr]. As this objective became difficult to 
materialize, Syrian leaders identified short-term objectives: recovering the 
territories occupied in 1967, retrieving Palestinian rights, and balancing Israel’s 
military power in the region. Despite this pragmatism and flexibility, Syria’s 
definition of the Self remained centred around a sense of ‘Arabness’. Syrian 
public speeches and media statements were populated with references to the 
‘Arab people’ and the ‘Arab Umma’ while references to the Syrian entity were 
ambiguous and minimal (Kienle 1995, 58–61). Arab nationalism was portrayed 
in the regime identity as the struggle to unite the Arab lands from Morocco to 
Iraq under one Arab state where the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ coincide (Dawisha 
2003; Valbjørn 2009). On 17 October 1978, Minister of Defence Mustafa Talas 
declared: ‘the Arab-Syrian [region] is the only Arab [region] which has 
undertaken to hoist above its flag the standard of Arab unity’ (quoted in Kedar 
2006, 2006:29). 
Accordingly, Syrian leaders excoriated the Egyptian exit from the Arab-
Israeli conflict and described it as a violation of the basic principle of the Arab 
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nation. Leading the third Steadfastness and Confrontation meeting against 
Egypt, al-Assad expressed his frustration as follows: ‘yesterday, al-Sadat and I 
planned the October war against Israel and he told us at the time we are the 
most honourable fighters. Today, he left the most honourable fighters alone in 
their trenches’ (H. Al-Assad 1978).  The Syrian media considered the Camp 
David Accords to be ‘a plot’, ‘a treacherous treat’, and ‘a treaty of surrender’ 
(Kedar 2006, 2006:195). 
Syria’s alliance with Iran and its subsequent identification of Iraq as an 
enemy created the potential for an inherent instability within the Syrian regime 
identity. In other words, a contradiction within the identity narrative could 
emerge, possibly triggering a case of ontological insecurity. A secular pan-Arab 
regime with a Ba’athist ideology allied with Iran, a non-Arab Islamic regime, 
against a fellow Arab Ba’athist regime in Iraq. In this sense, the Iranian 
revolution did not disrupt the stability of the Syrian regime, as the Syrian 
regime was able to maintain its Self/Other distinction. Nevertheless, 
accommodating Syria’s physical needs held the potential of creating a 
contradiction within the identity narrative. To avoid this situation, Syrian 
leaders reframed their identity. This process involved two dimensions: 
widening the definition of the Self and reframing the Self/Other distinction to 
conform to the friend/enemy dichotomy related to Syria’s new physical security 
needs. In doing so, the Syrian regime identified the Iranian Other as a friend 
whereas Iraq was portrayed as a threatening Other. 
Although the constitutive elements of Syrian nationalism were present 
since independence, the move toward the consolidation of this ‘territorial 
entity’ into a ‘nation-state’ was slow and ambivalent until 1980 (Pipes 1990, 
45–52). The failure of several Arab unity schemes and the different military 
clashes with neighbouring states—Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan—slowly led the 
Syrians to imagine and construct their own community (Sadowski 2002, 150). 
In other words, a sense of ‘otherness’ emerged that differed from the broader 
pan-Arab vision. Slowly, Syrians came to appreciate that they are not just Arabs 
or Muslims, but that they belong to a distinct state called ‘Syria’. In the 1980s, al-
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Assad actively intervened in this process and redefined the Syrian self ‘from 
above’. As Sadowski (2002, 151) summarizes this development, ‘Assad has 
tended to act as neither a pan-Arabist nor a pan-Syrianist but a Syrian’. 
Although Arab legitimacy remained the guiding theme of the regime’s public 
statements, the Self/Other distinction underwent spectacular changes.  
The primary change was the emergence of ‘Syria’ as a relatively 
autonomous entity whose interests are not necessarily compatible with those 
advocated by pan-Arabism. ‘Syria’, instead of the ‘Arab Homeland’ (al-watan al-
‘arabi) increasingly became an essential point of reference in the legitimation of 
government decisions. Even though Hafiz al-Assad and other representatives of 
the regime avoided using an explicit notion to herald this change, they 
consistently employed implicit references to the Syrian people as a distinct 
entity. After 1979, al-Assad’s speeches pointed to ‘the Syrian people’ instead of 
‘the Arab people of Syria’ and ‘the Syrian citizen’ instead of ‘the Arab citizen in 
Syria’. Moreover, the regime’s policies were justified as being in ‘Syria’s qawmi 
and watani interest’ or at least serving ‘Syria’ (Kienle 1995, 61). In this regard, 
al-Assad appealed to the experiences of the Syrian people and highlighted the 
military institution as a nationally recognizable one (Phillips 2012, 52). 
The over-arching regime identity of pan-Arabism was weakened. Still, 
instead of announcing its decline, the regime maintained the fervour of pan-
Arabism while changing its meaning in light of the material constraints 
necessitating the alliance with Iran. Arabism is not defined based on intrinsic 
characteristics—such as the Arab language or ethnic origins. Rather, it evolved 
around the struggle against Israel, which defines who the Arab is and who his 
allies are. According to this nuanced Arab identity claimed by the Syrian regime, 
Iran’s change of strategy toward Israel and its commitment to the Palestinian 
cause turned it into a new ally. In other words, Iran was no longer portrayed as 
a hostile Other, but as a friendly one. Accordingly, Syrian media praised 
Khomeini’s opposition to the Israeli-Egyptian peace settlement. As Al-Thawra’s 
headline on 27 October 1979 stated, ‘Iran: we are in the same Trench as the 
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Arabs’ (Kedar 2006, 2006:179–180). Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar‘ 
summarized the change in the Syrian conception of Arabism as follows: 
It was not long after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979 that 
the Islamic Republic of Iran was suddenly attacked for no reason. The 
attack came immediately after the success of its revolution, after it closed 
the Israeli embassy in Tehran and gave it to Palestine, and after it adopted 
Arabic as an official language in the country. It was very strange indeed for 
Muslim Iran to be attacked by an Arab capital that sponsored the Arab 
National Charter and the Arab summit, which came as a reply to the visit 
to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords (quoted in B. Rubin 2000, 22). 
In short, pan-Arabism was redefined to suit Syria’s military needs vis-à-vis 
Israel and became a concept devoid of its crucial component: Arabness. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter examined Syrian and Saudi divergent threat perceptions in the 
context of the Iran-Iraq War through the prisms of ontological and physical 
security. In the Saudi case, identity does the causal work in explaining threat 
perception, as the material power distribution at the time in question was 
ambiguous and vague. The ontological insecurity that the Saudi regime suffered 
was the primary drive behind its threat perception. To (re)institute its 
distinctiveness and identity stability, the Saudi regime narrowed down its 
identity narrative from pan-Islamism to Sunni Islam, a process that involved the 
redefinition of the Saudi Self/Other distinction. This distinction not only marked 
the development of the Kingdom’s identity but also guided the friend/enemy 
dichotomy within an ambiguous relative power distribution. In the Syrian case, 
however, the material power distribution was clear and determinate. The 
regime sought an alliance with Iran as a response to physical security needs. 
Nevertheless, this alliance held the potential for contradictions and instability 
within the regime identity narrative. Therefore, the regime identity underwent 
accommodation and adjustment.  
 These empirical cases contribute to the development of this study’s 
theoretical framework in many ways. Looking at the interaction between 
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ideational and material forces is only possible because ontological security is 
distinct from and not reducible to physical security. This two-layered 
conception of security paves the way for further interaction and engagement 
between material forces and questions of identity. The cases of Syria and Saudi 
Arabia demonstrate that physical concerns have to be combined with a 
configuration of Self/Other processes. In some cases, the Self/Other distinction 
guides the identifications of physical security threats. In other cases, physical 
security threats emerge as the primary drive behind the Self/Other 
reconfiguration.  
 In addition, the divergent cases of Syria and Saudi Arabia help identify the 
different mechanisms according to which actors (re)institute their ontological 
and physical security. Actors can restore their ontological security by 
demonizing the Other and reinventing their identity distinctiveness. Physical 
security can be reinstituted through privileging a particular Self/Other 
distinction. Beyond this major theoretical proposition, the empirical cases 
discussed above are two examples of how identity narratives provide a bridge 
between domestic and external spheres. In the process of Self/Other 
reconfiguration, Syria and Saudi Arabia reinvented their identity narratives by 
emphasizing certain existing components of their identity. These elements did 
not exogenously emerge at the relational level but were deep-rooted in the 
domestic texture of those political entities.  
 Although Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions during the Iran-Iraq War 
demonstrate the benefit of analytically dissociating ontological and physical 
security, they also illustrate the interaction between both spheres. In the Saudi 
case, ontological insecurity led to a sense of physical insecurity. The new 
Self/Other distinction influenced the process of friend/enemy identification. To 
consolidate its distinctiveness and ontological security, the Kingdom went 
further to portray Iran not only as a distinct and different Other, but as an 
eminent enemy. This interaction has implications for the theoretical argument 
of this study. Although actors can be located in one of the four combinations of 
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ontological and physical security presented in the previous chapter, ontological 
and physical security affect each other. The Saudi Kingdom initially experienced 
a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security. By identifying Iran as an 
enemy and supporting Iraq, the Kingdom’s subsequent foreign policy led to 
physical insecurity. In the process of restoring its ontological security, the 
Kingdom moved to a situation of ontological security/physical insecurity. 
 The Syrian case reflected a different dynamic. The al-Assad regime initially 
faced a situation of ontological security/physical insecurity. The alliance with 
Iran was an attempt to increase Syria’s physical security vis-à-vis Iraq’s regional 
ambitions and Israel’s military supremacy. One of the consequences of this 
alliance was a challenge to the consistency of al-Assad’s regime identity. In 
other words, the Syrian regime moved to a situation of ontological 
insecurity/physical security. To avoid the exacerbation of this inconsistency, the 
regime undertook a reframing of its identity. 
 To conclude, this empirical chapter has shown the benefit of addressing the 
following interrelated questions in an integrative theoretical framework: how to 
maintain the stability and consistency of Self-narratives? How to transform the 
relation with the Other? Finally, how does identity relate to physical security 




Chapter 4: Explaining Saudi and Syrian Threat Perceptions 
during the 2006 Lebanon War 
 
‘[This war] exposed half-men and people with half-
positions, and exposed all [people with] ‘delayed’ 
positions, i.e. those who waited to see where the scale of 
power would settle before aligning their positions’. 
Bashar Al-Assad, August 2006 (B. Al-Assad 2006b). 
 
 
This chapter examines Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during the 2006 
Lebanon War. Although the war occured between Israel and a non-state actor in 
the Lebanon, its implication transcended the boundaries of the Lebanese-Israeli 
conflict and caused regional divisions and divergences. The Saudi Kingdom, 
conventionally portraying itself as the main supporter of the Arab cause against 
Israel, appeared to side with Israel against a resistance movement. 
Consequently, a controversial question arises: why would a non-state actor with 
limited capabilities— located, moreover, far from Saudi borders—be perceived 
as a threat? Meanwhile, Syria, a Ba’athist secular regime, oppressing Islamist 
movements at home, supported Hezbollah and engaged in a pan-Arab discourse. 
In light of these complexities, this chapter looks at these two cases of threat 
perception through the two-layered conception of security: ontological and 
physical. Whereas Hezbollah constituted a source of identity instability for the 
Saudi Kingdom and, hence, endangered its ontological security, Israel’s military 
supremacy constituted the primary source of danger to the physical security of 
the Syrian regime.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first outline disparate regional 
reactions to the 2006 Lebanon War. I then examine the Saudi enmity toward 
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Hezbollah. By looking at the relative power distribution at the regional level, I 
conclude that the physical security of the Kingdom was not affected by the war. 
However, Hezbollah’s version of Islamic identity and its conception of ‘Islamic 
resistance’ endangered the ontological security of the Kingdom. I then examine 
the Syrian threat perception. I argue that the regional power distribution and 
the material constraints following the 2003 Iraq war isolated Damascus and 
endangered its physical security. In this context, Hezbollah emerged as a 
strategic asset for the regime. To accommodate these material constraints, the 
Syrian regime identity underwent a reconfiguration of the Self/Other. 
1. The 2006 Lebanon War and Regional Reactions 
Following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, the struggle 
between Israel and Hezbollah continued on a small scale. Hezbollah maintained 
the legitimacy of the ‘resistance’ against Israel by focusing on two issues: the 
recovery the Shab‘a farms63 and the liberation of Lebanese prisoners held in 
Israel. This state of affair collapsed in the summer of 2006 when Hezbollah 
kidnapped two Israeli soldiers with the intent of using them in prisoner 
exchanges. Although this action had a precedent in previous prisoner 
exchanges, Israel retaliated with a massive attack that lasted from12 July until 
14 August 2006. Throughout the thirty three days of the war, popular and 
societal expressions of support for Hezbollah resounded throughout the Arab 
world (’Aḥmad 2006). Regional opinion polls ranked Hezbollah’s leader, Sayyid 
Hassan Nasrallah, as the most admired Arab leader (Telhami 2007). 
Although Arab societies expressed unified support for Hezbollah, the war 
was the source of contention among Arab regimes. Alongside its violent conflict 
with Israel, Hezbollah was engaged in a bloodless clash with Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and Jordan. Saudi officials spoke of Hezbollah’s ‘reckless adventurism’. 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah of Jordan accused 
                                                             
63 Shab’a Farms is a small strip of disputed land at the intersection of the Lebanese-Syrian 
border and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. 
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Hezbollah of ‘dragging the region into adventures’ (Rasid Al-Ikhbariyya 2006).64 
Whereas Syria supported Hezbollah due to the fear of an Israeli military 
supremacy in the region, this constituted a regional exception. The Saudi 
Kingdom, which portrayed itself as a long supporter of the Arab cause against 
Israel, astonishingly condemned Hezbollah. In addition, it identified this 
resistance movement as endangering Arab interests and putting the stability of 
the region at risk.65  
Two politicized narratives emerged to explain the divergence in Arab 
positions. The first was articulated by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice. According to her, the region was divided between ‘violent radicals’ and 
‘moderate reformists’. The former group was constituted of Hezbollah, Hamas, 
Syria, and Iran.66 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan led the other camp, in a way 
that conformed to the United States’ vision for a New Middle East. As Lynch  
(2010) notes, ‘The Bush administration sought to polarize the Middle East into 
an axis of ‘moderates’— grouping Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and other like-
minded Sunni autocrats with Israel—against ‘radicals’ such as Iran, Syria, 
Hezbollah and Hamas’. Another narrative was sponsored by the so-called 
‘moderate’ camp, which described their clash with Hezbollah using sectarian 
terms. Talks of a ‘Shiite axis’ comprising Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran became 
widely spread.67 Accordingly, the 2006 Lebanon War was portrayed as a proxy 
war launched by Iran to destabilize the region. In Saudi Arabia, this position was 
supported by regime owned-media outlets, such as the newspaper Al-Sharq al-
Awsat and the satellite channel al-Arabiya. Some scholars have also embraced 
this sectarian narrative (Nakash 2011; Yamani 2008; Zisser 2009a). For 
example, Susser (2007) states, ‘the fault line between Middle Eastern states is 
no longer monarchies versus republics or pro-US governments versus pro-
                                                             
64 For the full statement, cf. (Al-Ahram 2007:9). 
65 Some accounts went further to claim that Saudi Arabia implicitly supported Israel (Bilqīz 
2006, 70). 
66Also called Jabhat al-Muqāwama wa al-Mumāna‘a [Resistance and Defiance Front]. 




Soviet one, but the Sunni-Shi’ite divide’. Similarly, Nasr (2006) predicts that 
cleavages within Islam would shape future political dynamics in the Middle 
East. Beyond these politicized narratives, IR scholars have refrained from 
conducting theoretically informed studies of Arab regimes’ behaviour.68 
This chapter argues that threat perception is more complex than the 
sectarian or the moderate-radical narratives would suggest. The alliance 
between Syria and Hezbollah is far from being driven by religious convergence. 
Similarly, the Saudi fear from Hezbollah is not related to Shiism per se. I argue 
that a two-layered conception of security—ontological and physical—provides 
a third fruitful approach for understanding the seemingly odd foreign policy 
choices these two states made in the course of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict. For 
this reason, the aim of this present chapter is to move beyond these politicized 
and simplistic narratives to offer more rigorous and theoretically grounded 
explanations for Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions in 2006.  
2. Saudi Arabia: Resisting the Resistance 
From a realist perspective, scholars have argued that Saudi animosity toward 
Hezbollah represented a balancing strategy against an expanding Iranian 
influence in the region (cf. Gause 2007). Nevertheless, this argument does not 
explain how a non-state actor fighting Israel on southern Lebanese borders can 
be considered a military threat to the security of the Kingdom. In the following 
section, I demonstrate that Hezbollah, despite its alliance with Iran, could not 
endanger the physical security of the Kingdom. Instead, I argue that Saudi 
Arabia feared Hezbollah’s Islamic conception of resistance, which endangered 
Saudi conception of the Self. To bloster its ontological security, the Kingdom 
framed its Self/Other distinction based on a sectarian narrative, which 
influenced its perception of enemies and friends. 
                                                             




2.1. The Relative Power Distribution: Saudi Physical Security 
Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the destruction of 
Iraq’s military capabilities, Iran gained prominent influence in the Arab world 
(Rajab 2010, 293–299). Considering Hezbollah’s strategic alliance with Iran and 
Syria, Saudi opposition to Hezbollah might be read as a raison d’état reaction to 
balance Iran in the Middle East. Nevertheless, this realist-inspired narrative 
alone is insufficient for explaining Saudi opposition to Hezbollah. First, US 
military capabilities in the region are more important than Iranian ones. Second, 
this narrative assumes that regional actors lack agency. Hezbollah is not a mere 
Iranian offshoot in Lebanon.  
The fall of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq following the US-led invasion in 2003 
removed a critical set of military threats to the Kingdom and brought a new 
power distribution to the region. As its conventional military forces were 
destroyed, Iraq no longer poses any military threat to the Saudis or to any of its 
neighbours. Before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had over one million men in 
uniform, 5500 battle tanks, and one of the largest deployed air defence systems 
in the world. The Gulf War (1990-91) destroyed around 40 per cent of Iraq’s 
military capabilities. After the Gulf War, Iraq could not repair this damage as it 
was not allowed to import arms (Cordesman and Obaid 2005, 3). By 2003, Iraq 
had approximately 400, 000 men under arms, and demonstrated little 
conventional warfighting capabilities (The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies IISS 2003, 110–111). With the US-led invasion, Iraq’s land forces, its 
naval forces, and its air-defence were entirely destroyed within few weeks. In 
short, any potential Iraqi conventional military threat to Saudi Arabia vanished 
for decades. 
The destruction of Iraq’s conventional capabilities led to an 
unprecedented vacuum in the Persian Gulf. As the Gulf monarchies were unable 
to fill this void, Iran emerged as the only rising power in the region. Iran’s 
military capabilities seemed impressive compared to those of the six Gulf 
monarchies seemed dominant. Whereas the Gulf monarchies had approximately 
127 
 
10,391,795 men in uniform in 2003, Iran had 18,319,545 men in 2004 (Langton 
2004, 121–140). The conscript in Iran was approximately 540,000 as opposed 
to 330,800 in the six Gulf monarchies (Cordesman 2004, 2–3). Despite its failure 
to export the Islamic revolution to the Arab world throughout the 1980s, Iran 
deployed successful efforts to expand an indirect influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and 
among the Palestinians. In Iraq, the Islamic Republic has enjoyed political and 
military influence, supporting the Shiite governments from 2003 onwards. Iran 
swiftly recognized the transitional government on 17 November 2003 and 
restored full diplomatic relations with Iraq on 18 April 2004 (Rajab 2010, 294). 
In addition, by the time of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict the Iranian influence had 
extended to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. During the Palestinian Intifada of 
2000, Supreme Leader Khamenei referred to Palestine as ‘a limb of our body’ 
(quoted in Wehrey et al. 2009, 23). Alongside the verbal support, Iran became a 
major player in Gaza through its financial support for Hamas and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ). 
Since its establishment in 1982, Hezbollah was identified as an Iranian 
ally. In the wake of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a group of clerics 
drifted away from Mūsā al-Ṣadr’s69  movement Ḥarkat al-Maḥrūmīn [The 
Movement of the Deprived] and established a militia to resist the Israeli 
invasion (Fuller 2007, 141–142). This militia constituted the basis for 
Hezbollah, whose organization was officially announced in 1985 with an ‘open 
letter’ to the ‘Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World’ (translated in A. Norton 
1987, 167–187). This document clearly reflects an ideological inspiration from 
Khomeini’s interpretation of wilāyet al-faqīh [The Rule of Jurisprudence]. The 
founders of the group expressed their loyalty to the Islamic Revolution and 
pronounced themselves as ‘[abiding] by the orders of a single, wise and just 
command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent (waliyy al-
faqīh), currently embodied in the Supreme Ayatullah Ruhollah al-Musawi al-
                                                             
69 Al-Ṣadr was an Iranian cleric who came to Lebanon in the late 1950s and assumed a 
prominent role in the mobilizing Shia community on the social and political levels. For more 
details, cf. Norton (2007). 
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Khomeini […] who has detonated the Muslims’ revolution, and who is bringing 
about the glorious Islamic renaissance’.  
The document framed its worldview around struggle of the oppressors 
versus oppressed. Whereas the oppressors identified by Khomeini in the 
context of the Islamic revolution were the Shah’s regime and Western powers 
(particularly the United States). Hezbollah’s oppressors were the invading 
Israelis and supporters, the United States including. The document explicitly 
states that: ‘Imam Khomeini has stressed time and again that America is behind 
all our catastrophes, and it is the mother of all vice […] The US, its NATO allies, 
and the Zionist entity in the holy land of Palestine [Israel] attacked us and 
continues to do so without respite’ (Alagha 2011, 40–41). Moreover, Hezbollah 
leaders have often expressed their loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini and his 
successors (Hamzeh 2004, 38–48). 
Beyond this ideological subscription to the Islamic revolution, Hezbollah 
has been a prominent recipient of financial support from Iran, which has been 
reflected in the group’s social and philanthropic programs.70 In addition, Iranian 
funding has extended to military assistance (El Husseini 2010, 809; Levitt 2007, 
137). According to reasonable estimates, this support has been of 
approximately US$ 25-50 million per year (Cordesman 2006a, 3). Beyond 
financial and military aid, Iran provided Hezbollah with logistical support. In the 
early days of Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) trained 
the party of God’s members in Iran or in al-Beqaa Valley in Lebanon (Fuller 
2007, 142; Mus‘ad 2006, 301–302; Qassem 2005, 240). Even after their official 
withdrawal from Lebanon in the early 1990s, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards continued to train Hezbollah’s members (Hamzeh 2004, 71). 
In this context, Saudi discourse was able to portray Hezbollah as an 
offshoot of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon. On 29 July 2006, the Saudi-owned 
daily newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published a detailed article on the 
                                                             
70 This assistance did not officially come from governmental channels. Instead, it came from 
charitable foundations affiliated with the Supreme Leader. 
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assistance that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard extended to Hezbollah. The article 
went as far as to claim that the Revolutionary Guards officers were fighting 
along with Hezbollah (Zādah 2006). Saudi Columnist Mshari al-Dyadhi 
expressed the fear of an expanding Iranian influence as follows: ‘examine all the 
big Arab portfolios—Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. They are being stolen from 
Arab hands […] and turned over to Iranian hands gradually’ (quoted Wehrey 
2011, 22). Other Arab regimes—mainly Egypt and Jordan—seconded this Saudi 
position during the meeting of Arab foreign ministers meeting on 16 July 2006, 
as they announced their ‘complete refusal to all projects that aim to turn 
Lebanon into a theatre for open confrontations to achieve regional and 
international goals at the expense of the national interest of the Lebanese 
people and their security and stability’ (Ḥasīb 2006, 44–45; Al Riyadh 2006). 
Considering the Hezbollah-Iran connection, the Saudi perception of 
Hezbollah as a threat could be seen through the lens of physical security needs, 
according to which Riyadh needed to balance Teheran’s infiltration in the 
region. I argue that this realist-inspired narrative misses the bigger picture. 
Despite its connection with Iran, Hezbollah could not and did not pose a threat 
to the physical security of the Kingdom. 
First, even though Iran could be considered to pose a conventional 
military threat to Saudi Arabia at this juncture, this does not mean that the 
Iranian power was left unbalanced. Ever since its involvement in Iraq in 2003, 
the United States was willing to increase its military presence in case its 
geostrategic interests were threatened, such as the flow of oil from the Gulf. 
Moreover, the United States maintained military bases in various Gulf states. 
They also deployed large military forces in countries neighbouring Iran from 
the east (Afghanistan) and the west (Iraq) (Kam 2004, 18–20). Accordingly, the 
military presence of the superpower in the region constituted a considerable 
source of pressure on Iran. As shown on the map below, after 2003, Iran became 
surrounded virtually on all sides by countries associated with the United States 
and hosting US military bases, with considerable projection capabilities (Piven 
2012). In this context, Iranians became aware of their limited capabilities. As 
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Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarif explained, ‘Do you think the 
United States, which can destroy all our military systems with one bomb, is 
scared of our military system?’ (quoted in Chubin 2014, 66). Alongside the 
superpower’s presence in the region, the collapse of Iraq’s military power 
provided Israel with a set of opportunities to entrench its military supremacy, 
which in itself also would impede any Iranian expansion in the region.  
 
 
Source: Dufour (2007). 
Second, Iran’s infiltration in the region might be considered a sign of 
weakness rather than power. As Wehrey et al. (2009, 22) argue that ‘Iran’s 
hyperactivism on pan-Arab issues is not necessarily proof of its influence, but 
rather just the opposite—an effort to overcompensate for its fundamental 
isolation from the rest of region’. In other words, appealing to ‘Arab’ issues 
reveals Iran’s failure to export its revolution and to mobilize any mass-based 
opposition to existing regimes in the Arab world. Moreover, Iran is separated 
from Saudi Arabia by an oceanic moat (the Gulf) and lacks meaningful 
technological capabilities to project its military power across the Gulf or even to 
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the Arab-Israeli sphere (Chubin 2014). In addition, Iran’s infiltration in the 
region does not mean that it will become a dominant power. As Gause 
eloquently expresses it, ‘If the United States, with all its power, could not 
dominate the region post-2003, it is hard to imagine that Iran could’ (Gause 
2011, 182). 
Moreover, Iran’s conventional military power is far less modern than it 
was during the time of the Shah, or during the Iran-Iraq War. Most of its military 
equipment is aging, and arm imports have considerably decreased since the 
eight-year conflict. According to US estimates, Iran imported US$ 8.8 billion 
worth of arms between 1988 and 1991, but only US$ 2 billion between 1996 
and 1999, and US$ 600 million between 2000 and 2003 (Cordesman and Obaid 
2005, 16). Its overall military expenditures were comparatively limited in the 
last two decades. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
estimates the Iranian military expenditure of US$ 3.051 billion in 2003 and US$ 
5.2 billion in 2005. In contrast, according to the IISS, Saudi Arabia spent US$ 
18.747 billion in 2003 and US$ 18.4 billion in 2005 (The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies 2006; The International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS 
2003). If Iran’s military expenditures can be compared to that of the Gulf 
monarchies, it is hard to argue that it aspires to military hegemony (Cordesman 
2014). As Chubin (2014, 65) succinctly states, ‘by orthodox standards Iran is 
militarily weak, and cautious, defensive and prudent in resorting to force’. 
Third, and most importantly, the Hezbollah-Iran connection cannot be 
seen as a mechanical transfer of Iranian power to Lebanon. Whereas Western 
and Saudi discourses claimed that Hezbollah’s decision to kidnap the two 
soldiers was an Iranian-led operation,71 there is no evidence of any control of 
Iran over Hezbollah. The Hezbollah-Iran connection can be rather considered a 
conventional form of alliance. In responding to the claims that Iran directed 
                                                             
71 This claim is based on the assumption that Iran used Hezbollah as a card in its negotiations 
with the United States, especially with regard to the nuclear programme. For example, 
Makovsky (2006) mentions that on the eve of the kidnapping of the two soldiers, Ali Larijani, 
Iran’s head of the Supreme National Security Council, threatened that the West ‘will suffer if the 
Iranian nuclear issue was taken back to the United Nations Security Council’. 
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Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah declared, ‘This is a great lie. We are an independent 
Lebanese organization. We do not take orders from anyone. However, this does 
not mean that we are not going to form alliances’ (CounterPunch News Service 
2006). Most analysts have argued that despite the financial and ideological 
linkage with Iran, Hezbollah is an independent local organization. Based on 
interviews with Israeli decision-makers conducted in August 2006, Cordesman 
(2006b) stresses that no Israeli officer thought that Hezbollah was acting under 
Iranian command. According to Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh 
Na‘im Qassem (2005, 56–57), 
There is no connection between the internal administration of the Iranian 
state and Hezbollah’s administration. These are two separate issues, each 
having its own particularities and bodies of administration, despite the 
commitment of both to the commands and directions of the Jurist-
Theologian. 
Furthermore, Hezbollah’s relations with Iran have wavered over time. 
The death of Ayatullah Khomeini as well as the end of the Cold War led to 
significant changes in Iranian foreign policy towards Lebanon, and towards 
Hezbollah in particular (El Husseini 2010, 807; A. R. Norton 1999, 18). As a 
result, Hezbollah’s leaders turned to the domestic sphere and made a 
considerable effort to transform the militia into a Lebanese political party. Since 
the 1991 elections, Hezbollah has participated in all Lebanese parliamentary 
and municipal elections. This process is often termed as the ‘Lebanonization’ of 
Hezbollah.72 The 2009 New Hezbollah Manifesto unmistakably reflected this 
process. The document defers the ideologically inspired goal of establishing an 
Islamic state in Lebanon. Moreover, it places Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran 
squarely in the context of its relations with other Islamic countries. The New 
Manifesto explicity states: 
In this context, Hezbollah considers Islamic Iran to be a focal nation in the 
Islamic world. For Iran was the country that thwarted the Zionist-U.S. 
scheme through its national revolution, supported resistance movements 
in our region, and stood with courage and determination alongside Arab 
                                                             
72 For further details on this process, cf. Hamzeh (1993) and Norton (1999). 
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and Islamic causes, at the forefront of which is the Palestinian cause 
(Alagha 2011, 131). 
Signs of this wavering relationship between Iran and Hezbollah were 
manifested even during the 2006 War. Beyond verbal support, Iranian officials 
denied any military intervention to support Hezbollah. In his meeting with 
Lebanese Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh, Iranian Ambassador Muḥamad Riḍā 
stated that: ‘There is no military defence treaty between Iran and Lebanon, 
similar to the one we have with Syria. Regardless of this matter, historical 
records clearly show that Iran has been, still is, standing behind Lebanon’ (Al-
Hayat 2006a). In response to allegations that the Revolutionary Guards were 
assisting Hezbollah, Hamid Rida Asifi, the spokesman of Iran’s foreign minister, 
denied the existence of any Iranian soldiers in Lebanon and stressed that 
Iranian support for Hezbollah is limited to ‘political, diplomatic, and 
humanitarian support’ and if ‘there was any military support, Israel would be 
defeated long before’ (Al-Hayat 2006b). 
From this perspective, Hezbollah did not, in the run up to the 2006 war, 
pose a physical security danger to Saudi Arabia. The organization’s linkage with 
Iran or Syria did not even imply any Iranian influence in the region that could 
threaten the physical security of the Kingdom. Israel’s supremacy in the Arab-
Israeli sphere would not allow Hezbollah to play a military role beyond the 
Lebanese borders. Why then was a Lebanese local organization identified as a 
threat to the Kingdom? The following section argues that Hezbollah’s Islamic 
identity threatened the identity stability of the Kingdom. The process of 
ontological security restoration involved reframing the Self/Other narrative 
based on sectarian terms. This Self/Other distinction influenced the Saudi 
identification of friends and enemies during the 2006 War.   
2.2. Regime Identity and the Ontological Security of Sectarianism 
Since 1967, Saudi Arabia has played a prominent role in the Arab struggle 
against Israel through financial and diplomatic means. Despite this traditional 
position against Israel, the Saudis astonishingly condemned Hezbollah in July 
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2006. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an Arab state 
claiming the leadership of the Muslim world condemned a resistance movement 
and inadvertently backed Israel (Yamani 2008, 153). This section argues that 
Hezbollah’s Islamic identity narrative challenged the stability and the 
distinctiveness of the Saudi regime. As a response, the Kingdom framed a 
Self/Other distinction based on sectarianism (Sunni versus Shiite). This newly 
framed ‘Other’ was furthermore identified as an enemy.  
The Saudi involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict manifested itself in 
two aspects. First, the Kingdom financially supported the frontline states—
Egypt, Jordan, Syrian, and the PLO—in their struggles against Israel, especially 
after 1967. Second, the Kingdom emerged as the primary regional mediator in 
the conflict (Kostiner 2009; Al-Dakhīl 2007; Kamrava 2013). The Kingdom put 
forward a progressive agenda that portrayed the Arab interest as pacifying the 
Arab-Israeli conflict through the peace process. Furthermore, this role became 
embedded in the Saudi Islamic narrative. 
The first Saudi mediation was in the early 1980s with the Fahd peace 
plan, 73 which illustrated the Saudi vision supporting a peaceful settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In contrast to the Egyptian initiative in Camp David, 
which was based on bilateral negotiations with Israel, Saudi Arabia promoted a 
comprehensive peace plan including all Arab states in order to avoid any rift 
within the Arab camp. Among the eight points proposed by the Fahd plan, the 
seventh point stipulated that all Middle East states have the right to live in 
peace. In other words, if Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967, 
it will be given the right to live in peace with the other states in the region 
(Kostiner 2009, 419). The peace initiative was a Saudi attempt to bring the 
whole region to order while positioning the Kingdom as the maestro of this 
concert.  
This Fahd plan constituted a compromise that enabled Riyadh to 
capitalize on its relationship with Washington while maintaining a consistent 
                                                             
73 For more details on the Fahd Peace Plan, see Long (1986). 
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Islamic identity narrative (Sela 1998, 274). During the 1970s, the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty created a rift in the US-Saudi partnership, as the Kingdom 
found itself forced to participate in the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation 
Front boycotting and punishing Egypt (Kostiner 2009, 418; Sunayama 2007, 
54–55). While promoting its pan-Islamic narrative in the region by 
demonstrating solidarity against Israel, Saudi Arabia employed the peace plan 
to portray itself in the West as a promoter of peace. Nevertheless, the initiative 
was not successful. The Fahd plan encountered Syrian opposition and was foiled 
by the absence of the Syrian delegation from the Arab summit meeting in Fez, 
Morocco in November 1981. Following this Arab objection, the Saudi initiative 
was reintroduced with changes at the second Fez Summit in September 1982. 
The seventh point stressing that all states in the region have the right to exist in 
peace was eliminated (Kostiner 2009, 419–420).  
In 2002, Saudi Arabia re-cultivated the same strategy through the 
Abdullah peace initiative—also known as the ‘Arab Peace Initiative’. Instead of 
offering Israel mere ‘recognition’, this new plan offered full ‘normalization’ with 
the Jewish state in return for the complete withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. 
This new Saudi initiative reflected Arab states’ weakness; Egypt under the 
leadership of Mubarak was unwilling to play a regional role, and Iraq was 
extremely weakened and isolated ever since the invasion of Kuwait. All Arab 
states unanimously accepted this initiative during a summit in Beirut in March 
2002 (Bahgat 2009a).  
In the meantime, the peace-making strategy became embedded in the 
Kingdom’s identity narrative. In other words, the Saudi role in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict became inextricably related to the Kingdom’s position as the guardian 
of Islam’s holiest sites. Religious clerics close to the royal family claimed that 
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from a religious perspective seeking peace is more favourable than taking risks 
and going to war. As ‘Abd al-Muhsen al-‘Ubayykan74 (2006) stated, 
[A] condition of Jihad is the possession of sufficient power to defeat the 
enemy, repulse its evil, and ensure the safety of the Muslim people’s lives, 
property, and honour and safeguard them from assault and loss, namely, 
the squandering of resources, violation of honour, and loss of lives. [… ] If 
we consider [the prophet’s example] and compare the two situations, we 
will find that at this time we are required to make a truce with the Jews or 
seek peaceful political solutions on the grounds that the Muslims lack the 
requirement of sufficient military strength. This can continue until the 
time when the Muslims are prepared to regain their rights because they 
have sufficient power. In this way we will be obeying the prophet’s 
example in word and deed’  (emphasis added). 
By linking its role in the peace process to an Islamic narrative, the Kingdom tied 
the legitimacy of its foreign policy to the stability of its identity narrative. 
Accordingly, Hezbollah’s conception of ‘Islamic resistance’ not only challenged 
the Saudi role in the conflict but also endangered the stability of its identity 
narrative. 
Whereas Saudi Arabia claimed that the Arab Peace Initiative was the only 
solution capable of preserving the ‘Arab interest’ (Teitelbaum 2009, 19), 
Hezbollah presented a competing vision based on armed resistance 
(muqāwama). Since the party’s foundation in the early 1980s, Hezbollah’s 
raison d’être has been intimately tied to resistance against the Israeli 
occupation of South Lebanon. Hezbollah has defined itself as a ‘jihadi 
movement’, whose ultimate priority has been the liberation of the Lebanese 
territory from Israeli occupation as well as the Liberation of Palestine. 
Accordingly, for Hezbollah, resisting the occupation took precedence over the 
goal of establishing an Islamic state. In addition, this declared objective could 
only be achieved through armed resistance (Saad-Gorayeb 2002, 112–117). 
Because it considers Israel an oppressive occupying force, Hezbollah defines 
                                                             
74 Al-‘Ubayykan is a senior ultraconservative Wahhabi cleric. He was member of the Shura 
Council and a consultant for the Ministry of Judiciary. Moreover, he was adviser to the Royal 
cabinet until he was dismissed in May 2012. 
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‘Jihad’75 as a ‘defensive’ duty (Mahmoud 2010, 42–44). Consequently, by 
capturing the two Israeli soldiers on the morning of 12 July 2006, Hezbollah 
considered itself to be taking a legitimate action to restore its rights, which 
included liberating the Shab‘a farms, exchanging the soldiers for Lebanese and 
Palestinian war prisoners, and deterring Israel from any expansion in Lebanon 
(Ḥasīb 2006, 26–28). As Sheikh Qassim (2007) declared, ‘The confrontation 
with Israel is not an elementary choice for the resistance, but it is a current and 
future defensive choice’. 
Behind the logic of armed of resistance lies a strong belief in the 
unviability of the land-for-peace based negotiations with Israel. First, this 
position stemmed from Hezbollah’s non-recognition of Israel, which the party 
considers to be an unjust oppressor state.76 Second, the negotiations have so far 
proven fruitless. As ‘Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah’s former secretary-general, has 
expressed it, ‘Any rational person who thinks objectively will reach one 
conclusion: that force is the only option when political activity and negotiations 
are of no avail. We announce that resistance is our only choice and that our talk 
is based on logic’ (quoted in Saad-Gorayeb 2002, 120). According to Hezbollah, 
Israel cannot be trusted, and the conflict will continue until all Muslim 
territories are liberated (Bilqīz 2006, 48–50). According to Sheikh Qassim, 
‘Confrontation with Israel is inevitable. If we refuse the occupation of our lands, 
we should expect violent confrontation because Israel is aggressive, 
expansionist, and self-oriented’ (2007).  Hezbollah believes that even if Israel 
was granted recognition by the entire Arab region, it would not withdraw from 
the occupied territories (Mahmoud 2010, 43). This belief was based on 
Hezbollah’s experience; Israel withdrew to the security zone in 1985 and from 
the South of Lebanon in 2000 only because of the armed resistance.  
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Still, Hezbollah’s armed approach to the conflict per se did not challenge 
the Kingdom. Instead, it was the Islamic colour of the resistance that disrupted 
the stability of the Kingdom’s identity. Although Hezbollah’s pan-Islamic 
ideology and its related goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon has 
wavered and become increasingly replaced by political pragmatism, the party is 
still fighting Israel under a banner of ‘Islamic resistance’ (A. R. Norton 2007, 83; 
Bassedas 2009, 18–28). This Islamic dimension has been based on the concept 
of Jihad. Although Hezbollah’s concept of Jihad borrowed heavily from 
Khomeini’s doctrine, its ideological flexibility and its exlusive focus on fighting 
Israel made it appealing to Arab public opinion. In addition, Hezbollah’s path of 
Jihad against Israel and its commitment to the Palestinian cause has served a 
role model for other groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas 
(Hamzeh 2004; Khashan and Mousawi 2007). In short, Hezbollah’s logic of 
resistance has undermined the Saudi identity narrative favouring peace 
negotiations. Furthermore, it has impeded the Kingdom from speaking in the 
name of Islam.  
The Saudi official position toward Hezbollah reflected the regime’s 
anxiety. Following the outbreak of the Lebanese conflict, a Saudi formal 
statement on 13 July 2006 accused Hezbollah of ‘not serving the Arab interest’, 
which can be implicitly understood as the stability of the region based on the 
peace process promoted by the Kingdom. Resenting Hezbollah’s logic of armed 
resistance, the statement distinguished between ‘legitimate resistance’ and 
‘miscalculated adventures’. Saudi Arabia accused Hezbollah of ‘adventurism’ as 
its actions were carried ‘without consultation or coordination with Arab 
countries’. The Saudi statement further described Hezbollah as threatening the 
Arab interest by ‘creating a gravely dangerous situation exposing all Arab 
countries and its achievements to destruction with those countries having no 
say’. 77 On 14 July 2006, the same statement was issued again with the same text 
with the following added concluding paragraph: ‘The Kingdom will continually 
                                                             




seek for security and stability in the region, exerting everything that it can do to 
protect the Arab nation from an Israeli oppression and transgression’.78 This 
Saudi leading role in defining the Arab-Israeli agenda was seconded on 14 July 
2006 by the joint statement of King Abdullah of Jordan President Mubarak of 
Egypt, who condemned Hezbollah’s actions and assigned the responsibility for 
the suffering of the Lebanese people to the party.79 From this perspective, 
Hezbollah’s actions against Israel emerges as threatening the status of Saudi 
Arabia as a normative leader in the Arab-Israeli sphere. 
In the process of restoring its ontological security, the Kingdom 
attempted to demonize Hezbollah’s Islamic identity by claiming that Hezbollah 
was serving Iranian interests. Moreover, the Saudi regime promoted a sectarian 
discourse to distinguish its own identity from that of Hezbollah’s. Whereas 
Nasrallah framed the struggle against Israel in religious terms: ‘A defeat for us is 
a defeat for the whole Muslim nation’, Saudi Arabia portrayed Hezbollah’s 
‘irresponsible acts’ as providing Iran with an opportunity to extend its influence 
in the region (Amba 2006). 
In addition, the Kingdom reinforced a sectarian Self/Other definition, 
which identified Hezbollah as a threatening ‘Other’ because of its Shiite roots. 
On the 18 July 2006, shortly after the Saudi official statement condemning 
Hezbollah, the Saudi Press Agency republished an old fatwa of Sheikh Abdullah 
bin Jibrin80 and circulated it through state-influenced media outlets. Originally 
published in 2002, this fatwa states:  
It is forbidden to support this rāfiḍi81 party, joining it or even praying for it 
to achieve victory, I advise all Sunnis to deny this party and those who join 
it and to explain its hostility to Islam and Muslims, specially that such 
                                                             
78  For the full text of the second statement, cf. 
http://www.spa.gov.sa/English/details.php?id=375423  
79  For the full text of this statement, cf. 
http://www.ahram.org.eg/Archive/2006/7/15/ARAB6.HTM 
80 Ibn Jibrin was the second top leading scholar in the Wahhabi movement. He was also a 
member of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatwa in Saudi Arabia. 
81 A word used by Wahhabi clerics to refer to Shiites. 
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rejecting parties have always been hostile to Sunnis and tended to expose 
their shortcomings (Rasid Al-Ikhbariyya 2006). 
Religious ulama closely related to the royal family have expressed 
hostility toward Hezbollah based on religious considerations. Sheikh Nasir al-
‘Umar described Hezbollah the ‘the party of the devil’. In addition, he claimed 
that ‘Hezbollah does not represent Sunni Muslims’ resistance in Palestine or any 
other place, but it serves the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ (Fattah 2006). 
Similarly, Safr al-Hawali issued a fatwa according to which ‘it is forbidden to 
pray for Hezbollah or to provide any support for its war against Israel’ (Al-
Rashid 2013). From this perspective, the Sunni-Shiite discourse served as a 
mechanism to re-establish Saudi ontological security. 
 
 
3. Syria: The Quest for Physical Security 
In contrast to Arab positions condemning Hezbollah and blaming it for the 
devastating effects of the war, the Syrian regime pronounced its alliance with 
Hezbollah against Israel. When asked about the possibility of a regional war, 
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu’allim replied as follows: ‘Welcome to the 
regional war; we are ready for it and we do not hide our preparations.’ He then 
added: ‘I am ready to be a soldier under the leadership of Hassan Nasrallah’ 
(quoted in Ziadeh 2011, 117).  
This section argues that Syria’s support for Hezbollah during the 2006 
Lebanon War was driven by Syria’s physical security needs. Indeed, Syria had 
played a direct role in the establishment of Hezbollah.82 Throughout the 1980s, 
the Syrian regime had allowed Iranian units to enter Lebanon to provide 
logistical and operational support for the party. Given this historical context, 
two erroneous assumptions predominated. The first assumption claims that 
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Hezbollah is only a ‘proxy’ or a ‘pawn’ implementing Syria’s will in Lebanon. 
Following the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah on July 12, 
Western governments accused Syria of being an accomplice.83 As the US 
National Security Council spokesperson Frederick Jones  stated, ‘We charge 
Syria and Iran who support Hezbollah with the responsibility for the attack and 
the violence which followed it’ (quoted in Ziadeh 2011, 115). The second 
assumption considers the alliance between Syria and Hezbollah to be driven by 
sectarian affinities between Hezbollah, described as a Shiite group, and Syria’s 
‘Alawite ruling elite (Amidror 2007). Yet, these assumptions do not reflect the 
complex nature of this alliance.  
Thinking of Hezbollah as Syria’s proxy is inaccurate. Prior to 2005, while 
Syria had 20,000 troops stationed in Lebanon, the chiefs of Syrian istikhbarat 
mukhabarat (military intelligence) had exerted considerable influence over 
Hezbollah’s operational planning (Perthes 2006:36). Following Syria’s military 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the Syrian regime could no longer control 
Hezbollah’s strategic actions. The group asserted itself as an independent actor 
with operational autonomy and a distinct decision-making process (El-
Hokayem 2007). During the 2006 War, the two actors asserted dissimilar policy 
imperatives. For this reason, Syria’s alliance with Hezbollah should be 
understood as a strategic decision made by the regime. With Syria’s regional 
isolation, this alliance became strategically more vital to Syria than to 
Hezbollah.  
Ideological convergence is hardly a driver behind this ‘marriage of 
convenience’. Despite the seemingly sectarian affinity, the alliance between the 
Alawite ruling elite in Syria and Hezbollah is driven by strategic factors more 
than by ideological ones. The Islamic ideology of Hezbollah has been the source 
of discomfort to a Ba’athist pan-Arab secular regime oppressing its own Islamic 
movements (El-Hokayem 2007, 36). However, the repeated convergence of 
interests has enabled the protracted cooperation between both actors (El 
                                                             
83 Cf. White House statement on the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers (2006). 
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Husseini 2010). As Norton (1999, 11) put it, ‘Syria has no eternal allies and no 
perpetual enemy in Lebanon’ and Hezbollah is a ‘wary ally of Damascus’. 
This section explores Syrian threat perception in 2006. I argue that 
Syria’s physical insecurity was endangered by Israel’s military supremacy 
following the US-led war in Iraq (2003). Those fears were substantiated with 
the failure of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations and Syria’s regional and 
international isolation. The alliance with Hezbollah provided the Syrian regime 
with leverage in its struggle against Israel. However, allying with a militia with 
an Islamic ideology belying the secular pan-Arab nature of the Syrian regime 
compelled the regime to adapt its own identity. First, I examine the relative 
power distribution that led to Syria’s physical insecurity. I then examine how 
the regime in Damascus adapted its identity to accommodate this alliance.  
3.1. The Relative Power Distribution: Surviving Isolation 
Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria suddenly faced a new 
geopolitical situation, which fostered its regional isolation and made its position 
in the Arab-Israeli balance more fragile than it had been. These regional 
developments made the alliance with Hezbollah more vital for Syria’s interests 
than ever before. 
The conflict with Israel maintained its centrality in Syria’s security 
priorities. Although the Syrian-Israeli front had been relatively quiet since 1967, 
the outbreak of war always remained in the background. Syria’s ruling elite was 
aware of the country’s military incapability of defending itself in the case of an 
open military confrontation with Israel. On the one hand, the absolute numbers 
reflected a military imbalance in Syria’s favour. In 2003, Syria’s armed forces 
counted approximately 319,000 active soldiers, 548 combat aircraft, and 4,500 
main battle tanks. Israel could field approximately a total of 167,000 active 
soldiers, 438 combat aircraft, and 3950 main battle tanks (The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies IISS 2003, 111–112; 122–123).84 Nevertheless, 
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Syria’s military hardware has not been modernized since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union; it has been poorly maintained, and its technical standards have 
lagged far behind those of Israel. For instance, more than half of the Syrian tanks 
are T-55 or T-62s — models from the 1950s and 1970s.  In case of war, Israel’s 
air force would predominate, and its troops would be in Damascus before any 
Syrian troops could enter Israel’s territory. Syria’s military capabilities were 
limited to launching a surprise attack on the Israeli instalments in the Golan 
Heights or to shoot Scud missiles at Israeli cities. In short, Syria could not 
effectively balance against Israel. Also, its deterrent capabilities were limited, 
particularly since it did not possess nuclear weapons (Perthes 2004, 42).  
At the outbreak of the 2006 War and under the conditions of military 
imbalance in favour of Israel, the Syrian regime had two policy options. First, 
Syria could deviate from the Iran-Hezbollah axis to join the so-called ‘moderate’ 
camp. In this case, Bashar al-Assad would mend its fences with the United States 
and seek peace with Israel. This option would allow the Syrian regime to escape 
its regional isolation and re-establish itself as an active regional player through 
mediating between the Iran-Hezbollah axis and other Arab regimes. For 
domestic reasons, Bashar could endorse this policy only in return for the Golan 
Heights, Arab financial support to the Syrian economy, and strategic influence in 
Lebanon. In short, if it took this option, Syria would bandwagon with the United 
States in the region and give up any balancing behaviour against Israel. The first 
option was unlikely to materialize as both the US and Israel rejected the idea of 
integrating the Syrian regime into the peace process. Moreover, Israel rejected 
the notion of returning the Golan Heights. Bandwagoning would, therefore, 
threaten rather than protect the regime (Salloukh 2009, 165).   
The second policy option was bolstering the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis to 
counterbalance the Arab ‘moderate’ camp, Israel, and the United States. This 
option meant participating in anti-American and anti-Israeli operations. It 
provided Damascus with strategic depth vis-à-vis Israel. In other words, Syria 
could—and did—take advantage of its alliance with Hezbollah in Lebanon to 
advance its political and military interests, for example by using any Hezbollah 
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attack against Israeli forces in south Lebanon as a leverage for Israeli 
concessions in the Golan (B. Rubin 2000, 18). Regional observers called this 
strategy ‘the resistance card’ (Perthes 2001, 41). In addition, observing the US 
failures in Iraq and Israel’s poor performance against Hezbollah, Syrian leaders 
could reassert their regional role without making any concessions to the United 
States or other Arab regimes. 
Syria initially attempted to go with the first option and to end its 
isolation by engaging in peace negotiations with Israel. Nevertheless, the failure 
of the peace negotiations, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon in 2005, and its 
isolation from the other Arab countries made the alliance with Hezbollah and 
Iran the only option for preserving Syria’s physical security. 
Sine the 1990s, aware of Syria’s inability to either balance or deter Israel 
and wanting to escape from international isolation, Hafiz al-Assad sought a 
peaceful settlement for the conflict with Israel. Between 1991 and 2000, 
Damascus participated in the US-brokered peace talks with Tel-Aviv in a bid to 
regain the Golan Heights in exchange for peace and recognition of Israel 
(Goodarzi 2013, 46–47). Syria’s approach to the negotiations was best 
characterized as a zero-sum game, according to which Israeli gains were 
automatically considered Arab losses. After numerous US-sponsored meetings 
between Syrian and Israeli representatives, the failure of the peace talks became 
evident in 2000.85 In November 2000, Syria turned back to its old enemy—
Iraq—for support. Despite the fact that Syria supported Iran in its war against 
Iraq (1980-1988) and provided troops in the coalition effort to liberate Kuwait 
in 1991, Iraq—which was desperate for any regional ally—gave Damascus the 
opportunity to break its regional isolation.  
In this context, the fall of Saddam Hussein was a substantial setback for 
Damascus, as it became deprived of its regional ally. Al-Assad provided Saddam 
Hussein with military supplies, hosted Iraqi refugees, and allowed Islamist 
                                                             




jihadist to cross the borders to Iraq to support the resistance against the US. 
Moreover, the swift US victory in Iraq raised fears among the Syria ruling elite 
that they could be next in the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ (Goodarzi 
2013, 47). In a word, the Iraqi developments heightened Syria’s exposure to the 
US foreign policy in the region.  
 After the quick fall of Saddam, Syrian fears grew that Damascus was 
next. In the post-9/11 environment, the Bush administration categorized states 
as being ‘for’ or ‘against’ terrorism. In this context, the term ‘rogue states’ 
resonated with neoconservative proposal to extend the war on terror beyond 
al-Qaeda to states that sponsor terrorism. From Washington’s viewpoint, Syria 
supported terrorist groups (Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad) and possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Syria was on the 
top of ‘rogue states’ list (Lesch 2005). Following the fall of Baghdad, prominent 
figures in the Bush administration voiced their desire to see ‘a regime change’ in 
Damascus. As Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz declared, ‘there will 
have to be a change in Syria’ (quoted in Salloukh 2009, 164).86 
 The Syrian elite’s fear gained saliency when the US army cut the Iraqi oil 
pipeline to Syria shortly following the invasion of Iraq. On 12 December 2003, 
the US Congress signed a bill entitled ‘Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereign Act’. According to this bill, the US required Syria to stay away from 
Iraq and to close down the offices of Palestinian organizations in Damascus. 
Moreover, Syria should not interfere with the ‘road map’ of the Israel-
Palestinian talks. The US indirectly pressed Syria to restrain Hezbollah and 
withdraw its troops from Lebanon. If Syria failed to comply with these 
requirements, military measures would be used (Lesch 2005, 99; Perthes 2004, 
50–51). Although Syria opposed the US invasion of Iraq, the Syrian elite 
responded to the Act by backing away from any overt support for Iraqi 
resistance. In addition, Syria extended an offer to reach an understanding with 
Washington. Syrian leaders offered to provide intelligence against al-Qaeda and 
                                                             
86 Cf. Seale (2003). 
146 
 
to help stabilize Iraq through tightening the control over the borders 
(Hinnebusch 2009, 19–20; Ziadeh 2011, 88–90).  
At the same time, al-Assad was reluctant to comply with all US 
requirements in the Accountability Act, as it would lead to Syria’s weakness and 
dependence on the United States for security. Accordingly, these negotiations 
revealed Syria’s strategic isolation in this new geopolitical situation. Syria 
became locked between Israel on the south and a US-dominated Iraq on the 
east. This line of thinking was best described in General Bahjat Sulayman’s 
article in the Lebanese newspaper al-Safir. Sulayman, former head of Syrian 
intelligence, suggested that Syria would help control Hezbollah and Palestinian 
Jihad and would contribute to the stability of Iraq in exchange for US guarantees 
regarding the survival of the regime and Syria’s reintegration into the peace 
process (al-Safir, 15 March 2003). Nevertheless, Washington was not willing to 
bargain or negotiate with Damascus; it expected full compliance with its 
demands and insisted on isolating Syria (Salloukh 2009, 164–165). 
This new geopolitical situation aggravated Syria’s regional predicament 
and its physical security, especially vis-à-vis Israel. In a final attempt to enhance 
its position, Syria renewed the peace talks with Israel. In December 2003, 
Bashar al-Assad implored Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to return to the 
negotiating table. In the history of peace talks, this was the first time that Syria 
independently proposed talks with Israel over the Golan (Simon and Stevenson 
2004). This Syrian initiative reflected the increased pressure on Damascus and 
its attempt to survive under these unfavourable conditions. Nevertheless, 
Bashar’s offer for peace negotiations was rejected by the Bush administration as 
well as Israel.  
Instead of surrendering to the United States’ requirements, the Syrian 
regime undertook a number of actions aimed at counterbalancing the US and 
Israel. Damascus continued to provide discreet support to the Iraqi resistance. 
In addition, Syria bolstered its alliance with Iran, especially in terms of the 
latter’s activities in Iraq. In an attempt to prevent the United States from using 
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Iraq as a base to launch attacks on Damascus or Teheran, both regimes fuelled 
the insurgency in hopes that it would pin down US forces. On the one hand, 
Teheran maintained close relations with all groups in Iraq in order to ensure 
that the new government in Iraq would not take any hostile positions toward it. 
On the other hand, Damascus aided the passage of Arab and Sunni fighters from 
Syrian territory to Iraq (Goodarzi 2013; Ma’oz 2007a).  
These counterbalancing measures aggravated Syria’s isolation at the 
regional level. Arab regimes—Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular—
traditionally gave the Syrian regime strategic depth in its conflict with Israel. 
They supported the al-Assad regime in the peace process and approved of 
Syria’s position in Lebanon. In addition, Syria was one of the principal recipients 
of Saudi aid. In return, Syria accepted a Saudi influence in Lebanese affairs. But 
these relationships were deeply affected by the disagreement over Iraq. 
Following the invasion of Iraq, al-Assad furiously attacked pro-US Arab regimes 
for siding with the US strategy towards Iraq. Moreover, Bashar al-Assad 
regularly denounced Arab regimes for not cutting relations with Israel. This 
Arab populist rhetoric, which was directed toward Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia, led to the animosity of Arab regimes (Perthes 2004, 47–48). Syria’s 
active diplomacy in the Arab world declined, especially in regards to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In July 2003, an Arab summit was organized in Sharm al-
Sheikh to give an impetus to the ‘road-map’, which is a plan to solve the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict suggested by the United States, Russia, the European 
Union, and the United Nations. Only the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states—
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the Palestinian Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Abbas—were allowed to attend. Although Syria had played a crucial 
role in the region for decades, it became completely isolated (Ziadeh 2011, 94–
95). 
Syria’s regional predicament reached its peak following the assassination 
of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, as Syria had to withdraw its forces 
from Lebanon in 2005. Lebanon has always been a sphere of influence granting 
the Syrian regime a strategic depth vis-à-vis Israel. Losing such depth, especially 
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considering the above regional developments, only increased Syria’s physical 
insecurity vis-à-vis Israel. Therefore, holding on its strategic relationship with 
Hezbollah became a necessity. Remaining in the Syria-Hezbollah-Iran axis 
became Damascus’ only option. In other words, Syria had no choice but to ‘defy 
the hegemon’ (Hinnebusch 2005a).  
In this context, and especially after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, 
the strategic importance of Hezbollah to Syria shifted from the status of a 
‘resistance card’ to an indispensable strategic ally. As El-Hokayem (2007, 36) 
noted, ‘Syria is more pro-Hezbollah than Hezbollah is pro-Syria’. On the one 
hand, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime converged in their struggle against 
Israel. On the other hand, reinvigorating the alliance enabled Damascus to 
escape its regional isolation. According to a high-ranking member of the Ba’ath 
Party ‘after Syria left Lebanon, the West thought the regime was dead, and so 
Damascus used its support to Hamas and Hezbollah to prove that it was alive’ 
(quoted in Perthes 2006, 39). Therefore, Damascus understood any attempt to 
defeat Hezbollah militarily or politically to be an effort to emasculate and isolate 
Syria. During the 2006 War, Damascus considered Riyadh’s animosity toward 
Hezbollah and its refusal to offer overflight rights to Iranian supply planes as 
part of a strategy of encircling the Syrian regime (Salloukh 2009, 171).  
3.2. The Regime Identity: Widening Pan-Arabism  
Although the physical insecurity of the Syrian regime determined the 
identification of its friends and enemies, this choice did not affect the stability of 
its identity or, in other words, its ontological security. Syria’s support for 
Hezbollah during the 2006 War conformed to its previous Self/Other 
distinction. To avoid any potential contradiction within its identity following its 
strategic alliance with Hezbollah, Syrian leaders expanded Syria’s identity 
narrative to accommodate Islamic movements. 
The alliance between Syria and Hezbollah has often been attributed to 
the Shiite nature of the ‘Alawite ruling elite in Syria (cf. Talhamy 2009). 
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Describing the Syrian regime as a minority-based regime by referring to the 
‘Alawi minority is simplistic.87 As stated by Ismail (2009, 14–15), the case of the 
Syrian regime is described as ‘the sectarianism of the authority’ rather than ‘the 
authority of the sect’. In other words, the ‘Alawi elite does not rule, but the 
authority consecrates the ‘Alawi sect and relies on alliances with other sects 
when their interests coincide. Instead, the regime identity narrative is based on 
a nuanced pan-Arabism, where the struggle against Israel constitutes the source 
of distinctiveness. This pan-Arab narrative coincided with Hezbollah’s struggle 
against Israel. Despite this apparent convergence, Hezbollah’s identification as a 
‘friend’ presented a potential for inconsistency within the Syrian identity 
narrative. The Syrian regime has been claiming a secular identity oppressing 
Islamist movements at home while Hezbollah is an Islamist movement with an 
active pan-Islamic call. To avoid the pitfalls of this contradiction, Syria’s 
strategic need for this partnership led Damascus to reframe its identity by 
embracing Islamist and anti-imperialist dimensions from Hezbollah’s 
worldview. 
The Iran-Iraq War, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the rise of the 
‘me-first’88 policies by Arab states led to the growth of a reconsidered ‘Syrian 
identity’. Instead of rejecting pan-Arabism, the regime maintained its 
commitment to this ideology but reframed its meaning to suit Syria’s physical 
security needs. Since then, Syria’s definition of Arabism has been based not on 
the ‘Arab’ component but the struggle against with Israel. This slow emergence 
of Syrian nationalism was consolidated throughout the 1990s. Driven by a 
strategic and economic quest for regional reintegration, the Syrian regime 
decided to join the US-coalition to liberate Kuwait in 1991. This decision further 
solidified the new Syrian nationalism. During the Syrian-Israeli negotiations 
throughout the 1990s, Hafiz a-Assad often explained his participation in the 
                                                             
87 This argument is strongly present in Pipes (1990), Van Dam (1996), and Ma’oz (1988). 
88 These policies reflected the endeavor of Arab states to consolidate their national identities 
and to drift away from pan-identities. For instance, Egyptian leaders point to an ‘Egypt-first’ 




peace process as based on Syria’s interests (Hinnebusch 1996; Seale 1992). On 
16 January 1994, Hafiz al-Assad declared:  
Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic 
choice that secures Arabs right; end the Israeli occupation; and enables the 
people of the region to live in peace, security, and dignity. In honour we 
fought; in honour we negotiate; and in honour we shall make peace…we 
want the peace of the brave, a genuine peace which can survive and last, a 
peace which secures the interests of each side…’ (Rabil 2006, 105). 
When he commenced his rule in 2000, Bashar intended to follow his 
father’s legacy. Bashar initially pursued pragmatic regional policies toward Arab 
states, Turkey, and the United States. More importantly, Bashar expressed his 
adherence to pan-Arabism defined in Syrian terms (Ma’oz 2007a, 11). 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Syria’s physical security needs led Hafiz al-
Assad to pursue the course of peace and redefined the notion of pan-Arabism. 
During the 2006 War, this identity narrative fit well with Syria’s physical 
security needs to ally with Hezbollah in balancing Israel. 
Under these circumstances, the regime identity narrative appealed to a 
pan-Arab identity, according to which the main line of Self/Other 
distinctiveness evolved around the struggle against Israel. Bashar appealed to 
audiences beyond Syria and expressed his loyalty to the Arab nation. His 
speeches depicted Syria as a stronghold of Arabism or as ‘the throbbing/beating 
heart of Arabism’.89 On 21 January 2006, in an interview with al-Hayat, Bashar 
publicly declared that he considers ‘Syria the heart of the Arab world’, and that 
his main goal was to ‘reinvigorate Arab unity’ (quoted in Kandil 2008, 430). He 
also stated the following: 
Many have tried in the past to destroy the Arab national perception by 
attempting to position it in confrontation with feelings of ‘local patriotism’, 
which ostensibly are contaminated by separatism. Some tried to position 
Arabism in confrontation with Islam […] Others even tried to turn Arabism 
into the equivalent of backwardness and isolationism […] But none of this, 
of course, is correct (quoted in Zisser 2006). 
                                                             
89 Cf. Bashar al-Assad’s Speech at the Arab Parties General Conference (B. Al-Assad 2006c). 
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Bashar went further to widen the definition of pan-Arabism beyond 
Syria’s interests. Whereas Hafiz al-Assad limited the idea of ‘a comprehensive 
peace’ to Syrian interests, which ruled out the Lebanese and the Palestinians, 
Bashar declared that any agreement would not constitute a comprehensive 
peace plan without ‘a balanced Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian axis’. He noted 
that ‘signing an accord with Syria would not be enough to solve the problem and 
attain the purpose of coordinating other policies’ (quoted in Ziadeh 2011, 85). 
From this perspective, Bashar highlighted not only the importance of achieving 
a comprehensive peace, but also the necessity of establishing an agreement with 
all Arab states to resist the ‘Zionist project’. He harshly criticized the so-called 
moderate Arab regimes—Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—for backing the 
Saudi-sponsored Arab peace initiative (2002). He claimed that Arabs should 
reconsider their policy of ‘peace as a strategic option’ vis-à-vis Israel and cut 
their diplomatic relations with Israel (Ma’oz 2007a, 12). 
In this context, Syria’s alliance with Hezbollah conformed to the regime’s 
pan-Arab narrative. On 15 August 2006, Bashar gave a significant speech to the 
Syrian Journalists Union, where he declared that Hezbollah’s resistance to Israel 
followed the tenets of Arabism. He claimed that ‘resistance and peace’ are not 
contradictory or mutually exclusive and ‘constitute one pillar rather than two 
pillars, and who supports part of it has to support the other part’. The 
innovation in Bashar’s pan-Arab rhetoric lay in condemning the past failure of 
Arabism. He argued that Arab weakness and failure is the main reason for 
Israeli supremacy: ‘The only thing Israel possesses is the destructive force at the 
military level and some other factors at the international level, but at the same 
time it possesses a very big force; namely the weakness of the Arabs, both 
morally and physically’ (B. Al-Assad 2006b). He also conceded that Arabs talked 
much and hardly achieved anything in their history. For that matter, al-Assad 
considered Hezbollah to be a model of a regional Arab resistance against Israel 
(Wikas 2006). 
This pan-Arab narrative, however, belied an inherent contradiction with 
Hezbollah’s identity. This contradiction could potentially endanger the stability 
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of the regime identity narrative and the regime’s legitimacy at the domestic 
level. Syria’s pan-Arabism was secular in nature. In addition, the regime 
oppressed Islamist movements domestically and criticized their identity. In an 
attempt to accommodate Syria’s identification of Hezbollah as a friend, Bashar 
further widened Syria’s definition of pan-Arabism by incorporating two 
dimensions. First, pan-Arabism was declared to be compatible with Islamic 
values. Second, Bashar incorporated Nasrallah’s worldview in his opposition to 
the United States, describing it as a struggle against the ‘oppressor’ (El-
Hokayem 2007, 43). An example can be found in the speech delivered to the 
conference of Arab lawyers in Damascus on 21 January 2006. 
[the US policy] is meant to target Syria and Lebanon as part of an 
integrated project to undermine the region's identity and reshape it under 
different names that finally meet Israel's ambitions to dominate the region 
and its resources […] But what is targeted are [not only Syria and Lebanon, 
but all] the Arabs and even the Islamic nation […] What is happening now 
[with Syria and Lebanon] is part of a big conspiracy (B. Al-Assad 2006a). 
During the 2006 Lebanon war, Bashar adopted the same rhetoric. He 
described the Israeli aggression as ‘Israeli in tools, but [...] American in decision 
shared by certain Western countries’ (B. Al-Assad 2006b). In short, Syria’s pan-
Arab narrative was broadened to include non-Arabs and Islamists dimensions 
to accommodate Syria’s identification of Syria and Hezbollah as friends and 
Israel as enemies. From this perspective, Syria’s Self/Other distinction 
converged with the enemy/friend identification. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter examined Saudi and Syrian threat perception during the 2006 
Lebanon War. It explicated their divergent reactions towards Hezbollah’s fierce 
confrontation with Israel, namely Syria’s decision to support Hezbollah’s against 
Israel and Saudi opposition to the actions of this Islamist movement. The Saudi 
case reflected a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security. Despite 
Iranian and Syrian support, Hezbollah, which is a non-state actor that does not 
share any borders with the Kingdom and is militarily focused on its war against 
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Israel, cannot pose a danger or source of harm to the Kingdom. Instead, it was 
Hezbollah’s Islamic narrative that constituted a serious challenge to the regime 
identity narrative in Saudi Arabia. In order to restore this identity stability, the 
Kingdom demonized the Islamic credibility of Hezbollah while reinforcing Saudi 
Self/Other distinction based on a sectarian narrative (i.e. Sunni versus Shiite). 
This Self/Other distinction was framed in negative terms. In the process of 
restoring its ontological security, the dynamics of the Kingdom’s physical 
security underwent a change as this Self/Other distinction affected the 
friend/enemy identification during the war. Accordingly, Hezbollah was 
identified not only as an Other but also an enemy. 
 Compared to its Saudi counterpart, the al-Assad regime was in a 
situation of ontological security/physical insecurity. Whereas Hezbollah and 
Israel did not endanger Syria’s identity stability, its physical security was 
endangered, especially in the context of the 2006 Lebanon War. This chapter 
explored the geopolitical imperatives that impelled al-Assad regime to support 
Hezbollah. Alongside the military imbalance in favour of Israel, Syria suffered 
severe regional and international isolation following the 2003 Iraq War. Based 
on this relative power distribution, Israel remained Syria’s bitter enemy 
whereas Hezbollah was an ally. This friend/enemy dichotomy was partly 
congruent with Syria’s identity narrative. Israel was consistently portrayed as a 
threatening Other. On the other hand, Syria’s alliance with Hezbollah held the 
potential for infusing the regime’s identity narrative with contradiction and 
instability, as the Ba’ath regime is a secular pan-Arab regime oppressing 
Islamist movements at home, which were always portrayed as ‘Others’. From 
this perspective, Syria’s Self/Other distinction underwent an accommodation to 
integrate this friend/enemy dichotomy. Al-Assad reframed the regime identity 
narrative from Syrian pan-Arabism to a wider pan-Arabism that includes any 
actor involved in confrontation with Israel, whether it be Islamist or secular.  
 One of the most important implications of the cases examined above for 
the theoretical framework of this study is that identity framing and reframing 
are important mechanisms to restore ontological security both in the Syrian and 
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Saudi case. Saudi Arabia adopted had a stake in maintaining a sectarian 
discourse to differentiate itself from Hezbollah and its ally, Iran. Syria, on the 
other hand, broadened its pan-Arab framing to include Islamist movements to 
avoid inconsistencies. From this perspective, the processes of identity framing 
and reframing can be triggered by ontological security concerns but also by 









Chapter 5: Explaining Saudi and Syrian Threat Perceptions 
during the 2009 Gaza War 
 
Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Tehran 
have decided to put the Palestinian cause and its martyrs 
into Iran’s hands. However, everyone is forgetting one 
important point—namely, that we will not hand over our 
people’s capabilities to lunatics who hide out in Syria and 
who fire not a single bullet at Israel […] there is a plan to 
set the entire regional ablaze, and to kill as many 
Palestinian and Lebanese martyrs as possible, in order to 
expose the helplessness of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the 
[entire] moderate Arab axis. 
Mohamed Ali Ibrahim, Al-Gumhouriyya (Egypt), 29 
December 2009. 
 
This chapter examines the divergent Saudi and Syria threat perceptions during 
the 2009 Gaza War. On 27 December 2008, Israel launched a military operation 
called the ‘Cast Lead’ in Gaza against the Palestinian militant group, Hamas—
also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqāwmah al-
Islāmiyya). Although the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has its own internal 
dynamic, Arab reactions reflected other dynamics that yield empirical and 
theoretical insights. Saudi Arabia, traditionally a supporter of the Palestinian 
cause, surprisingly condemned the resistance and blamed it for the suffering of 
the Palestinian people. While Syria supported Hamas—that is, a Sunni Islamist 
movement with Muslim Brotherhood origins—the al-Assad regime 
simultaneously continued oppressing a group with a similar ideology at home. 
Why did Saudi Arabia perceive Hamas as threatening while Syria conversely 
considered it to be an asset in its struggle against Israel’s military supremacy? 
Why did Syrian and the Saudi regimes diverge in their threat perceptions?  
 This chapter addresses these questions by looking at the interplay 
between the physical and ontological security spheres that led to this outcome. 
Whereas Saudi Arabia demonstrates a case of ontological insecurity/physical 
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security, Syria is a case of ontological security/physical insecurity. Hamas 
challenged the Saudi regime’s Islamic identity. At the same time, while 
struggling for survival in a hostile regional and international environment, Syria 
found in Hamas an opportunity to advance its regional leverage. Although 
Syria’s alliance with Hamas could have created an internal contradiction in the 
regime’s identity, the al-Assad regime preempted this problem by widening its 
pan-Arab discourse  in such a way that Syria’s secular pan-Arabism does not 
contradict the Islamic ideology of Hamas.  
 As the previous two empirical case studies have showed how identity 
and power interplayed, examining Saudi and Syrian threat perception during 
the Gaza war aims to contribute to the wider debate on the role of identities in 
Middle East international relations. The previous two cases have established 
that sectarian identities per se were not the driving force behind threat 
perception. Instead sectarian identities served as tool reinforce ontological 
security and distinctiveness, especially in the case of Saudi Arabia. The previous 
chapters have also showed that the widely spread narrative about the Shiite 
nature of the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis are mistaken. An examination of threat 
perception towards Hamas provides further evidence confirming the previous 
findings. As opposed to Hezbollah, Hamas is a political Islam movement that 
finds its ideological origins in the Muslim Brotherhood belonging to a Sunni 
school of thought. Despite the identity convergence between Hamas and Saudi 
Arabia, the Kingdom perceived Hamas as a threat. Also, the Ba’ath regime, often 
depicted as Alawite in nature, has perceived Hamas as an ally. The Gaza war 
provides uncontroversial evidence that threat perception is not driven by 
sectarian identities per se. 
 From this perspective, this chapter aims to contribute to the wider 
literature on the study of sectarianism as a significant texture undergirding 
Middle East international relations. Sectarian identities at the regional level 
have gradually spurred growing scholarly interest, especially since the outbreak 
of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Broadly, it has been situated within the debates 
between primordialists (essentialists) and rationalists. The primordialist 
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approach belongs to this major trend in IR theory that puts emphasis on culture 
and identity as determinants of conflict and cooperation among actors. 
Primordialists have analysed Sunni-Shiite identities as the core conflict in the 
region since the 7th century, and it continues to shape its political dynamics 
{Citation}. Based on Huntington’s (1993)  famous argument about the clash of 
civilizations, according to which conflicts would erupt around cultural divides, 
some scholars argued that the ‘clash’ is within Islam (Sadiki 2014). This 
approach clearly fails to explain threat perceptions during the Gaza war.  
Rationalists have, however, adopted an instrumentalist top-down 
approach, which derives from neorealism and Marxist structuralism in IR 
theory. As the structure is constituted of relative power distribution, identities 
and norms are instruments manipulated to legitimize actors’ material interests 
(Walt 1987; Kedourie 1992). From this perspective, the Sunni-Shiite divide in 
the region emerged as prop of power and material interests in the region 
(Gause 2007; F. Wehrey et al. 2009; F. Wehrey 2013; Lynch 2013; Gause 2014; 
Zubaida 2014; Berti and Paris 2014). Instrumentalist approaches clearly 
answer more questions than primordial ones do. Nevertheless, this top-down 
approach leaves many questions unanswered: if leaders are motivated by 
material interest, can they manipulate identities whenever and however they 
wish? Moreover, by reducing identities to superstructures, rationalists cannot 
why Saudi Arabia feared a non-state actor with limited military capabilities and 
situated far from its borders. 
In this context, this chapter provides an understanding of sectarianism 
that goes beyond primordial and instrumental approaches to identities. It 
argues that ontological security provides a third way to examine the role of 
sectarian identities in the processes of threat perception. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first present the context in which the 
2009 Gaza War occurred and the subsequent regional reactions. I then explore 
Saudi enmity towards Hamas. The relative power distribution demonstrates 
that the war did not endanger the physical security of the Saudi Kingdom. 
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Instead, Hamas’ Islamic Sunni identity put the ontological security of the 
Kingdom at risk, as it endangered the consistency of the Saudi identity 
narrative. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Saudi regime had preserved its 
distinctiveness by maintaining a sectarian narrative based on Sunni-Shiite 
divisions. The emergence of a Sunni Islamist movement challenged the 
distinctiveness of this narrative. By presenting a resistance strategy based on an 
alternative Sunni Islamic narrative in the region, Hamas challenged the Saudi 
regional role and the Kingdom’s related Sunni Islamic identity. Third, I explore 
Syria’s threat perception. I argue that the relative power distribution and the 
unfavourable regional and international environment endangered the physical 
security of the Ba’ath regime. In this context, Hamas emerged as a strategic ally 
of Syria in its struggle against Israel. I then examine how the Syrian regime 
revived an inclusive pan-Arabism to accommodate its alliance with a Sunni 
Islamist movement and to avoid any contradictions in its identity. 
1. The 2009 Gaza War and Regional Reactions 
On 27 December 2008, Israel began a series of air attacks on Gaza, which was 
later expanded into a ground offense. This war underscored the regional 
divisions that crystallized during the 2006 Lebanon War between two camps: 
the so-called ‘moderate’ regimes—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—and the 
‘resistance’—Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Syrian and Saudi perceptions 
toward Hezbollah in 2006 were replicated in regards to Hamas in 2009.  
During the extraordinary Arab summit in Doha on 16 January 2009, 
Bashar al-Assad declared: ‘we should show our clear support for the Palestinian 
resistance. I suggest that this summit official calls the Zionist entity a terrorist 
entity’ (BBC 2009). Against this clear and explicit support for the resistance 
movement, the Saudi Kingdom criticized Hamas for abandoning the cease-fire 
with Israel and blamed it for the war casualties in Gaza. As Prince Saud al-Faisal, 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, declared: ‘This terrible massacre [from the Gaza 
war] would not have happened if the Palestinian people were united behind one 
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leadership, speaking in once voice’ (Black 2009). Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian 
president, echoed the same sentiment: ‘You all know that efforts Egypt had 
undertaken to extend the ceasefire and our warnings that a refusal by factions 
to extend it was an open invitation to Israeli aggression’ (Reuters 2009). 
Saudi newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat compared Hamas’ reckless 
instigation to Hezbollah’s move that had led to the 2006 Lebanon War. 
Similarly, Egypt explicitly blamed Hamas for abandoning the ceasefire with 
Israel. As Foreign Minister Ahmed Abou al-Gheit stated, ‘Hamas served Israel 
the opportunity on a golden platter to hit Gaza’ (Erlanger 2009b). Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia portrayed Hamas as a mere pawn of non-Arab Iran and, hence, 
accused it of serving Iranian instead of Arab interests. Consequently, critics of 
Saudi and Egyptian foreign policies accused the so-called ‘moderate’ regimes of 
collusion with Israel, the Arab and Islamic world’s bitter enemy. 
Although Arab reactions to the 2009 Gaza war underscored the intra-
Arab divisions that emerged during the 2006 Lebanon war, these events pose 
further questions. In contrast to the Shiite religious identity of Hezbollah, 
Hamas is a Sunni movement recognized as an offshoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood ideology, combining a traditional pan-Islamist ideology with 
Palestinian nationalism. Situated at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
with a Sunni background, Hamas should have attracted the support of the Saudi 
Kingdom, a monarchy with a Sunni pan-Islamic ideology. Paradoxically, the Al 
Saud, a ruling elite claiming the leadership of the Islamic world and of the 
support for the Palestinian cause, condemned the resistance. The Syrian 
regime—a secular regime oppressing the Muslim Brotherhood at home—
explicitly sided with Hamas and supported it verbally and financially.  
 
 
2. Saudi Arabia and the Struggle for Consistency 
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The Palestinian question has traditionally been the subject of an ideological and 
religious sensitivity in Saudi foreign policy. Saudi Arabia, as the custodian of the 
two most important holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, sees itself as having 
a divine mission to protect the holy sites of Islam. From this perspective, 
Palestine, especially Jerusalem, is particularly important to Saudi Arabia’s self-
conception, historically leading the Kingdom to defend and support the 
Palestinian cause. The following extract is a speech addressed to those making 
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1997, by King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz and Crown Prince 
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has continued to hold the same position of 
giving support to a just and comprehensive peace which will bring an end 
to oppression and which will return occupied Arab lands to their own 
people in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. In relation to Jerusalem and the 
construction of Israeli settlements there, the stand of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is one which is completely clear and to which it has given 
expression many times. The Kingdom deplores and condemns all actions 
in Jerusalem, which are in conflict with the nature of the city and with the 
legitimate rights of its Arab population therein (quoted in Khan 2004, 
176). 
Although the Kingdom has never been a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and has never had any troops involved in military operations against 
Israel, the Palestinian cause has remained at the centre of  Saudi international 
and regional diplomacy.  
Following the defeat of the Arab forces in the 1967 Six-Day War, the Al 
Saud became actively involved in continuing the struggle against Israel, 
henceforth serving as the primary financial supporter of the frontline states. 
From that moment, the Saudis financially and diplomatically supported the 
Palestinians, particularly their primary organization, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and later Hamas during the 1990s. During the 1970s, the 
Kingdom provided the PLO with hundreds of millions of dollars, and an 
estimated US$1 billion in the 1980s (Bowen 2008, 124–25). With the Egyptian 
retreat from the conflict (1979) and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty (1994), 
Saudi Arabia opted for a regional role, playing a mediating role in Lebanon and 
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in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. From the early 1990s onwards, the 
Kingdom provided financial support to the Palestinians to attend peace talks 
and actively participated in some regional talks that led to the Madrid and Oslo 
rounds of negotiations (Wilson and Graham 1994, 125). Throughout, the Saudis 
consistently portrayed themselves as supporters of the Palestinian resistance, 
an image they bolstered by funding secular leftist Palestinian groups as well as 
Islamist groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Yet, in 2009, the Saudi 
Kingdom perceived Hamas as an eminent threat.  
To explain this paradox, I argue that Hamas, despite its alliance with Iran, 
did not pose any threat to the Kingdom’s physical security. Instead, Hamas’ 
Islamic ideology endangered the Kingdom’s ontological security, as it 
questioned the Saudi claim of Sunni leadership and its associated position as a 
sponsor of the peace negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In what follows, I 
first examine the relative power distribution before and at the outbreak of the 
2009 war. I argue that Iran’s support for Hamas did not at the time make it a 
source of physical insecurity to the Kingdom. I then examine the ideational 
challenge Hamas posed to the Saudi regime’s identity narrative. 
2.1. Saudi Physical Security: Is Hamas a Threat? 
Saudi perception of Hamas as a threat in 2009 has been often read as a realist 
strategy, in accordance with which the Kingdom was balancing Iran’s expanding 
influence in the region. Considering Iran’s support for Hamas and other 
Palestinian groups, this realist logic seems accurate at first glance. Upon further 
examination, however, the story appears to be more complex. Iran’s support for 
Hamas did not necessarily mean any Iranian military presence and, hence, did 
not endanger the physical security of Arab states, the Kingdom including. 
Furthermore, this argument erroneously assumes that Hamas is not an 
independent actor. This section argues that Hamas’ drift toward Iran did not 
contribute to any military imbalance in the region. Instead, the balance of power 
in the region remained in Israel’s favour, and Iran’s support of Hamas could not 
threaten the physical security of the Kingdom. 
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The 2009 Gaza War broke out under conditions similar to those of the 
2006 Lebanon War. The regional configuration that emerged following the US 
intervention in Iraq was manifested in 2006 and again in 2009. The fall of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and the destruction of Iraq’s military capabilities 
changed the regional power distribution. Israel’s military supremacy became 
evident in the Arab-Israeli sphere, especially with the persistence of the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty since 1979 and the conclusion of the Jordanian-
Israeli peace treaty in 1994. Moreover, by ‘shattering’ the Iraqi state, the United 
States eliminated Iraq’s power as a regional buffer vis-à-vis Iran, which in turn 
attempted to fill the vacuum and expand its own influence (Roy 2007). This 
meant that the traditional stable triangle of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia—in 
which the three powers balanced one another—collapsed and left room for a 
Saudi-Iranian confrontation (Fürtig 2007). Arab states became fragmented 
around two camps. On the one hand, the US-backed coalition consisting of Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan supported the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Moreover, this camp identified Iran as the most substantial threat to 
the stability of the region. The second coalition included Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, 
and Hamas. This camp, often called the ‘resistance axis’, considered the United 
States and Israel to be the ultimate sources of threat in the region. The 
fragmentation of the region around these two camps has often been termed as 
the ‘New Arab Cold War’. 
From this perspective, Hamas’ threat to the so-called moderate camp 
was often exacerbated by Iran’s support for the organization. Hamas was 
accused of serving Iranian interests rather than Arab or Palestinian ones. It was 
also portrayed as a threat because it allowed Iran to expand its influence over 
the Palestinian question, thereby acting counter to the ‘Arab interest’. The 
portrayal of Hamas as an Iranian pawn was abundant in the Arab media 
coverage, especially in Saudi media outlets. Hamas was accused of assisting Iran 
in taking over the Middle East (Carmon 2009). For example, Tarik al-Humayd, a 
journalist in the Saudi newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, questioned whether Iran’s 
support for Hamas and Hezbollah and their designation as ‘freedom fighters’ or 
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‘liberation movements’ amounted to the ‘hijacking [of] Arab causes to serve 
Iran’s interests’ (Chubin 2009, 170). In the Saudi daily Al-Riyadh, Saudi 
Columnist Ali Al-Mahmoud warned about Iran's ‘octopus-like expansion’. In his 
view, ‘Iran wants to control the region, not by spreading its ideology [...] but by 
maintaining armed organizations [in Arab countries] it violates their loyalty to 
their homelands, replacing it with loyalty to Iran’ (Al-Riyadh, 29 May 2008). In 
the Saudi daily Al-Watan, Saudi Columnist Ali Sa’d Al-Moussa wrote that Arab 
countries were being subjected to ‘Persian colonialism’. He added:  
Iran has become a major and central player in Arab politics [...]. Today we 
are seeing new signs of Persian colonialism. This is a [new] more advanced 
colonial model: We are no longer talking of troops occupying [certain] 
regions or of flags [flying] over public buildings. The colonialism of the 
modern era is manifested by the submission of [various regional forces to 
Iran]... Iran chose [regions] on the Arab map and attacked them without 
[even] pulling the trigger. Arabs are implementing its entire plan (Al-
Watan, 29 May 2008).  
In light of this, it is not surprising that Saudi state-influenced newspapers 
presented the Israeli attack on Gaza as an attack on Iranian influence in the 
region.90 Leading Saudi Columnist Khalaf al-Harbi accused the Saudi state-led 
propaganda of marketing the idea that ‘any support for the [Hamas] resistance 
is an incitement to terrorism’ (Al-Harbi 2009). 
Existing explanations of Saudi fear from Hamas, I argue, have conflated 
physical and ontological security spheres. Iran’s support for Hamas did not in 
fact mean a change in the balance of power and did not transform Hamas into a 
material threat to the physical security of the so-called Arab moderate 
countries, Saudi Arabia included. By the time of the 2009 war, Iran’s support for 
Hamas did not mean any military presence in Gaza. Instead, Iran’s support for 
Hamas remained mostly ideological.  
Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has considered Israel to be its ultimate 
enemy in the region and—for religious reasons—the Palestinian issue has 
featured as a core component of Iranian foreign policy. The Iran-Hamas 
                                                             
90 This was the case of Egyptian and Jordanian newspapers as well. 
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relationship developed during the 1990s and matured in the wake of Hamas’ 
international isolation after 2006. The relationship started in 1992 when Israel 
expelled hundreds of Hamas’ leaders to Lebanon, where they met with 
representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Since this meeting, Iran has 
been funding and training Hamas. The relationship was consolidated during the 
Oslo Accords in 1993 and the following Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in 
1996. Following its isolation in 2006, Hamas relied more extensively on the so-
called ‘axis of resistance’ for funding. In addition, the organization was inspired 
by the successful model of Hezbollah in its war against Israel in 2006 (Frankel 
2012). 
Iran became Hamas’ biggest donor. Estimates of Iranian financial 
assistance to the organization have varied significantly between US$30 and 
US$250 million per year (Levitt 2008, 172–174; Haaertz 2006; Al-Mughrabi 
2013). Nevertheless, this Iranian support for Hamas did not mean any Iranian 
military presence in Gaza that could threaten neighbouring Arab states. On the 
geopolitical level, whereas Iran was able to support Hezbollah logistically 
through sending military hardware via Syria, the same was not possible in the 
case of Hamas. As Head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Gen. Mohamed Ali Jafari 
declared, 
Gaza is under siege, so we cannot help them. The Fajr-5 missiles have not 
been shipped from Iran. Its technology has been transferred and (the 
missiles are) being produced quickly (CBS News 2012). 
In other words, military assistance consisted of the transfer of technical 
know-how necessary for manufacturing weapons (rockets and anti-tanks 
missiles). This knowledge transfer also included military training for Hamas 
members (Szorm 2009). Throughout, even though Iran might have possessed 
the potential military capabilities to balance Arab states, it was unable to project 
these capabilities far beyond its borders, because Iran’s economic capacity was 
not sufficient to support such expansionism (Chubin 2009).   
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More importantly, Hamas cannot be considered as a mere Iranian proxy 
devoid of agency. Although Iran was its primary funder of Hamas since 2006, 
Tehran did not have any control over the Palestinian group. As Sadjadpour puts 
it, ‘Iran supports Hamas, but Hamas is no Iranian puppet’ (2009). Hamas’ 
agency became evident after the 2009 War when the organization broke its 
alliance with Iran and turned to Egypt during the short-lived rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (2012-2013). In other words, the alliance between Iran and 
Hamas around the time of the 2009 Gaza conflict was built upon shared 
interests. On the Palestinian side, Hamas was encircled and isolated after 
winning the elections in 2006, as Arab states followed the US in isolating Hamas 
and cutting funds. From this perspective, Iran filled a vacuum. On the Iranian 
side, the support for the Palestinian cause served the interests of Iranian foreign 
policy, as it enabled Iran to overcome its regional isolation and to enhance its 
leverage in the negotiations over the nuclear program (Chubin 2009).  
Hamas’ sense of agency was evident, as Hamas had the choice between 
the support of Sunni Arab states and Iran’s support. According to Ahmed Yusuf, 
the adviser to Hamas Leader Ismael Haniyah, ‘our relations with Iran have 
angered Saudi Arabia but sometimes we have no choice. We would prefer to 
have closer relations with Saudi Arabia and maybe that will come’ (Urquhart 
2007).91 Hamas’ leaders had two options: moderating their core principles in 
order to ensure the support of Arab states, or accepting Iranian support while 
maintaining a bellicose stance against Israel. As Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
followed the US boycott of Hamas, the organization’s leaders opted for the latter 
option. They took into consideration Iran’s uncompromising position on Israel 
and turned to the Islamic Republic for financial and military support. In short, 
Hamas took advantage of the region’s rivalries to enhance its own position 
(Kostiner and Mueller 2010). At the end of the day, the relationship between 
Hamas and Iran is merely strategic, and the former will not act on behalf of the 
latter. According to Salah Bardawil, a member of Hamas’ political Bureau in 
Gaza, in case of war between Israel and Iran, ‘Hamas will not be part of such 
                                                             
91 See also the interview with Khaled Mesh‘al on ABC Channel (Willacy 2006). 
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war’ (quoted in Sherwood 2012). The same position was seconded by Gaza 
leader Ismail Haniyeh: ‘Hamas is a Palestinian movement that acts within the 
Palestinian arena and it carries out its political and field actions in a way that 
suits the interests of the Palestinian people’ (Nakhoul and Stott 2012). 
The subsequent Gaza wars of 2012 and 2014 decisively demonstrated 
Hamas’ independence from Iran. Following the breakout of the Syrian crisis, 
Hamas refused to follow Iran in supporting the al-Assad regime against the 
rebels. Iran considered Hamas’ position to be a betrayal to the axis of resistance 
and fiercely scaled back its support and cut financial aid to the Palestinian group 
(Al-Mughrabi 2011). Under these circumstances, and with the rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt in 2012, Hamas shifted its alliance back 
to Egypt (Qassir 2014). Hamas leaders also ought a rapprochement with Turkey 
and Qatar (Abu Amer 2013).92 Still, despite Iran’s waning support for Hamas in 
2014, Saudi perception of Hamas as a threat persisted (Riedel 2014).  Whereas 
the Kingdom refrained from condemning Israel’s assault on Gaza that year, it 
openly blamed Hamas for the suffering of the Palestinian people; the Saudi royal 
elite was thereafter accused of colluding with Israel in destroying Hamas 
(Kirkpatrick 2014). 
Why has Hamas been perceived as a threat to the Saudi Kingdom despite 
the fact that the group is not Iran’s proxy? The Kingdom has often justified its 
fear of Hezbollah by referring to a sectarian narrative, i.e., Sunni versus Shiite. 
Hamas is, however, a Sunni Islamist movement. Despite the seemingly sectarian 
convergence, the Kingdom has portrayed Hamas as a threat. The following 
section examines this paradox. I argue that Hamas’ Islamic nature endangered 
the stability of the Kingdom’s identity narrative and, hence, its ontological 
security. 
2.2. Saudi Regime Identity: ‘Othering’ Hamas 
                                                             
92 Nevertheless, this alliance shift was intermittent. With the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt Hamas has sought to re-activate its relationship with Iran (Al-Mughrabi 2013).  
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The Palestinian question has been central to the Kingdom since the early stages 
of its formation (Piscatori 1983; Kazziha 1985). As King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz 
stated:  
The cause of Palestine which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has always 
placed at the top of its priorities will always have that position for us 
because this issue is linked to positions of principle and to encompassing 
vision which embraces the higher Arab interest and necessities of 
comprehensive Arab security.93 
 As already discussed in the previous chapters, the Palestinian question and 
Jerusalem is constitutive of the Islamic dimension in the Saudi identity 
narrative. According to Esposito (1998, 114), ‘The liberation of Jerusalem and 
the creation of a Palestinian state became a major component of Saudi foreign 
policy and an Islamic issue to which Faisal rallied worldwide Muslim support’. 
In other words, the Palestinian question has constituted a core element in Saudi 
self-conception at the regional and domestic levels (Khan 2004, 175–178).  
As already discussed in the previous chapter, since the 1980s, the Saudi 
Kingdom has developed a vision for the conflict based on a comprehensive 
peace. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd launched the first 
Arab peace initiative in 1982, while he was still crown prince. In February 2002, 
following the Palestinian Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (2000), Crown 
Prince Abdullah presented a second peace initiative, which was later endorsed 
by the Arab League and became known as the ‘Arab Peace Initiative’.94  The 
proposal was an explicit expression of the Saudi stance on the conflict and 
offered Israel full normalization of relations with its neighbours in return for 
full withdrawal to the 1967 borders; it did not, however, lead to real 
negotiations. In 2007, King Abdullah attempted to revive the ‘Arab Peace 
Initiative’ during the Riyadh Summit in order to boost a new round of 
negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. 
                                                             
93 http://www.saudinf.com/main/x003.htm 
94 For further details on this initiative, cf. Kostiner (2005). 
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 At the same time, the Saudi Islamic narrative enabled the Kingdom to 
play a crucial role in the inter-Palestinian mediation between Fatah and Hamas. 
As a result of the 2006 elections, Hamas won the majority of seats in the 
Palestinian National Council, with its leader Ismail Haniyah becoming the 
Palestinian prime minister. Hamas’ growing power in relation to Fatah, together 
with the struggle over the new government, created acute tensions. In February 
2007 King Abdullah invited both factions to Mecca to negotiate the terms of a 
‘unity government’. The Saudi King also promised US$ 750 million in aid to the 
unity government (Kostiner 2009). The mediation was a failure, as following 
the Mecca agreement, tensions between the two factions crystallized and led to 
a split in the government: Fatah ruled over the West Bank and Hamas ruled 
Gaza. 
The Saudi vision favouring negotiations was a strategy developed to 
combine the Kingdom’s physical security needs related to its partnership with 
the United States and its identity narrative inextricably related to the support of 
the Palestinian cause. By mediating between Palestinians and Israel, the 
Kingdom was able to actively portray itself as the guardian of the Palestinian 
cause. In the meantime, it conformed to the US narrative by playing the role of 
the maestro of a ‘moderate’ Arab coalition aiming to counterbalance ‘radicalism’ 
in the region. Moreover, by engaging in negotiating intra-Palestinian conflicts, 
the Saudis aimed to lure Hamas back into the Arab fold in order to deprive Iran 
of its influence in the Palestinian question. This strategy constituted a 
compromise for the Al Saud, balancing their interest in bringing Hamas back to 
the Arab camp and limiting the Iranian influence in Palestinian issues without 
controverting the Western boycott of Hamas. More importantly, this strategy 
allowed the Kingdom to maintain a consistent identity narrative. 
As the Palestinian question is at the heart of Saudi identity, the Al Saud 
had to link their strategy with their identity narrative. The late senior Saudi 
Mufti Ibn Baz issued a fatwa stating that peace between Jews and Muslims was 
compatible with shari’a, citing the Prophet’s example. Ibn Baz even issued 
another fatwa permitting Muslims to visit Al-Aqsa mosque as a way to facilitate 
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peace with Israel (Chubin and Tripp 1996, 59). By tying its strategy in the Arab-
Israeli conflict to its Islamic identity narrative, the Kingdom risked a loss of 
credibility in the face of alternative strategies. Which is precisely what 
happened in the run up to the 2009 War: all while relying on a Sunni Islamic 
identity narrative similar to that of the Saudis, Hamas presented an alternative 
vision of the conflict based on the concept of ‘resistance’. It should not therefore 
be surprising that the Hamas vision endangered the stability of the Saudi regime 
identity, as inconsistencies between its claim of support for the Palestinian 
question and its opposition to Hamas’ rejection of the peace process emerged. 
From this perspective, Hamas presented a two-fold challenge to the 
Saudi regime identity. The Saudi elite already condemned Hezbollah’s mode of 
struggle against Israel by relying on a sectarian discourse based on the Sunni-
Shiite divide.  Following this Saudi Self/Other distinction, one would expect the 
Kingdom to support Hamas. However, by presenting an alternative approach to 
the conflict based on armed resistance linked to a Sunni Islamic narrative, 
Hamas questioned the Saudi dedication to the Palestinian cause and, hence, to 
its related identity narrative. In short, Hamas’ Islamic identity associated with 
the resistance endangered the Saudi exclusive identity narrative portraying the 
Kingdom as the champion leader of the Sunni world. 
Hamas regional policies and narrative came in stark contrast to the Saudi 
plea for a peaceful settlement. The Palestinian group has embraced as a 
fundamental tenet the belief that independence and freedom will be achieved 
only through armed struggle. According to Hamas, this is the only logic that 
Israel understands. From this point of view, peace with Israel is not an option 
for Hamas. As Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal stated,  ‘Our enemy only comes 
under pressure when they are under fire and as our rockets hit them they were 
forced to hold talks with us’ (Bakr 2014). Although Hamas has consistently 
opposed peace negotiations with Israel, it has considered the hudna (cease-fire) 
to be a strategic option. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin launched this idea in the early 
1990s. In his view, ‘Islam permits a temporary truce for a limited period with 
the Jewish enemy if necessary’ (quoted in Jensen 2008, 34). Despite Hamas’ 
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moderation throughout the 1990s and after it won the elections, the armed 
struggle against Israel was and remains at the heart of its ideology and raison 
d’être. 
Hamas’ ideology exposed the inconsistencies in the Saudi Kingdom and, 
hence, raised questions about the credentials of its Islamic identity narrative. In 
other words, the stability of the Saudi regime identity and its ontological 
security were shaken. This challenge did not only affect the external dimension 
of the Kingdom’s identity narrative, it exposed this identity inconsistency to 
Saudi public opinion, garnering Hamas admiration among domestic Islamic 
groups within Saudi Arabia. As a consequence, the Arab public, including the 
Saudi one, came to resent the positions of the so-called moderate Arab regimes 
and to largely sympathize with the resistance. Massive demonstrations took 
place in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, as well as in the Gulf, showing support for 
Hamas and virulently criticising the positions of Arab regimes (Pollock 2009). 
In order to escape these inconsistencies in its identity narrative, the regime 
attempted to restore its ontological security through various mechanisms 
aiming at demonizing and Othering Hamas.  
First, the Saudis blamed Hamas for calling the 2009 War upon itself by 
refusing the negotiations with Israel. Indeed, the Gaza War broke out, at the end 
of a six-months ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, as on-going negotiations 
between Israeli and Palestinians failed.95 In other words, the Saudis blamed 
Hamas for being the cause of the Palestinian suffering in Gaza that could have 
been avoided if the organization had complied with the Saudi vision of conflict 
resolution. This Saudi narrative became even more explicit during the second 
and third Gaza wars (2012 and 2014), where the Saudi King explicitly blamed 
Hamas. In 2014, in a stunning statement, King Abdullah called the Hamas-Israel 
war a ‘collective massacre’ caused by Hamas (Batrawy and Al-Shihri 2014).  
Just as the Saudi mediation on the Palestinian-Israeli level failed to 
temper Hamas’ stance toward Israel, the Kingdom’s interference in the intra-
                                                             
95 The cease-fire was from June 2008 through December 2008. 
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Palestinian split also failed. A   few months following the Mecca Accord, the 
situation evolved into a civil war that ended in Hamas’ control of the Gaza strip 
with Fatah remaining in control of the West Bank. Accordingly, the Saudi 
Kingdom considered the Israeli war on Gaza in 2009 to be a direct result of 
Hamas’ failure to unite with Fatah. As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-
Faisal declared, ‘This terrible massacre [from the Gaza war] would not have 
happened if the Palestinian people were united behind one leadership, speaking 
in one voice’ (Erlanger 2009a). 
Moreover, to fend off domestic discontent, the Kingdom attempted to 
portray Hamas as Other by questioning the organization’s religious credibility. 
For example, the Kingdom did not recognize Palestinian causalities as martyrs 
(shahīd), a position clearly reflected in the Saudi media, such as the TV channel 
al-Arabiya (L. Rubin 2014, 110). Second, Hamas was portrayed as an Iranian 
agent undermining the so-called ‘Arab interest’, defined in Saudi terms as the 
peace process with Israel. Finally, the regime relied on the ‘ulama’s religious 
discourse to delegitimize the protests supporting Hamas. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al-
Sheikh96, the grand mufti in the Kingdom, issued a fatwa forbidding protests in 
support of Gaza and describing these acts as ghawghā’iyya [demagogic]. Instead, 
the grand mufti stated that the best way of helping the Palestinians is to send 
aid and financial support (Al-Ifrig 2009). In addition, the Kingdom aimed at 
improving its regional credibility by offering financial support to the 
Palestinians. At the end of the war, the Al Saud offered to donate US$ one billion 
for rebuilding Gaza (Al-Faisal 2009). In short, despite their shared Sunni 
ideology, the Kingdom demonized Hamas and portrayed it as Other. This 
similarity exposed Saudi identity inconsistencies and threatened the stability of 
its regime identity narrative. Moreover, the sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) discourse 
employed by the Kingdom to distinguish and distance itself from the ‘Resistance 
Axe’ seemed loosing credibility.  
                                                             




3. Explaining Syrian Threat Perception 
Whereas the Saudi regime perceived Hamas as a threat despite their shared 
Sunni background, Syrian policies operated based on an entirely different logic. 
Under the secular Ba’ath regime, Syria fostered a strategy that combines the 
oppression of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood at home and support for Hamas, a 
Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza strip. In an 
interview on Al-Jazeera, senior Hamas Leader Mahmoud al-Zahar highlighted 
this paradox: ‘Syria has very good relations with Hamas, but terrible relations 
with the Muslim Brotherhood group. More than 24,000 people [members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood] were killed in 1982 [in Hama] by the Syrian regime’ (Al-
Zahar 2009).  
Although the Syrian regime perceives Islamist movements as its bitter 
enemy at home, this did not impede al-Assad from adjusting its identity in 
response to physical security needs in the run up to the 2009 War. Due to 
Israel’s perpetual military supremacy, the Syrian regime perceived Hamas as an 
asset in its quest to counterbalance the southern neighbour. The regime further 
understood that an alliance with Hamas would allow Syria a strategic depth in 
its struggle against Israel and enhance its leverage in pushing Israel back to the 
negotiation table. Accordingly, Syria’s support for Hamas included providing 
refuge in Damascus to senior Hamas figure Khaled Meshal. In addition, the 
Syrian regime provided the Palestinian ally with arms and military training 
(Karmon 2008, 33–34; Ghadry 2009). All told, in 2009 Syria’s threat perception 
represented a case of ontological security/physical insecurity. 
I argue that Syria’s physical insecurity and its regional isolation 
dominated the regime’s threat perception. This perception led the secular 
Ba’ath regime to support Hamas’ Islamic narrative, an ideology it heavily 
oppressed on the domestic level. Although Hamas’ ideology per se did not 
challenge the Syrian regime identity, alliance with the group held the potential 
of unravelling the contradictions within Syria’s identity narrative. To avoid 
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imminent ontological insecurity, the regime revived an extensive pan-Arab 
discourse that includes support for any other group engaged in a struggle 
against Israel, regardless of its secular or Islamic nature. The first section below 
outlines the regional environment affecting Syrian foreign policy in the 
aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon War up until the 2009 Gaza War. The second 
section examines the ideational accommodation the Syrian regime underwent 
during its alliance with Hamas, where the Islamist narrative converged with 
Syria’s pan-Arab vocation. 
3.1. The Relative Power Distribution: Escaping Isolation 
In the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency, the regional system 
established by Hafez al-Assad collapsed, and Syria became internationally 
isolated and regionally estranged. The Ba’ath regime in Syria became a target of 
the US war on terror under the George Bush administration following a series of 
events that led to a serious fracture in Syrian-US relations: the outbreak of al-
Aqsa Intifada (2000), the 9/11 attack on the United States, and the 2003 Iraq 
War. In addition, Syria became isolated at the regional level following its 
rapprochement with Iran and Hezbollah, which created a rift in Syria’s 
relationship with the so-called ‘moderate camp’. This regional fragmentation 
culminated during the 2006 Lebanese War, when Bashar al-Assad called the 
leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt ‘half-men’ (B. Al-Assad 2006b). Following 
Hezbollah’s performance in 2006, the isolation of the Syrian regime became 
partially alleviated, as international and regional actors understood the al-Assad 
regime’s value in managing Middle East conflicts. This section argues that 
despite these improvements in Syria’s position, it remained under a condition of 
severe physical insecurity. Alongside the constant risk of an Israeli attack, the 
Syrian regime feared a return to its isolation.  
In immediate terms, after the Lebanon War Syria’s influence in the Iraqi 
and Lebanese spheres of conflict made the Ba’ath regime a ‘sought-after player’ 
(Zisser 2009b). As Martin Indyk, a former American Ambassador to Israel, 
stated at the time, ‘Syria is a strategic linchpin for dealing with Iran and the 
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Palestinian issue’ (quoted in El-Khawas 2011). This influence constituted 
Syria’s card in the negotiations with Israel over the Golan. At the same time, 
despite a long history of enmity, Syria moved into a close alliance with Turkey. 
The empowerment of Kurds in Iraq following the 2003 Iraq War gradually 
brought Syria and Turkey together (Hinnebusch 2014, 229). Despite an Iranian 
objection, Turkey even sponsored the renewal of peace talks between Syria and 
Israel in May 2008 (Bronner 2008).  
During the same year, Syria’s participation in the Doha agreement—
which eased the tensions in Lebanon—made Syria indispensable for European 
and US efforts to stabilize the region. As French President Sarkozy broke with 
the US policy of isolating Syria, Bashar al-Assad was invited to the Paris launch 
of the European-Mediterranean Union, with Syria’s accession to this 
partnership on the agenda. The overall improvement in relations was made 
possible by leadership change, as Nicolas Sarkozy replaced Jacques Chirac in 
France and Barak Obama replaced George W. Bush in the United States. The 
Obama administration adopted a more conciliatory approach to the Ba’ath 
regime and opened a cautious dialogue to explore the possibility of improving 
relations (Hinnebusch 2010a). At the regional level, the tensions between Syria 
and Saudi Arabia appeared to ease in 2007, especially during the Arab summit 
in Riyadh when King Abdullah expressed his wishes to restore Syrian-Saudi 
détente (Kabalan 2010, 39–42). 
Although the severe isolation and the regional estrangement of Syria 
seemed alleviated in 2008, its physical insecurity persisted due to its protracted 
geopolitical predicament vis-à-vis Israel. Syria was unable to sustain a 
conventional military balance with Israel as a growing technological and 
airpower gap opened between the two countries. Such an imbalance in Israel’s 
favour is quantitatively evident. Israel was predominant in several aspects, 
including land weapons, air forces, artilleries, arm deliveries, mobilized army 
manpower, and military expenditures. Worse, from Syria’s point of view, this 
Israeli predominance was not only quantitative. After the 2006 Lebanon War, 
Israel sought to make considerable progress in developing the quality of its 
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reserve manpower and making technological advances in conventional military 
hardware (Cordesman and Burke 2008). In the face of this situation, Syria 
sought to consolidate its alliance with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas (Goodarzi 
2013). Moreover, it turned to Russia for arms purchases. From 2007 to 2010, 
the value of Russian arms deals with Syria more than doubled—from US$ 2.1 
billion in 2003 to US$ 4.7 billion in 2006 (Herszenhorn 2012). The continuation 
of Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights remained a constant pressure on the 
Syrian leadership. Unable to recuperate the occupied lands by military means, 
the regime was aware of its inability to compel Israel to withdraw to the 1967 
borders. The only alternative means to achieving this goal was through 
negotiations. 
When the Gaza war broke out in December 2008, the Ba’ath regime saw 
an opportunity to enhance its position in the negotiations with Israel as well as 
in its relationship with the United States. In other words, Syria sought to 
replicate the 2006 Lebanon War scenario, which led to Syria’s reintegration at 
the regional and international levels. By hosting Hamas’ leadership and allowing 
them to maintain permanent offices in Damascus, the Syrian regime 
demonstrated a strong support for the Palestinian resistance during the Gaza 
conflict. On the ground, Syria backed Hamas’ military efforts by relaying 
information on Israeli air sorties that were detected by Syrian Radar 
installations. Domestically, the Syrian regime facilitated a donation campaign 
for the Palestinians in Gaza (ACRPS 2014). Moreover, Syria, together with Qatar, 
spearheaded an effort to convene an extraordinary Arab summit aimed at 
supporting the resistance and bringing the Israeli aggression to an end. During 
the extraordinary Arab summit in Doha in mid-January 2009, 97 Bashar al-Assad 
expressed his full support for Hamas and stated that Israel only understands 
‘the language of blood’. In addition, he called on the Arab world to boycott 
                                                             
97 The divisions among Arab states over Gaza manifested during the preparation for Arab 
summits. Whereas Syria and Qatar pushed for an extraordinary Arab summit in Doha aiming to 
put an end to the Israeli aggression, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states boycotted the 
Doha summit and discussed the Gaza issue one week later in Kuwait during the Arab Economic 
summit (Black 2009b).  
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Israel, to close any Israeli embassies in the region, and to sever all ‘direct and 
indirect ties with Israel’. Furthermore, he announced the suspension of peace 
talks between Israel and Syria (“Bashar Al-Assad Speech in the Doha Summit” 
2009).  
The Syrian support for Hamas cannot be understood without a detailed 
examination of the relative power distribution and Syria’s physical insecurity in 
its geopolitical environment. Developments immediately post 2006 encouraged 
Syria to play a more confident role. Its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah made it 
a regional asset indispensable in solving Middle East conflicts. As Carter 
summarized it: ‘Syria is a key factor in an overall regional peace’ (Carter 2009, 
174). The Syrian leadership employed its support for non-state actors in the 
Middle East as a strategy to manage its regional isolation and acquire leverage 
during the negotiations with Israel to recuperate the Golan Heights. As this 
strategy led to a partial alleviation of Syria’s regional isolation, the Syrian 
regime finally managed to obtain a foothold in-between two networks in the 
region. On the one hand, it was a constituting part of the Iran-led ‘resistance 
axis’, pursuing a policy of defying the West made sustainable by economic 
relations with Asia and renewed economic and military relations with Russia. 
On the other hand, Syria’s relationship with the West was revived, which 
manifested itself in the détente in the relationship with France, the Turkish-
sponsored peace talks with Israel, the cautious dialogue with the United States, 
and the détente with Saudi Arabia. The Syrian regime aimed at maintaining such 
a balance with the ability to tilt towards one camp or the other with the view of 
obtaining benefits from both sides  
Yet, Syria still found itself in an unfavourable physical security 
environment that made it, at the end of the day, inclined to support Hamas in 
2009. Despite the Obama administration’s willingness to open the dialogue with 
the Ba’ath regime, it maintained continuity with Bush’s policy by setting pre-
conditions and making demands on Syria. The United States offered to play a 
role in Israeli-Syrian negotiations, remove Syria from the list of states 
sponsoring terrorism, and lift the economic sanctions, if Syria severed its 
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relations with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. In other words, improving the 
relationship with the United States and the ‘moderate’ axis in the region could 
only come at the expense of depriving Damascus of all its ‘cards’, especially in 
the negotiations with Israel (Hinnebusch 2010a). Unsurprisingly, the Syrian 
regime remained suspicious of US motives and refused to sever its relationship 
with the ‘axis of resistance’. As Bouthaina Sha’ban, al-Assad’s political and media 
advisor, stated, ‘improved relations with the US would not come at the expense 
of Syria’s relationship with Iran (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 19 March 2009).  
Consequently, in 2009 the Syrian regime believed that its ability to 
maintain a dialogue with the United States and leverage over Israel during the 
negotiations stemmed from its ability to influence the political and military 
outcome in Gaza, especially given that the military balance heavily tilted in 
Israel’s favour. Therefore, Bashar al-Assad steadfastly backed Hamas, even 
though this led to the suspension of the Turkish-sponsored negotiations with 
Israel. As former Syrian Information Minister Mahdi Dahlallah explained,  
The most important factor that brought about the change [in U.S. policy] is 
the Arab resistance camp, [comprising] Syria, the Lebanese and 
Palestinian resistance, and the Iraqi people, who refused [to accept] the 
occupation. Additional [factors] are the Iranian position, which refuses to 
accept the [American] hegemony, as well as the new Russian policy [...] 
Had Bush been able [to implement] his policy without meeting opposition 
from anyone, the new administration would have continued the same 
policy [...] The change introduced by Obama […] does not stem from an 
[American] reassessment of its ideology [...] but from [Bush's] failure to 
achieve the goals that the U.S. was—and still is—pursuing [...] [This 
administration simply] realized that it cannot promote the totality of its 
interests in the region without a relationship with the Syrians’ (quoted in 
Hinnebusch 2010a, 26). 
From this perspective, by backing Hamas during the Gaza War, al-Assad 
aimed to advance his position against Israel over the Golan Heights and to 
prevent the United States from demonizing his regime. Syria attempted to 
persuade the United States to abandon the strategy of aligning with the so-
called ‘moderate’ Arab Sunni states as a coordinated front against ‘Shiite’ Iran, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas. In short, the Syrian support for Hamas during the Gaza 
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War seemed tied to Syria’s overall regional security strategy of resisting Israel’s 
regional predominance and US intervention, both of which threatened the 
physical security of the Ba’ath regime. According to Patrick Seale (2009), the 
above strategy was efficient in guarding the vital interests of the Syrian regime, 
as it protected Syria’s sphere of influence in Lebanon and prevented foreign 
penetration. In addition, this strategy countered the US-Israeli hegemony in the 
region by strengthening the Teheran-Damascus-Hezbollah-Hamas axis, which 
continued to steadfastly back the Palestinians. More importantly, the Syrian 
policy blocked the US strategy of reshaping the Middle East, or at least that 
component of it which aimed at bringing down al-Assad’s regime. 
In 2009, Syria’s support of Hamas seemed to result in a slight change in 
US foreign policy toward Syria. Shortly after the ceasefire in Gaza, the Obama 
administration opened a dialogue with Bashar al-Assad, as the regional weight 
of Syria in Middle East issues became evident. In February 2009, four US official 
visited Damascus to negotiate Syrian-US relations (Islammemo 2009). The 
negotiations were over the following issues: the stability of Iraq and Lebanon, a 
comprehensive peace process for the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Iranian-
Syrian alliance. In July 2009, US envoy George Mitchell visited Damascus as a 
prelude to starting the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations (BBC Arabic 2009). 
Despite Syrian and US optimism, however, the negotiations ultimately did not 
produce the intended détente. By the end of 2009, no agreement was reached, 
and the United States renewed the sanctions on the Syrian regime. Furthermore, 
the al-Assad regime was further accused of bombings in Iraq in August 2009 ‬as 
well of fostering the instability in Lebanon. ‬ 
The failure to reach an agreement reinforced Syria’s fear of a return to 
isolation and explains the regime’s insistence on maintaining its alliance with 
Iran as well as its refusal to disassociate itself from Hamas or Hezbollah. In 
other words, it was this physical insecurity that led the regime to capitalize on 
its alliance with Hamas, which was identified as a ‘friend’. The next section 
explores how the Syrian regime’s pan-Arab narrative converged with its realist-
based foreign policy choices. 
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3.2. The Regime Identity Narrative and the Resistance Discourse 
After 1979, the Syrian regime identity had been narrowed from pan-Arabism to 
a ‘Syrio-centric Arabism’, which is a confluence of pan-Arabism and Syrian 
nationalism. Yet, Syria’s physical security needs following the 2003 Iraq War led 
to the reassertion of an inclusive pan-Arab narrative. This return to pan-
Arabism converged with Syria’s new regional struggle against the United States 
and Israel as well as its alliances within the axis of resistance (muqawma) or the 
steadfastness (muman’a) front. Despite this apparent convergence between 
Syria’s pan-Arab narrative and Hamas’ struggle against Israel during the 2009 
Gaza War, this alliance posed a potential source of instability for Syria’s regime 
identity and its ontological security. The secular Ba’ath regime, which 
oppressed the Muslim Brotherhood at home, found itself allying with Hamas, 
which was itself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. The Syrian 
regime avoided this contradiction by reviving an overarching inclusive pan-
Arabism in the context of the resistance against Israel and the United States. 
This section examines the new Self/Other framing Syria’s regime identity 
narrative.  
The pan-Arab discourse was discernible in Bashar al-Assad’s speech 
during the extraordinary summit in Doha. He repeatedly referred to the Arab 
people as ‘the Arab nation’, a term that targeted Arab public opinion. He 
described the struggle between the Palestinians and Israel as a struggle 
between ‘Arab resistance’ and ‘Israeli terrorism’. The following statement 
summarized this pan-Arab dimension: ‘the destiny of Gaza is not that of Gaza 
Citizens alone; it is our shared destiny. The battle of Gaza is the battle of every 
Arab citizen’. From this perspective, Syria’s pan-Arabism was inclusive. The ‘us’-
versus-‘them’ definition depended on identifying Israel as the enemy. In other 
words, the friend/enemy identification guided the Self/Other framing. From this 
perspective, the definition of the pan-Arab Self reasserted an inclusive 
dimension gathering those secular and Islamic groups who fight against Israel. 
al-Assad framed this Arab dimension in the context of the struggle against 
Israel: ‘Israel wants through its aggression on Gaza to change the new realities 
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created by the resistance, especially after the resistance has been victorious in 
Lebanon, stronger in Palestine, and been spread to the consciousness of the 
Arab Citizen’ (“Bashar Al-Assad Speech in the Doha Summit” 2009). On a front-
page article in the government Syrian daily Teshreen, pro-Syrian former 
Lebanese MP Nasser Qandil stated that the Doha summit was a turning point in 
the position of the Arabs, who began to adopt the Syrian discourse: 
President Assad's speech at the summit was a prime example of the new 
[Arab] discourse—a discourse that Syria had used [even] in the midst of 
the crises and wars, and whose [main principles] are adherence to the 
resistance and a quest for partners and sources of power within the 
shifting world [order]. This [will be achieved] by formulating a new Arab 
conception capable of generating alliances with rising regional powers 
that are interested in partnership—especially Turkey and Iran—while 
suspending the [Arab] peace initiative, which has been killed by Israel 
more than once (Teshreen, 5 April 2009). 
 Whereas the Syrian regime depicted its struggle with Israel as primarily 
related to the territory, Hamas portrayed the conflict as one about faith and 
belief. In this regard, Hamas was known for ‘Islamizing’ the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. In Livtak’s words (1998, 149), ‘at the heart of Hamas’ ideology is the 
emphasis on ‘the Islamic essence’ of the Palestinian cause’. Interestingly, Bashar 
al-Assad entirely ignored the Islamic nature of Hamas’ ideology. Hamas was 
even referred to in his speeches as the ‘Arab resistance’ (“Bashar Al-Assad 
Speech in the Doha Summit” 2009). The same struggle against Israel, the United 
States, and the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab regimes was pan-Arab for Syria and 
Islamic for Hamas. Nevertheless, the Syrian regime framed an inclusive pan-
Arabism wherein Islamism fit into the discourse. Such identity fluidity enabled 
the Syrian regime to accommodate its physical security needs.  
Does this mean that leaders can manipulate identity narratives 
whenever and however they need to? No. Leaders can only activate or 
deactivate identity elements already present at the domestic level that provides 
leaders with the ‘menu of choices’. In Syria’s case, adopting this inclusive pan-
Arabism was possible as the domestic audience supported the struggle against 
Israel. Subsequently, the Syrian official discourse that followed during the 2012 
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and 2014 Gaza Wars merits further attention because of the way it shifted with 
the changing political landscape in the Middle East. The Syrian regime’s position 
toward Hamas in the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars only confirmed that the 
resistance axis, including the Syrian-Hamas alliance, was based on strategic 
interests. It also suggests that leaders cannot easily manipulate regime identity. 
At the outbreak of the Syrian uprisings on 15 March 2011, Hamas played an 
ambiguous role and attempted to conciliate the two opposing sides. Once the 
conflict between the protesters and the regime transformed into an armed 
struggle, the Ba’ath regime requested Hamas’ unconditional support in its 
struggle against the revolutionary movements. The Iranian regime even echoed 
this request. When Hams refused to assist Damascus, the Syrian regime 
demanded the departure of Hamas’ leaders from the Syrian capital and the shut 
down of their permanent offices in November 2012 (ACRPS 2014).  
Despite Hamas’ refusal to support the Syrian regime, al-Assad could not 
follow the ‘moderate’ Arab regime in renouncing or condemning the resistance. 
In his inauguration speech on 17 July 2014, the Syrian president insisted that 
his government would remain committed to the Palestinian cause. He did, 
however, make a distinction between the Palestinian resistance and Hamas, 
which he deemed to be a ‘fraudulent’ resistance movement. As the following 
statement summarizes, 
[We are required] to distinguish carefully between the Palestinian people 
who resist, whom we must support, and some ingrates among them [...] 
between real resistance fighters, whom we must back, and those amateurs 
who wear the garb of resistance according to their interests and to 
improve their image and bolster their power. If we do not do this, then, 
consciously or unwittingly, we will be serving Israeli goals (quoted in 
ACRPS 2014, 3).  
In line with this position, the Syrian official media henceforth referred to 
various Palestinian factions as the ‘resistance’ and avoided mentioning Hamas. 
Instead, the media stressed that the faction that allied with the Syrian regime 
represent the ‘genuine resistance’.98 Yet, the Syrian regime could not go further 
                                                             
98 E.g. the Jihad Jibreel Brigades. 
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in condemning Hamas, which reflects the significance of the Palestinian 
question in the domestic struggle for legitimacy in Syria. Following a decade of 
reviving pan-Arabism in the Syrian regime identity discourse, the Syrian 
uprisings reversed this process.  As a consequence, in its on-going struggle for 
survival, the Syrian regime has downgraded pan-Arabism in favour of a strong 
Syrian nationalism (Rifai 2014). 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided further evidence for the utility of a two-layered 
conception of security in explaining the divergent Syrian and Saudi threat 
perception. In 2009, Saudi Arabia, traditionally portraying itself as a supporter 
of the Palestinian cause, condemned the resistance movement, Hamas. It is hard 
to imagine that a non-state actor enslaved in the Gaza strip could pose a threat 
to the Kingdom, even though it received financial support from Iran. The 
analysis showed that the Kingdom’s physical security was not endangered. 
Instead, the stability and distinctiveness of its identity were disrupted. In the 
aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Saudi Kingdom narrowed its 
identity from pan-Islamism to Sunni Islam. Since then, the Kingdom has 
portrayed itself as the leader of Sunni Islam in the region against a Shiite Other. 
Hamas, a Sunni Islamic movement presenting an alternative vision of the Arab-
Israeli conflict to that of the Kingdom, was a source of anxiety and ontological 
insecurity for the Saudi regime. In response, the Kingdom criticized Hamas not 
only for its war against Israel but for its version of Islamic ideology, which was 
described as untruthful. In other words, the Saudi Kingdom redefined its 
identity and presented a new source of distinctiveness (Muslim Brotherhood 
versus Salafi), according to which Hamas is considered to be the ‘Other’. 
 In contrast to its Saudi counterpart, the al-Assad regime supported 
Hamas against Israel, which was perceived as a source of danger to Syria’s 
physical security. In this chapter, I examined the geopolitical situation 
surrounding the Syrian regime. Fearing a return to its regional and international 
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isolation following the failure of the peace talks with Israel, the al-Assad regime 
identified Hamas as a ‘friend’ whereas Israel and the United States were 
identified the ‘enemy’. Based on this physical insecurity, the regime identity 
adopted a broad pan-Arab discourse according to which the ‘us’ includes any 
actor identifying Israel as an enemy, justifying the alliance with Hamas. 
 This empirical chapter contributes to the development of this study’s 
theoretical framework in several ways. First, the analysis of Saudi threat 
perception towards Hamas showed that identity convergence and similarity can 
be source of threat and conflict. Whereas Saudi Arabia was able to reframe its 
identity narrative and distinguish it from the Islamic revolution in Iran and 
Hezbollah using a Sunni-Shiite discourse, the same narrative was not possible in 
the case of Hamas.  Instead, Saudi Arabia further narrowed down its identity by 
stressing the Sunni-Wahhabi element and demonizing the Muslim Brotherhood 
ideology. In other words, this chapter has showed that ontological security 
provides a theoretical lens through which sectarianism can be seen as a source 
of security and distinctiveness for the Saudi Kingdom. This empirical chapter 
provides some insights to examine Saudi behaviour during the Arab uprisings, 
especially towards the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt. 
 Second, Syrian threat perception towards Israel and its alliance with 
Hamas showed how states can hold diverging identities and interests. Whereas 
the Syrian regime oppressed the Muslim Brotherhood at home, they supported 
a group with a similar ideology at the regional level. This case shows the benefit 
of examining identities and interests as separate spheres of analysis. A 
constructivist approach assuming that identities and interests are co-
constituted masks these dynamics. In these cases where identities and interests 
dictate contradictory behaviour, the study showed how the Syrian regime 
reframed and accommodated its identity narrative to conform to its physical 
security. The case also showed that holding contradictory identity and interests 
create a potential for a situation of ontological insecurity, where states face 
‘shame’. Giddens (1991, 65) defines shame as ‘anxiety about the adequacy of the 
narrative by means of which the individual sustains a coherent biography’. At 
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the state level, shame translates into states’ anxiety over the ability to reconcile 
actions with the narrative states use to present their self-identity and justify 
actions at both domestic and international levels. As the Syrian regimes 
supported Islamist movements beyond its borders—namely Hamas— while 
oppressing groups with similar ideology at home could be an insurmountable 
source of shame. To avoid cases of ontological insecurity, the regime had to 
accommodate its regime identity narrative in a way that conforms to its 
material interests. 
 Finally, this chapter contributes to the debate on the role of sectarianism 
in Middle Eastern international relations. It provides empirical evidence that 
sectarianism is a complex process that transcends primordial and 
instrumentalist approaches. On the one hand, Saudi animosity with Hamas—a 
Sunni movement—seemed like a replica of Saudi behavior towards Hezbollah—
a Shiite movement.  On the other hand, Al-Assad’s regime, often depicted as 
Alawi, allied with a Sunni movement. Both cases have showed that threat 
perception is hardly driven by the content of these sectarian identities. 
Likewise, instrumental approaches have failed to provide an answer to this 
enigma. By focusing on power structures, instrumentalist approaches have 
ignored sectarian identity formation or what it means to make sectarian claims.  
Instead, this chapter using ontological security provides a third way to examine 
sectarianism as serving actors’ need of distinctiveness and their security-as-
being. In this way, it examines the processes of sectarian identity formation 






Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule 
proves nothing; the exception proves everything. In the 
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust 
of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.  
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty (1922, 15).  
 
How and why states perceive others as threats and what factors drive the 
process of threat perception remain core issues for scholars of international 
relations. To answer these questions, theories have been designed, refined, and 
applied to a broad range of cases as well as to different regions. These 
intellectual efforts have occupied a central place in IR theory as they explain 
state behaviour and unravel the dynamics of cooperation and conflict. Although 
uncovering the patterns of alliances and coalitions in the Middle East can be an 
intimidating exercise, the study of Middle Eastern dynamics has added to and 
continues to contribute to this theoretical endeavour.  
The claim that Middle East international relations, enmity, and conflict 
have been driven by ideational factors is indisputable. Pan-Arabism, pan-
Islamism, and sectarian identities have shaped regional security dynamics. 
Ideational factors are not only present as trans-national driving forces, but also 
play a crucial role at the domestic level. Supranational, national, religious, 
ethnic-tribal identities not only operate within states, but transcend state 
borders and influence state behaviour at the regional level. In this regional 
context, realist lenses treating identity as secondary have proved limited when 
faced with controversial empirical cases. Likewise, empirical analyses provide 
compelling evidence that focusing on identity while considering material forces 
secondary can be equally misguiding. In a region known to be the most 
militarized in the world, inter-state conflicts and war are still pervasive. 
According to the Global Militarization Index (GMI), six of the top ten countries 
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with the highest degree of militarization are in the Middle East. Nearly all other 
Middle Eastern states can be found among the first 40 positions (Grebe 2014, 6–
7). As Gause (2003, 274) put it, ‘if there is one area of the world where fears that 
a neighbour’s military power could be turned against a state should be high, it is 
the Middle East’. From this perspective, the Middle East, a region where 
ideational and material forces are constantly in play, provides an optimal pool 
for examining anomalies and puzzles that could advance theoretical debates 
about threat perception. 
The existing literature on threat perception is divided between those who 
prioritize identity over material power and those who reduce identity to an 
epiphenomenon or a mere instrument of material power considerations. Here, I 
have attempted to move beyond the ‘either/or’ dichotomy to explore how these 
two phenomena coexist and interplay in the process of threat perception. This 
chapter briefly summarizes the findings. I highlight the implications of the 
argument for the study of Middle East politics and IR theory in general. I also 
discuss some of the limitations and anomalies that this study could not address, 
some of which provide avenues for future research. 
 
 
1. Summary of the Findings  
This study has explored some of the ways in which ideational and material 
factors interplay in affecting and shaping international politics, by focusing on 
how and why states perceive threats based on ideational forces in some 
instances while threat perception is driven by material forces in other instances. 
It has offered a different way of thinking about threat perception by presenting 
a two-layered conception of security: ontological and physical. Whereas 
physical security, dominated by the logic of security-as-survival, is associated 
with military threats that endanger the survival of the state, ontological 
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security, or security-as-being, is associated with those dynamics and processes 
that centre around the reproduction of identity narratives and the maintenance 
of a system of certitude. The purpose has not been to generate a universal 
theory outlining the conditions under which ideational factors override material 
factors or vice versa. Instead, I have sought to advance the debate around the 
ideational/material nexus in threat perception by examining how these two 
distinct layers of security interact leading to divergent threat perceptions. 
 The empirical focus was on Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during 
three major regional wars in the Middle East in an effort to understand how and 
why states diverge in their threat perceptions. The findings from the cases 
suggest that states, or more specifically regimes, perceive their ontological 
security to be threatened when the Other’s identity disrupts the continuity or 
the distinctiveness of their identity narrative, or in one word, their security-as-
being. This logic becomes even more apparent if states’ physical security is not 
threatened. In this situation of ontological insecurity/physical security, states 
tend to restore their identity security through various mechanisms, namely, 
demonizing the Other and reinventing their identity narrative. Their perception 
of the relative power distribution, hence, becomes driven and influenced by the 
need to restore their security-as-being. This logic was dominant in the Saudi 
case. The Syrian case, however, showed that states could experience a different 
situation, that of physical insecurity, as the regime’s security-as-survival is at 
stake due to an imbalance in the relative power distribution. This situation 
becomes even more evident when the regime’s ontological security is stable. In 
other words, the regime is in a situation of ontological security/physical 
insecurity. 
 The study has presented a second argument connected to the first: 
examining how states perceive threats provides additional insights into how 
ideational and material forces interact. Although the two layers of security—
physical and ontological—are distinct and have different logics and dynamics, 
they are systematically intertwined and in constant interaction, which is an 
aspect that is often overlooked in the study of international relations, and of 
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Middle East politics in particular. This study has shown that states fearing for 
their physical security usually reframe their identity narrative to adapt to the 
constraining relative power distribution. Also, states fearing for their 
ontological security can mobilize military and material resources to bolster 
their ideational defensive mechanisms. To illustrate this point, this study has 
made a direct link between two dichotomies corresponding to the two layers of 
security: friend/enemy (physical security) and Self/Other (ontological 
security). According to the logic of physical security, states identify friends and 
enemies based on material forces. Following the ontological security logic, 
states, however, identify the us/them distinction or the Self vis-à-vis the Other 
based on ideational non-tangible factors. By dissociating these two spheres, one 
can come to the conclusion that the Other is not necessarily an enemy. 
Nevertheless, the enemy is necessarily an Other. Any incongruence between 
these two layers of security and their corresponding dichotomies requires 
adaptation and accommodation. 
 If states are in a situation of ontological insecurity/physical security, they 
attempt to restore their security-as-being by framing or reframing the us/them 
distinction. In order to reinforce this distinction, states attempt to mobilize 
material resources and build alliances. To justify this use of resources, leaders 
frame the Other as an enemy or an existential threat. In this case, the Self/Other 
distinction becomes the driver behind the friend/enemy dichotomy. The case of 
Saudi Arabia’s situation during the three wars discussed in this thesis 
exemplifies this dynamic. Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas were all consecutively 
identified as Saudi Arabia’s enemies. This identification followed the us/them 
distinction. Saudi Arabia, the leader of pan-Islam, perceived other Islamists 
movements as a source of disruption for its identity distinctiveness. By relying 
on new sources of distinctiveness, such as Sunni-Shiite sectarian narratives, the 
Kingdom removed these groups from the category of ‘us’ to ‘them’. In order to 
reinforce its identity-as-being narrative, the Kingdom subjugated its 
friend/enemy dichotomy to the ontological security logic. 
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 In the reverse situation, when states experience a situation of ontological 
security/physical insecurity, their identification of friend/enemy needs to be 
congruent with the existing Self/Other distinction. The Other does not 
necessarily need to be an enemy. Nevertheless, the enemy needs to fall in the 
‘Other’ category. If the regime’s alliance decision based on physical insecurity 
concerns generates a friend/enemy dichotomy that is incongruent with the 
us/them distinction, then a particular identity reframing is needed. Otherwise, 
regimes can potentially suffer from ontological insecurity that might evolve out 
of contradictions in the identity narrative. The case of Syria is informative. In 
1979, when the physical insecurity of the regime required an alliance with Iran 
in order to fend off Saddam Hussein’s military ambitions, Syria’s main identity 
narrative was based on Arabism. According to this narrative, Iraq is identified as 
‘us’ and Iran as ‘them’. From this perspective, identifying Iraq as an enemy 
based on material considerations was a clear violation of the regime identity. To 
resolve this contradiction, the Syrian regime reframed the regime identity and 
changed the meaning of Arabism. According to the new narrative, Arabism does 
not identify the us/them based on the ethnic component of ‘Arabness’ but based 
on animosity toward Israel. Thus, because Iran identified Israel as the major 
enemy, it fell into the Syrian ‘us’ category. Likewise, Iraq fell into the Syrian 
‘them’ category as it did not identify Israel as its most important enemy. The 
same adaptation took place in the cases of the Syrian alliance with Hezbollah 
and Hamas. Considering their Islamist background, the Syrian regime had to 
adapt and reframe the secular component in its identity narrative to make it 
more inclusive. In short, the friend/enemy dichotomy identified according to 
the logic of security-as-survival needs to conform to the Self/Other 
identification belonging to security-as-being. Otherwise, states might encounter 
future problems of inconsistencies in their identity narratives, ending up in a 
situation of ontological insecurity.  
 This study has shown that while physical security is obviously important, 
ontological security is just as important, because its fulfilment affirms state’s 
self-identity and determines how a state sees and defines itself vis-à-vis Others. 
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Accordingly, states seek to maintain a consistent self-conception through a 
stable identity narrative. While the costs of ignoring physical security are 
evident, such as wars, arms races, etc., little research has been done on the cost 
of ignoring threats to ontological security. Ignored threats to ontological 
security produce what Steele (2008, chap. 3) has referred to as ‘shame’, 
according to which states recognize how their actions were (could be) 
incongruent with their sense of self. This feeling of shame can produce a severe 
case of insecurity. States therefore attempt to avoid those situations that might 
result into shame. Treating the need for ontological security as a simultaneous 
layer to physical security when examining the Syrian case led to novel empirical 
findings. While contributing to restoring its physical security, the Syrian 
regime’s actions were incongruent with its identity narrative. This incongruence 
presented a potential case of ‘shame’. To avoid this situation, leaders reframed 
their identity narrative so that actions and self-identity narratives become 
consistent. 
 These arguments and findings come together to form the basis of the 
theoretical framework that guided the empirical analysis. As I mentioned at the 
outset of this study, this framework allows for the examination of regimes’ 
threat perception as a phenomenon present at the nexus of ideational/material 
and at the intersection of domestic/structural levels. By themselves, ideational 
or material lenses are insufficient to examine the phenomenon of threat 
perception; examining both layers that exist simultaneously and are in constant 
interaction allows for the drawing of a more comprehensive picture. 
 Saudi threat perception revealed the Kingdom’s steady quest for a distinct, 
consistent narrative of self-identity vis-à-vis other Islamic models emerging in 
the region. The Islamic character of the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), the 
emergence of Hezbollah as an important regional actor during the 2006 
Lebanese war, and the Sunni model of resistance portrayed by Hamas all 
constituted sources of anxiety to the Saudis, as they threatened the stability of 
the regime’s self-conception as the leader of the Muslim World. In these three 
cases, it is safe to say that the physical security of the Kingdom was intact. For 
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decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran was weakened and had no interest in 
launching a war with anyone. In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, the military 
balance was clearly in favour of Israel. Instead, the Saudi Kingdom saw the 
tenets of its identity narrative challenged by these three alternative Islamic 
models, and attempted to demonize them as a defence mechanism. Moreover, 
the ruling elite tried to draw a clear distinction between their identity own 
narrative and these models by reframing the Saudi identity narrative, arriving 
at a new Self-Other distinction. In relation to the Islamic Republic and 
Hezbollah, the Kingdom promoted a sectarian distinction based on the Sunni-
Shiite divide. Henceforth, the Saudi Kingdom portrayed itself as the leader of 
Sunni Islam. Therefore, Hamas, a movement with a Sunni background, 
presented an even more challenging case to the Saudis. To surmount this 
challenge, the regime aimed to demonize Hamas’ Muslim Brotherhood 
background. Saudi threat perceptions in these cases highlighted not only the 
interaction between ideational and material forces, but also the process of 
identity framing and reframing throughout several stages. 
 The case of Syria during the same three instances revealed another 
dynamic in the process of threat perception. As a result of Syria’s geopolitical 
position and lack of resources, the al-Assad regime constantly operated under 
severe conditions of physical insecurity. In 1979, Syria feared a military 
imbalance with Israel and the hegemonic ambitions of Iraq. In 2006 and 2011, 
the al-Assad regime suffered a severe imbalance in favour of Israel. Moreover, 
Syria was regionally and internationally isolated and deprived of any Arab 
support. In these three cases, the physical insecurity of the regime guided the 
Syrian friend/enemy identification. Syria allied with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas 
to balance the source of military imbalance, i.e., Israel, and also to escape its 
regional and international isolation. Nevertheless, these alliances created 
various contradictions in the regime’s identity narrative. The Ba’athist secular 
pan-Arab identity of the regime suffered a potential contradiction in the face of 
the alliance with a non-Arab Islamic regime in 1979. To a lesser degree, al-Assad 
supported two Islamic movements (Hezbollah and Hamas) while oppressing 
193 
 
their Islamic counterparts at the domestic level. Despite their importance to 
Syria’s physical insecurity, these alliances constituted the potential for future 
ontological insecurity, which might lead to shame. To avoid this situation, the 
regime reframed its identity at each stage. In 1979, the regime changed the 
meaning of pan-Arabism, from an identity based on an ethnic origin to one 
defined by the struggle against Israel. In other words, Arabism in the Syrian 
context does not necessarily lead to alliances with Arabs but with anyone who 
supports the struggle against Israel. The alliance with Hezbollah and Hamas also 
resulted in the reframing of Syria’s identity narrative, as al-Assad revived a pan-
Arab discourse to include Islamist movements in the struggle against Israel. In a 
word, Syria’s pan-Arab identity narrative widened and became more inclusive. 
Ultimately, the Syrian case demonstrates that states care about ontological 
security even under severe cases of physical insecurity. 
 The two cases presented in this study constituted extreme cases: Syria 
constantly suffered from physical insecurity whereas Saudi Arabia was in a 
perennial quest for ontological security. This leads us to an important question: 
are some states more prone to suffer from ontological insecurity whereas 
others are doomed to be victims of physical insecurity? On the one hand, Saudi 
state formation has contributed to its ontological vulnerability. The lack of a 
distinctive Saudi identity differentiated from Islam has contributed to the 
Kingdom’s anxiety towards other Islamic models. Nevertheless, the study has 
shown that Saudi identity has narrowed over time from pan-Islamism to Sunni 
Islam. In other words, regime identities are in constant mutation. One can 
expect that the Kingdom will develop a more state-focused identity over time, 
which might lessen the effects of its ontological vulnerability. In the Syrian case, 
the country has suffered from physical insecurity imposed by the geopolitical 
situation. Nevertheless, this physical insecurity is unlikely to last. The ever-
shifting regional alliances might eventually evolve towards enhancing Syria’s 
geopolitical position in the relative power distribution. Moreover, the domestic 
and regional struggle in Syria can pose novel challenges to the consistency and 
continuity of the regime’s identity narrative. Therefore, its situation of relative 
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ontological security might change into one of anxiety and ontological insecurity. 
In short, although these cases constituted extreme situations of insecurity, this 
does not mean that states are enclaves in perennial states of physical or 
ontological insecurity. On the contrary, the second part of the argument shows 
how the interaction between these two layers of security keeps states’ 
vulnerabilities in constant mutation. States can alternate between possible 
combinations of ontological and physical security (see figure 2, p. 70).  
 Moreover, the cases presented here have shown that ontological and 
physical security can affect each other through interaction. Ontological 
insecurity can create or reinforce physical insecurity. In the Saudi case, in 
responding to ontological security needs the Kingdom pursued a foreign policy 
behaviour that endangered its physical security. In 1979, to restore its 
distinctiveness and identity difference in the face of the ontological challenge 
from Iran, the Kingdom allied with Saddam Hussein in his war against the 
Islamic Republic; concurrently, the Kingdom discursively framed the Islamic 
revolution not only as a threatening Other, but as one that was physically 
threatening and endangering the Kingdom’s interests in the region. The 
Kingdom, in other words, pursued a foreign policy based on a particular 
perception of the relative power distribution, which was necessary to affirm its 
ontological security. As a result, conflictual relations with Iran preserved the 
Kingdom’s ontological security, but endangered its physical security. As Mitzen 
(2006) argues, states may remain in conflict and can sacrifice their physical 
security if it preserves their ontological security. Physical insecurity may also 
lead to ontological insecurity. In the Syrian case, restoring physical security led 
to situations of ontological insecurity, as the regime pursued a foreign policy 
that partially contradicted its identity narrative. In order to avoid possible 
situations of ‘shame’, the regime adapted and reframed its identity narrative. 
2. Lessons for IR Theory and Middle East International Relations 
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This thesis makes significant empirical and theoretical contributions to Middle 
East international relations and broader IR theory. The study’s major 
contribution is in showing that the treatment of ideational factors as a function 
of material forces or vice versa has obscured the myriad ways in which both 
aspects are in constant interaction. Moreover, relying on the ideational versus 
material argument obscures the dynamics of threat perception and hinders 
explanations as to why states diverge in this regard. This study has put forward 
a theoretical framework based on a two-layered conception of security. A major 
contention of the thesis has been that relevant literature on threat perception in 
both the realist and constructivist theoretical frameworks has overlooked the 
co-existence and the interplay of ideational and material forces in real-world 
events. Rather than being confined by the ‘–isms’, this research has aimed to 
advance the debates around substantive mid-range theories by adopting an 
eclectic approach driven by empirical puzzles.  
This study contributes to the broader IR literature by providing an 
integrative conceptual framework that bridges and links together the specialist 
literature on ontological security, Self/Other relations, and realism. My analysis 
both complements and challenges in important ways major international 
relations theories, including balance-of-threat theory, regime security 
approaches, constructivism, and securitization theory.   
First, the analysis adds specificity to Walt’s balance-of-threat theory. 
Although Walt (1987) claimed that states balance against the greatest threat, 
his theory did not specify how threat are perceived or how ideational and 
material power considerations play out simultaneously in this process. My 
analysis addresses this issue by showing how ideational and material spheres 
coexist in each case of threat perception. Moreover, by focusing on threat 
perception as a dependent variable, the analysis has considered other relevant 
foreign policy behaviours beyond alliance formation, such as identity reframing 
and the consolidation of existing alliances. 
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My argument has important similarities with and differences from 
regime security approaches (cf. Gause 2003). Scholars writing in this vein 
suggest that leaders will resist both external and internal threats to the survival 
of their regime. My argument obviously shares this focus on the dual levels of 
threat perception. Regime security approaches focus on transnational 
ideologies and their diffusion as the ultimate source of ideational threat, 
proposing that leaders often fear that these ideologies will transcend borders 
and lead to domestic unrest and instability. I however demonstrate that threats 
to identity can operate in many other ways. The analysis here shows that the 
Other’s identity can be also threatening as it drives actors to question their own 
identity. Moreover, identity similarity with the Other may threatens actors’ 
identity distinctiveness and consistency. These threats are external, but they 
also relate to domestic vulnerabilities. From this perspective, identity threats 
emerging from the interaction with the external Other can lead to domestic rifts 
and struggle as the identity narrative that holds the political community 
together is threatened. From this perspective, looking at the separate dynamics 
of ontological and physical security has allowed the analysis to delve further 
into this concept of ‘regime security’, which has many meanings and dynamics 
beyond the ones already identified in the literature.  
Barnett’s constructivist account offers the most direct challenge to my 
understanding of the ideational sources of leaders’ threat perception. 
Consequently, his account of Arab politics constitutes the principal competing 
argument to my own. Focusing on the ontological security layer allows us to 
understand the role of identity from another angle, one that is different from the 
one presented by either the constructivist approach or the rationalist-
instrumentalist approach to identity. Despite sharing with constructivism the 
notion that state identities are constructed, a theoretical account that privileges 
ontological security takes a step further by providing an insight into what 
motivates states in their actions. Whereas constructivists argue that interests 
and identities are co-constituted, ontological security answers the questions of 
why they are co-constituted. By addressing the question of why states want to 
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affirm their self-identity, or even why they pursue a foreign policy that 
conforms to their identity narrative, ontological security provides a more 
comprehensive analysis. In addition, ontological security shows why and how 
shared identities can be source of conflict and enmity, a relationship that has 
been observed in previous works on Middle East international relations but 
rarely investigated (Walt 1987; L. Rubin 2014; Barnett 1998).  
  Moreover, the present analysis has the potential to contribute to critical 
security approaches, in particular to securitization theory. The latter points to 
the process by which issues are transformed into security issues, i.e., are 
securitized. Securitization is a successful ‘speech act’ through which actors 
construct others as existential threats, enabling a call for urgent and exceptional 
measures to deal with the threats (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; Waever 
1995). Dissociating ontological and physical security has many merits that 
contribute to the development of securitization theory. My analysis has shown 
how ontological security—and its associated Self-Other definition—can affect 
physical security and its associated friend/enemy dichotomy. This type of 
interaction is similar to the dynamic exaplicated by the concept of 
securitization. Actors promote a Self/Other definition and tie it to a 
friend/enemy dichotomy, so that the Other is not simply ‘different’ but is an 
existential threat that requires the mobilization of all resources. The 
dissociation of ontological and physical security contributes to a better 
understanding of both securitization and desecuritization processes (Rumelili 
2015). Moreover, the interaction between physical and ontological security 
informs the question of how and why the securitization process is initiated in 
the first place, an underveloped area of inquiry within critical security studies 
(Sjöstedt 2013, 146). 
 Beyond its theoretical contributions, this study makes important 
empirical contributions. I have shown that a serious engagement with IR theory 
can lead to a new understanding of established historical narratives of past 
events in Middle East international relations. The thesis contributes to the 
debate on the role of identities in the Middle East, which is divided between 
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primordial and instrumental approaches. This study has presented a middle 
ground and a novel theoretical entry based on ontological security. First, I 
counter the primordial approaches that have predominated in the analysis of 
Middle East alliances, and which portray the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis as a 
‘Shiite axis’ and the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Jordan alliance as a ‘Sunni axis’. Instead, 
I have argued that sectarianism emerged as a defensive mechanism employed 
by actors whose ontological security was endangered. Second, this study also 
shows that a rationalist-instrumentalist approach to identity obscures those 
cases where identity is the major driver behind state behaviour. Moreover, the 
theoretical framework presented here may explain other instances in Syrian or 
Saudi foreign policy. For example, the ontological security lens provides an 
insight as to why the Kingdom perceived the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to 
power in Egypt as a threat. In addition, the theoretical framework presented 
here can inform the study of alliance decisions taken by other Arab states—such 
as Iraq (pre-2003), Jordan, and Egypt—where there is evidence of ideational 
and material interplay. 
3. Unresolved Anomalies and Avenues for Future Research  
My study also has notable limitations, some of which suggest areas that deserve 
further study. Five issues stand out. First, the argument may be limited in terms 
of the types of behaviour it explains. It cannot explain all cases of threat 
perception, as it focuses on those particularly driven by relative power 
distribution and identity narratives. Moreover, the ideational forces I have 
considered are mainly limited to regimes’ identity and their effect on threat 
perception. Culture, ideas, and other ideational factors that might contribute to 
threat perception and state behaviour are not accounted for in this study.  
 Second, the argument tells us little about the sources of the replacement 
identity narratives that are central to restoring or maintaining ontological 
security. My argument shows how leaders frame and reframe their identity to 
cope with ontological or physical insecurity, but I have not delved into the 
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sources of these identity narratives or why particular narratives emerge among 
others. The case of Saudi Arabia is relevant in this respect: namely, why did the 
ruling elite frame their identity narrative to be distinctive from their Iranian 
counterparts using a sectarian Sunni-Shiite reference, whereas the Arab/non-
Arab distinction, like the one Saddam Hussein used, could have served the same 
purpose? I am far from asserting that leaders can enforce any random identity 
narrative. Instead, this identity narrative should be socially accepted and figure 
within the existing social and historical structures. That is an important part of 
the story that takes place in this process of restoring security, and it certainly 
deserves more attention in future research. 
 Third, the argument is limited to non-democratic contexts or, in other 
words, to authoritarian regimes where authority is centralized in the hands of 
the elite in power. I have told the story of specific elites perceiving threats to the 
survival of their regimes while possessing some power to control their societies. 
From this perspective, some threats might be perceived by the elite but not be 
understood as such by the subject society. For example, the Saudi people and 
social groups did not share the regime’s perception of Hamas or Hezbollah as 
threats. A similar situation could be found in Egypt and Jordan. From this 
perspective, the role of domestic institutions in allowing the regime this sort of 
independence from domestic forces has not been considered. Also, divided 
societies, where no one powerful elite is in control, are also outside of the scope 
of this research. Nevertheless, as stated in the previous section, this thesis 
makes a contribution to the dynamics of interplay between ideational and 
material powers beyond authoritarian regimes. For this framework to be 
applied in democratic or semi-democratic contexts, a different account of how 
domestic and regional spheres interact would be necessary. Ideational and 
material factors interplay is a phenomenon that exists beyond autocratic 
regimes and beyond the phenomenon of threat perception. As Risse et al. 
(1999) show, national identities and interests interacted in European states’ 
decision to join the European Economic and Monetary Union. They examine 
how the interaction between national identities and interests led to divergent 
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policies in the cases of Germany, France, and Great Britain. In other words, the 
interaction between identity and relative power distribution in this study can 
inform similar processes in other democratic and autocratic countries. For 
application to democratic contexts, domestic structures as well as regional 
interactions might require an adaption of the assumptions underlying the 
theoretical framework. Moreover, as democratic regimes operate differently, 
the sources of threats affecting their ontological and physical security can be of 
different nature.  
 Fourth, the argument does not consider the weight of dynamics at the 
international level in regimes’ threat perception. The Middle East is often 
referred to as the most ‘penetrated’ system, as it is deeply influenced by 
international interventions but not fully subordinated (Brown 1984, 16–17). 
Both bipolarity during the Cold War and the Pax Americana after 1991 have 
influenced regional politics in myriad ways. To examine this influence, 
Hinnebusch (2003a, chap. 2) distinguishes between interactions at the 
international system level, or the ‘core’, and those at the regional level, or the 
‘periphery’. This study did not, however, make this distinction explicit. 
International actors and their influence on regimes’ threat perception were 
accounted for only at the empirical level, such as the Saudi-US partnership. The 
dynamics of the international system and their influence on regional 
interactions were not theorized. Future studies should explore to what extent 
this international level of analysis systematically influences regimes’ threat 
perception in Middle Eastern international relations. 
Fifth, the research design did not allow for variations in within-cases 
comparisons. Although the case studies were chosen based on variation in the 
dependent variable, within-case comparisons presented similar cases on the 
independent variables (ontological and physical security). Syria during the 
three wars consistently evinced a situation of ontological security/physical 
insecurity. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia consistently experienced ontological 
insecurity/physical security. Further research should examine states that 
alternate between these situations. Another defect in the research design is the 
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absence of empirical cases that reflect the situation of ontological 
insecurity/physical insecurity. The argument does not tell us how states would 
behave in this case or how they would prioritize between different types of 
threats. Would the state sacrifice ontological security for the physical or the 
other way around? Ontological security scholars claim that ontological security 
is far more important, and that states can sacrifice their physical security to 
satisfy their self-conception (e.g. Steele 2008). In contrast, neorealists argue 
that leaders’ understanding of the danger posed by other actors in the system is 
primarily the product of relative power distributions. This position can be 
summarized in Waltz’s (1986, 329) claims that material power considerations 
‘weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures’. 
Further studies should examine empirical cases where states had to choose 
between ontological and physical security to test these hypotheses. 
 In this study, I aimed to examine threat perception as a process in Middle 
Eastern international relations. By integrating ontological and physical security 
in an eclectic framework, this study has provided a theoretical model that 
facilitates the exploration of ideational and material forces as well as their 
interaction in the process of threat perception. By bridging the literature on 
ontological security, Realism, and Self/Other relations, this study has prepared 
the ground for further research. Such research can be developed in two ways. 
 The first is through widening the scope of the theoretical argument by 
applying it to other cases. Potential cases may include Jordan, a small state 
where physical security has been important, but where ideational factors have 
also been significant in holding together various domestic groups. Jordan could 
serve as a potential case for examining how states prioritize between 
ontological insecurity/physical insecurity. Another interesting case to examine 
is Egypt, where threat perception towards Iran constituted a cornerstone in the 
country’s foreign policy for decades. The examination could involve looking into 
the factors that led to the regimes’ threat perception. Egypt is a rather 
homogenous country with no Shiite minority. Why was Iran, a geopolitically 
distant country, identified as a threat? Moreover, why did the Mubarak regime 
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perceive Hamas as threat while deemphasizing Egyptian animosity towards 
Israel? This study has answered many questions on threat perception in the 
Middle East but raises many more. 
  A second way to move research beyond the scope of this study is to 
examine other dimensions in the process of threat perception, by addressing 
some of the limitations discussed above. For example, how do states prioritize 
between ontological and physical security? How do they choose among the 
available possible identities? Does threat perception operate differently in 
divided societies? 
 The Middle East constitutes an important pool of empirical data for 
fruitful theoretical frameworks that could be extended to other areas, such as 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia (cf. Solingen 2007). Moreover, it is an important 
repertoire to test and build theoretical arguments that contribute to the 
development of IR theories. In the previous two decades, many scholars with 
expertise in Middle East politics have noted the schism between Middle East 
area studies and mainstream International Relations and Comparative Politics. 
Nowadays, the common perception that the Middle East is too exceptional to be 
theory-relevant is diminishing. During the last decade, scholarly trends have 
shown that the Middle East is increasingly studied under the lens of theories 
produced by non-Middle East specialists. Instead, the Middle East can serve a 
more important role than theory application. It has the potential to be in itself 
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